Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

47. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research (Arneson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 2, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Intelligence Note: Showdown Near in Cuba

The chances for a peaceful solution to the Cuban political crisis appear to have vanished. On March 10, 1958, the 26 of July Movement of Fidel Castro, the dominant revolutionary group, rejected Catholic Church mediation efforts and two days later issued a manifesto to the Cuban people declaring all-out war on the government and warning that beginning April 1 all transportation in Oriente Province and the payment of taxes must cease; that on April 5 a campaign of extermination of all persons serving the Batista regime will begin; and that a call for a general strike is to be expected as the ultimate act which will overthrow the government. In reply to this challenge Batista has again suspended constitutional guarantees and apparently intends to ask congress for emergency powers.

With these developments the situation has become more rigid. Most opposition opinion seems to have crystallized on the demand that “Batista must go,” leaving no room for compromise. Moderate middle elements have either withdrawn from political activity or aligned themselves with the opposition, and a showdown involving violence and blood shed appears inevitable. Batista is dependent on the armed forces and organized labor, whose leaders remain loyal, to maintain his position. His support among the rank and file of these organizations is much less certain.

Should the 26 of July Movement be successful in its attempt to overthrow the Batista government, there is little about its top leadership to inspire confidence that it would show the qualities of integrity, moderation, and responsibility which will be needed to restore order and tranquility to Cuba. Although the evidence available to the Department does not confirm the Cuban government’s charge that Castro is a communist, it does suggest that he is immature and irresponsible. His chief lieutenant in the Sierra Maestra, the Argentine Dr. Ernesto Guevara, makes no secret of his anti-American feelings and shows definite indications that he has been subject to Marxist influence.

From this contest for power, a possible third alternative to a continuation of Batista, or the installation of a revolutionary regime dominated by Castro, could be the emergence of a military-civilian junta which would oust Batista but not permit Castro a dominant position.

A similar memorandum has been addressed to the Under Secretary.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4–158. Official Use Only. Initialed by Arneson. Copies were sent to G, C, S/P, ARA, P, and SCA.
2. At a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee on April 2, recent developments regarding Cuba were discussed. According to the notes of that meeting drafted by William McAfee of INR: “General Schow noted that the embargo on shipments to Batista had given the impression that this government was supporting Castro. Mr. Arneson pointed out that the action had been taken sometime ago and the hope was that its suspension would not become public information. He stated that the embargo did not imply that the Department favored Castro, that the Department continued to be deeply worried over his orientation and over what he stands for; Mr. Arneson commented in this connection on the suprisingly favorable press which Castro has enjoyed in this country. The Navy called attention to arrangements which are being made for the protection, by United States Marines, of the water supply at Guantanamo Bay.” (Department of State, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, IAC Meetings)