Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cuba ¹

Washington , March 31, 1958—6:56 p.m.

536. As your suggestions to GOC (Embtel 606²) are in nature purely informal advice short of intervention you should not comply Guell’s request you submit them in writing (Leonhardy’s telecon with Amb March 29³), but should again summarize verbally points Deptel 526,⁴ emphasizing friendly advice character your conversations.

You should also make clear to Guell that there no change in US policy toward GOC. Reiterate that our continuing policy requires careful consideration arms shipments to any part of world where unusual tensions occur. In Cuban instance our actions, implementing policy, are dictated in large part by Cuban developments resulting in GOC’s new resort March 12 to strong [arm] methods and sudden abandonment constructive steps toward negotiations that would explore at least possibilities for peaceful formula. GOC’s actions following Castro’s declarations almost eliminate prospect for time being of alternative to widespread disorder. This view also is illustrated by Church’s discouragement (Embtel 610⁵) as result of GOC’s apparent inability make any effective effort convince influential sectors Cuban public opinion it sincerely seeking constructive solution by such steps as Embassy and Department has proposed, some of which GOC seemed to have accepted (Embtel 536⁶), or to find any other workable formula.

It would seem from here that if Castro won’t negotiate, GOC could at least partially isolate violent rebels and strengthen peace possibilities by clear cut declaration of its objective to establish propitious climate for constructive solution, including elections satisfactory to majority of people (as distinct from apparently sterile repetition of determination to hold honest elections which GOC obviously bound to win with opposition hamstrung by conditions it considers prevent it from participating). Such declaration could include for example hopes for truce from violence to enable GOC carry out negotiations with representatives of responsible institutions and opposition elements to define such climate and how achieve it (Deptel 526). It is realized of course decision on such move and appropriate timing is entirely up to President Batista.

FYI Any other suggestions for feasible formula even at this late date to prevent needless bloodshed, protect US interests and future relations with Cuba, and in which we may properly assist, would also be welcome for study here. End FYI

Within long-established US policy and under terms of MSP legislation, as long as only prospect now in sight is one of force, we must continue to give careful consideration to all arms exports to that country. This fully accords with Department’s understandings with Embassy, set forth in Tab A of Memorandum to Secretary of January 17⁷ outlining your instructions concerning conditions in Cuba which would permit arms shipments.

In light of above suggest continuing consultations with GOC on possibility it may yet create such conditions, and advise Dept for consideration of appropriate reply to Cuban memo (Embdes 740⁸).

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–3158. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wieland and approved by Snow who signed for Dulles.
2. See footnote 6, Document 43.
3. No record of this conversation has been found.
4. Document 43.
5. In telegram 610, March 28, Smith stated that the Embassy had learned that members of the Church hierarchy decided it “would be useless to do anything at this time, as they are convinced Castro will not accept conciliation.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–2858)
6. Document 34.
7. Document 5.
8. See Document 40.