Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

421. Memorandum for the Record by Robert F. Packard of the Policy Planning Staff¹

Washington, January 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Discussion of the U.S. Policy toward Cuba and the Dominican Republic at the Planning Board on January 11, 1960

CUBA

At the outset Mr. Gray described the conditions under which these subjects were to be discussed at the meeting of the Planning Board and presented by the Acting Secretary at the meeting of the Council to be held on January 14. His description appeared entirely consistent with the arrangements which had been worked out previously between himself, Mr. Merchant and Mr. Smith. In addition, he stated that it should be possible for these subjects to be discussed at subsequent meetings of the [National] Security Council if the presentation and discussion this coming Thursday indicates such further discussion to be desirable.

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs—

1. Mr. Gray inquired whether the reserves and production of nickel in Cuba would, if more freely available to the Soviet Union or Communist China, constitute a problem of sufficient strategic importance to be raised in the Council along with other problems of major interest concerning Cuba. He referred to a “Memorandum on the Importance of Cuban Nickel to the Nation’s Security”, dated January 6,² which had been made available to him by Langbourne Williams of the Freeport Sulphur Corp., and which he in turn had tabled at the meeting of the Planning Board on January 6.³ At the conclusion of the discussion of this matter, and at the suggestion of Mr. Smith, he concluded that this was not such a problem but rather a matter only of additional possible interest.

(a) In commenting on the Williams memo, CIA pointed out that the figures in it appeared to be at least ten years old. CIA’s estimate is that Soviet reserves of nickel ore are adequate to Soviet needs and that the denial of Cuban nickel to the Soviet Union would not have a strategic effect upon the Soviets. In fact, the Soviets appear to be exporting some nickel to their satellites and to Communist China. The Soviet problem is one which arises from the relatively low grade of nickel ore available in the Soviet Union. Cuban ore is of higher quality and its availability to the Soviets would therefore be an asset to them. The Chinese Communists appear to have a greater need than the Soviets. The volume of nickel which may now be sold to the Soviet Union free of COCOM controls would appear to be adequate to meet their needs.

(b) OCDM pointed out that Canada is the major free-world producer of nickel—about 75% of the free-world’s production. Cuba produces around 10%. The United States is now taking only about two-thirds of the Canadian production and the strategic requirements of the U.S. would not be adversely affected by loss of Cuban nickel.

2. Mr. Gray inquired whether there are other strategic U.S. interests (other than psychological and political interests) in Cuba in addition to retention of our Naval base at Guantanamo.

(a) Mr. Irwin of Defense pointed out that our strategic military interests in Cuba are both, (1) far broader than merely the retention of the Naval base, and (2) inseparable from the political and psychological aspects of our situataion vis-à-vis Cuba. All present agreed not only with Mr. Irwin’s response but with the general propositions that Communist control of Cuba—either by the USSR or indirectly—would be intolerable.

3. Mr. Gray asked that the Department’s presentation deal with the question of the point at which indirect Communist control of Cuba, short of Russian intervention, would require U.S. intervention.

4. Mr. Gray noted that Congressman Hosmer of California had announced that he would introduce a Resolution to reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine in the light of the Cuban situation. Mr. Gray was curious as to how the President might respond to inquiries concerning such a Resolution.

JCS—

1. General Campbell requested guidance as to how the military should anticipate the possibility of a Cuban attack on the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay and what military action would be appropriate in response to such an attack. The military are concerned whether they should augment their forces at the Naval base now.

Defense—

1. Mr. Irwin summarized the several questions in his mind concerning possible U.S. intervention in Cuba, i.e., whether to intervene, when, where and how (covertly or overtly).

Bureau of the Budget—

1. Mr. Reid noted that the Mutual Security Act provides that the U.S. may not continue to provide economic assistance in the face of expropriation. He raised the question whether we will be able to continue to apportion aid funds in the absence of a specific Presidential exception within the terms of that legislation.

Justice—

1. Mr. Riley stated that the Attorney General is most anxious to receive guidance as to the extent of his Department’s prosecution of both anti-Castro and anti-Batista groups and individuals who violate U.S. requirements for registration, arms export, etc. He noted that his Department is proceeding impartially under the law and wondered whether this had become, or would become, embarrassing to the Department of State.

Treasury—

1. Mr. Weitzel pointed out that the Customs Bureau faces the same problem as that presented by Justice.

2. In addition, he stated that Treasury hopes that the presentation at the NSC would deal with the questions, (a) what is to be done with respect to our support of Cuban sugar production; (b) should the U.S. attempt to anticipate and prevent further expropriation; (c) should the U.S. attempt to discourage the provision of economic assistance to Cuba from other sources, e.g. international financial institutes, other countries, etc.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

PROBLEMS AFFECTING BOTH CUBA AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The Special Assistants for National Security Affairs and the OCB—

1. Both Mr. Gray and Mr. Harr hoped that the Department’s presentation at the Council would deal with the entire spectrum of U.S. aid to both countries.

2. In view of the Vice President’s concern that Congress would act quickly concerning the Cuban problem, Mr. Harr inquired as to what manner of legislative queries had been received by the Department so far.

JCS—

1. General Campbell was concerned as to how long the Department estimates it will be possible to restrain the British and others from exporting arms to the Caribbean area.

Robert F. Packard⁴

1. Source: Department of State, ARA Special Assistant Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba Planning and NSC Briefings. Secret. Drafted by Packard. The source text does not list the participants in the discussion.
2. A copy is attached to the source text, but not printed.
3. A copy is attached to the source text, but no record of discussion at this meeting has been found.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.