410. Memorandum of Discussion at the 429th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 16, 19591
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
With respect to Cuba, Mr. Dulles said he would deal only with the new stance of that country’s foreign policy and its closer ties with the Afro-Asian Bloc. These closer ties were accented by the return of “Che” Guevara who recently visited Yugoslavia and nine Afro-Asian countries and who felt Cuba could pick up trade and political support among these countries. There were various other indications of a Cuban attempt to establish closer relations with the Afro-Asian Bloc. For example, a recent statement by a Cuban before the United Nations had called the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. twin evils. The UAR was promoting the sale of cotton to Cuba. There were also indications that Cuba was about to suggest a conference of twenty-eight underdeveloped countries. Cuba was also drawing closer to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The Soviet exhibit would soon be moved from Mexico to Havana and Rojas plans to go to Communist China in January.
The Attorney General asked how after Castro had delivered a seven-hour harangue before a court demanding a death sentence for [Page 704] an accused man, the court could give the accused only twenty years.2 Mr. Dulles said in his view Castro probably told the court quietly to mitigate the severe penalty which he publicly demanded. [6 sentences (12 lines) not declassified] The Attorney General said it was hard to understand the logic of Castro in asking the court publicly to impose a death penalty and then asking the court privately to mitigate this penalty. He would have thought the Cuban people would have said, “Castro is not as powerful as we thought he was.” Mr. Allen said this procedure permitted Castro to proclaim that the Cuban courts were independent.
Mr. McCone asked whether there was any conservative element left in Cuba. Mr. Dulles said there was still a considerable conservative element in the country, but it did not dare to be vocal and was not well organized. Important opposition leaders were out of the country and there was no organized opposition internally. The only armed force ready to oppose the Castro regime was a foreign legion now in Santo Domingo. Only ten per cent of this force was Cuban; the remainder consisted of soldiers of fortune. Mr. Dulles felt it would be unfortunate if there were an expedition against Cuba originating in the Dominican Republic. There were many anti-Castro groups in Florida and on the Caribbean isles willing to take action against Castro, but they were not organized.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
4. Topics for Future Discussion or Consideration by the National Security Council
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
Cuba. Secretary Dillon said the problem of Cuba was extremely complex and delicate, not only because of action taken with respect to Cuba, but also because of the psychological reaction to any actions which might be taken. Since there had been continuing discussions between the President and the Secretary of State with respect to Cuba, Mr. Dillon believed that the Planning Board should not be hasty about taking up Cuban policy until the President and the Secretary of State returned. In any event, the problem of Cuba should be handled under special security precautions. The Vice President did not believe that Cuba should be handled in a routine fashion through normal diplomatic channels. Congress was an important element in the situation. The Administration must try to guide Congress and not simply react to proposals which may be made in Congress. He urged that between [Page 705] now and January 6 supplementary studies of U.S. strategy toward Cuba should be undertaken. Mr. Gray said there was disagreement within the Government on the basic approach to the Cuban problem. The Treasury’s suggestion for a paper on Cuba had been deliberately provocative, that is, intended to elicit discussion. Mr. Gray felt that certain elements in the State Department, particularly Assistant Secretary Rubottom, opposed Planning Board work on Cuba. The Vice President said that when Congress reconvened there would be a great assault on the Administration’s Latin American policy. Heavy criticism of that policy was coming from the Republican as well as the Democratic members of Congress. In his view a discussion of Cuba could not be avoided. The problem would soon have far-flung implications beyond the control of the Department of State; and any tendency of State Department officials to attempt to delay action would not be appropriate. Secretary Dillon said he was concerned that a strong attitude which this Government might assume in order to satisfy public opinion would not achieve basic U.S. objectives with respect to Cuba. The Vice President recalled that some State Department officials had earlier taken the position that we would be able to live with Castro. No doubt radical steps with respect to Cuba would create an adverse reaction throughout Latin America, but we needed to find a few dramatic things to do with respect to the Cuban situation in order to indicate that we would not allow ourselves to be kicked around completely. The Attorney General remarked that his Department could be either tough or lenient with respect to anti-Castro elements operating in Florida. He needed policy guidance, however, before specific instructions could be given to FBI agents in the Miami area. Mr. Gray said that a discussion of Cuba by the Council would not mean that the policy would be rewritten in detail, but only that the problem would be discussed on the basis of a paper prepared by the Planning Board, which would be seized of the problem only for the purpose of preparing a discussion outline. Mr. Scribner said Treasury had suggested the question of Cuba not necessarily for the purpose of changing the policy or interfering with State’s conduct of our relations with Cuba, but for the purpose of discussing the problem. Secretary Dillon said he had no objection to a discussion of Cuba, but he thought the matter should be handled as a delicate one without wide dissemination of knowledge that it was being discussed. The Vice President felt that Assistant Secretary Rubottom and the Planning Board could probably agree on what matters it would be appropriate to discuss. He repeated his fear that the problem was getting beyond the normal diplomatic province. Secretary Dillon suggested that the Planning Board might go ahead with the preparation of a Discussion Paper. The Vice President felt this was a good solution and added that we should not advertise the fact that we regard the situation in Cuba [Page 706] as a crisis situation. The Attorney General indicated that from 30 to 40 FBI agents in the Miami area were spending all their time on Cuban affairs, but were having some difficulties because they did not know whether it was our policy to permit anti-Castro activities to continue in Florida or whether such activities should be stopped. Mr. Dulles felt the question of whether anti-Castro activities should be permitted to continue or should be stopped depended on what the anti-Castro forces were planning. We could not, for example, let the Batista-type elements do whatever they wanted to do. However, a number of things in the covert field could be done which might help the situation in Cuba.3
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs. The Vice President presided at the meeting.↩
- Reference is to Fidel Castro’s testimony on December 14 in the trial of Huber Matos, which was summarized in telegram 1391 from Havana, December 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1559) The Embassy’s evaluation of the trial was contained in telegram 1398 from Havana, December 16. (Ibid., 737.00/12–1659)↩
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As a result of this discussion, the National Security Council agreed (NSC Action No. 2166–b–(1)) that, subject to consideration by the President, a “Discussion Paper on Cuba should be prepared by the Department of State and discussed in the Planning Board under special security precautions prior to its submission to the NSC.” (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) On December 23, Gordon Gray met with the President to report, among other things, on the discussion that had occurred at the NSC meeting of December 16. (Memorandum of conversation by Gray; Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Meetings with the President)
In a memorandum of December 23 to Secretary Herter, NSC Executive Secretary Lay indicated the President had that day approved NSC Action No. 2166–b–(l). (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5902 Memoranda)
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