Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

407. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Military Interest in a Policy Paper on Cuba

Ed Vallon informs me that Mr. Smith (S/P) has been asked by Defense for “a policy paper” on Cuba on the grounds that the military will sooner or later be called upon to help.

This appears to be a further aspect of the phenomenon about which we have talked several times of late: The military’s puzzlement about what they conceive to be the Department’s policy or lack thereof; the tendency of at least some of them to take an overtly tougher, if not interventionist, attitude toward Cuba and Castro, which they equate; and the consequent wish of some military elements to have the NSC and/or OCB go to work on Cuba and the Caribbean to develop with their participation a policy document.²

In part, this phenomenon may be due to the fact that senior Defense and JCS officials do not know either that we have a definite policy or what its nature is. You will recall that when we first put our paper³ up to Mr. Murphy (before it went on to higher realms) we asked not only for approval but for specific authorization to transmit it on a “need-to-know” basis to Ambassador Bonsal, Mr. George Allen, Mr. Allen Dulles, and to Defense. At the time, Mr. Murphy ruled against papers being transmitted but indicated he would take the matter up orally. Since then, Ambassador Bonsal and Mr. Dulles have been given the substance of our aim and position, and Mr. Allen has been cued in on the role USIA could play, but Defense is, so far as I am aware, still not on our current wave length.

It seems probable that we will have continuing difficulty unless we do something to clear up the situation, although we will have to be most careful that the military do not misinterpret or over-interpret our position and keep our basic attitude on a strictly “need-to-know” basis. It is also important that the military be thoroughly impressed with the necessity that the U.S. avoid undoing the rift developing between Castro and Co., on the one hand, and the Cuban people and the rest of Latin America on the other, by actions or words which would transform it into a Cuban-American rift.

My proposals would be:

a) That you ask Mr. Merchant to give the substance of the position to Mr. Gates privately.

b) That you go along with Mr. Merchant and/or Mr. Smith in the near future to the JCS to explain the position and brief them about the current Cuban situation.

c) That Mr. Merchant, Mr. Smith, and you all endeavor to persuade Mr. Gates and the JCS to keep our basic attitude and position to themselves, but that they take steps to get their subordinates to lay off trying to develop papers and policies on Cuba in the NSC–OCB and elsewhere at this time.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1059. Secret. Drafted by Hill. Copies were sent to Mallory and Gerard Smith.
2. This was a sentiment shared by some members of the NSC staff. In a memorandum of December 3 to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, Samuel Belk, on behalf of fellow staff members, wrote that a paper on the Cuban problem should be discussed by the Council during the President’s absence. Belk mentioned the Department’s reluctance, expressed at recent Planning Board meetings, to have a policy paper written on Cuba because “the situation at present is too fluid” and “great flexibility is needed to handle U.S.-Cuban relations.” Belk wrote he and his colleagues believed the time had come for high-level decisions on some outstanding issues between the two countries “which will be of continuing importance to the United States regardless of the kind of government we have in Havana,” such as the sugar problem, the Guantanamo base, and the Nicaro facility. (Eisenhower Library, Project “Clean Up” Records, Cuban Situation)
3. Document 376.
4. Written on the source text is the following: “I will do. RRR”. On December 29, Merchant telephoned General Nathan F. Twining and suggested that the Department of State and Joint Chiefs resume their regular Friday morning meetings. Merchant suggested that they meet on January 8 at the Pentagon and that “it might be useful to have a discussion on Cuba and, if they are interested, on other problems in the Caribbean as well.” Twining agreed. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, December 29; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–2959) Regarding the January 8 meeting, see Document 419.