Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

405. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)¹

Washington, December 4, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Observations Concerning Cuba and Our Current Policy Towards It

During my period of consultation in Habana last week, which included consultation with the various members of the Country Team, I made a number of observations which migh be useful in the implementation of our policy over the next few months.

1. Attitudes Towards the Castro Regime and the Revolution. Observations and discussions on the ground bring out more clearly than reading or listening in Washington that Cuba is not sharply divided into pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups. Actually, there are three general groupings in Cuba: the first being a diminishing group of elements prepared to follow and support Castro and his clique unreservedly; the second consisting of a large number of people who retain hope in Castro and the stated aims of his Revolution, but are increasingly concerned about the direction it is taking; and a third composed of elements, largely from the processing [propertied?] classes and from the Batista and previous administrations, who are anti-Castro. In the current phase, it is the second rather than the third group which appears to be growing most rapidly, as there appears to be a marked emotional reluctance among many Cubans to face up to the fact that their union with Castro is turning out badly. Perhaps this reaction is most vividly illustrated by a report made to us by an American professor who witnessed the hysterical jubilation which swept over the University and the rest of Habana when a false report was received that Camilo Cienfuegos, the lost Army Chief, was found: the students were not only happy because the moderate and smiling Cienfuegos was popular, but hysterical because for many of them his “discovery” removed momentarily gnawing doubts that something sinister and ugly was going on in the Castro hierarchy. They wanted to believe that the Revolution was still pure and idealistic. If one were to single out factors underlying this tendency to cling to hope in Castro, the more prominent would be (a) the impact that real honesty, courtesy, and idealism in government, especially at the working level, has made on the people; (b) the fact that a great bulk of the Cubans, although increasingly apprehensive about methods, have awakened enthusiastically to the need for social and economic reform; and (c) the absence to date of alternative leadership which could serve as a repository for the new idealism. It is true, of course, that the process of disillusionment already started might greatly accelerate with uncalculable results, especially as so much depends on Castro’s ability to stay on the right side of the thin line between a national symbol of hope and an impractical buffoon.

The policy implications of the foregoing attitudes for the next few months would appear to be these:

(a) Any group, or coalition of groups, which can hope to supplant the present Castro gang can gain acceptance for the movement only on the basis of continuing the Revolution with more practical management and less national, socialist, and Marxist contact. For the present, elements associated with a “conservative” return to the status quo ante are unlikely to have appeal, even if they were not too closely associated with Batista.

(b) If such a group comes to power, the United States will have to be prepared to face up to the necessity of countenancing and even cooperating with a lot of aspects of the Revolution which are not wholly palatable. While a successor regime might be more in line with us on international and Communist issues and somewhat more moderate and free enterprise in outlook, it will continue to operate under a mandate that the government and not private initiative should bring about quickly the desired social transformation. This may mean, for instance, that U.S. investments will still not be handled entirely correctly and that U.S. aid will be expected for projects and programs which we would not ordinarily support.

(c) For the present, the United States must disassociate itself as much as possible from elements which would be considered as rushing to undo the Revolution and, in particular, seek to have the more notorious Batista elements leave Florida.

2. Economic Situation. While, particularly with the last Cabinet shifts, there appears to be growing realization in Habana that the regime is hell-bent on establishing a national-socialist economy, with the State taking over an increasing share of both production and distribution, it would be a mistake to believe that the errors that the Castro regime is making by the standards of classical free-enterprise economics will necessarily bring an early economic collapse. Even superficial observation of activity in Habana reveals the extent to which WPA-like public works cushion and postpone the impact of certain economic measures. One is struck also with the fact that as long as sugar sales hold up and workers directly and indirectly dependent on the sugar industry do not increase consumption, the backbone of the Cuban economy is not too much affected by the Revolutionary program. Further study is required before we would be justified in assuming that the actual economic situation (as distinct from psychological factors) will have a great bearing on the situation in 1960.

3. Actual or Potential Opposition. Despite increasing concern in Cuba about the course that Castro is taking, there is as yet little organized and purposeful opposition to his regime and, in particular, there appears to be no opposition group within the country which has any real hopes or plans to overthrow or take control of the Government in 1960. The principal actual or potential opposition forces of the country may be catalogued as follows:

(a) The Autenticos, under Tony Varona, are quietly but with some effect building up their organization. They have been particularly active in the labor movement, where along with the Catholics, they are credited with successfully resisting Castro’s insistence on a “unity” which would have brought card-carrying Communists into the CTC Executive. Varona, who broke a leg in a car wreck, is concentrating through his newspaper and TV appearances on the election issue. He is said to have definitely broken with Prio, and has direct contacts with other groups. However, he appears to have no “in” with any organized segment of the Armed Forces and no armed underground. He is thus not in a position to seize power if anything happens, or to initiate revolutionary action.

(b) Sanchez Arango has a smaller group than Varona and is apparently in close contact with Betancourt and Figueres. Although his aims and tactics are parallel to those employed by Varona, personal rivalry tends to keep them apart.

(c) Monte Cristi group, including Justo Carillo in Cuba and Col. Barquin in France, has kept together, but apparently is at the present stage largely a directorate without an organized following. Barquin lost prestige with the old professional officers’ corps, now disbanded, by his quick surrender to the Castro forces, but is still in a better position than most to rally this element.

(d) Catholic Labor and Youth organizations are reported to have vigorous, young leadership—many of the classmates of the 26th of July. They have done excellent although not mass-scale work in labor, and are now reportedly organizing a Christian Democratic Party. Their limitation is the limited appeal that denominational movements have in Cuba.

(e) Ex-26 of July. There is a growing body of “moderates” who have been removed in the various purges from responsible Government positions or expelled from the Government altogether. There are indications, although only limited concrete proof, that they have sympathizers still within the “26th of July” movement in the Armed Forces and government, especially in the provinces. This element is as yet apparently not organized, and its political leadership at the moment appears more disheartened than determined to do anything.

(f) Ex-“Batista” Elements, especially discharged officers, soldiers, and government employees constitute numerically probably the largest source of clear-cut opposition to Castro. Some of them have formed small guerrilla-outlaw bands in the provinces. However, the combination of the lack of effective organization and leadership and of the lack of any positive appeal at this time seriously limits their political effectiveness.

In addition to the foregoing, it should be noted that the Castro regime has not established full control of University students and of the labor movement. While these, at this time, cannot be said to be actual or potential opposition elements, their degree of independence from dictatorial control may be said to be an asset to non-Castro forces.

The immediate problems facing the opposition are, basically, (a) how to bring the various actual and potential opposition groups together and (b) how to get adequate support within the Armed Forces and, possibly, also the labor movement by undercutting the Castro leadership. There now appears to be no overall concept among them as to how this should be done although several aspects of the problem are becoming clear:

1. Greater unity, at this stage and probably through much of 1960, can only be brought about on the basis of carrying forward the Revolution; this means that the ex-Batista elements would, at best, have to be in the background.

2. Greater unity can only be brought about, in the immediate future, on the basis of a loose coalition—possibly some sort of “Democratic Revolutionary Directorate” representing the various factions—since the materials and leadership for making a single strong anti-Castro movement are unlikely.

3. No leadership now in exile appears to have the potential for attracting sufficient support to take control of the situation.

4. Initially at least, opposition cannot openly be directed against Castro himself and has to be directed at the failures and excesses of the Revolution and at the extremist elements on whom Castro relies.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–459. Secret. Drafted by Hill and Devine. The source text bears a drafting date of December 7. Copies were sent to Lester D. Mallory and Wieland. The source text bears the following handwritten marginal note: “A thoughtful analysis—well done. RRR”.