402. Memorandum of Discussion at the 426th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, December 1, 19591
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
Turning to Cuba, Mr. Dulles said the appointment of “Che” Guevara, an Argentine soldier of fortune, as head of the National Bank was a blow to those who thought the Cuban Government would not move toward the Left. Mr. Dulles thought we must now be prepared for radical moves to seize the financial products of the sugar crop. He [Page 684] noted also that the new Minister of Public Works was probably a Communist. Although Castro had appeared to suffer a mild set-back in a recent meeting of the Cuban Labor Federation, his hand-picked candidate, who in the past had worked closely with the Communists, had been chosen Secretary General of the Federation. Mr. Dulles characterized the situation in Cuba as gloomy.
Secretary McElroy inquired whether Castro was engaged in setting up a Communist government in Cuba. Mr. Dulles said Cuba was drifting toward Communism. Secretary McElroy said that in view of the assistance Castro is getting from the U.S.S.R. and from Communist China, it appeared to him that Cuba was becoming more and more Communistic. Mr. Dulles said the U.S.S.R. was being very clever in not permitting its interest in Cuba to be openly identified. For example, Mikoyan had decided not to go to Cuba. Secretary Herter believed the U.S.S.R. did not want to be identified with any steps tending toward Communism in Cuba because it was convinced we would take action against an identifiable Communist government in Cuba similar to the action we had taken in Guatemala.
Secretary Anderson asked whether the U.S. did not buy most of the Cuban sugar crop. Mr. Dulles said the U.S. bought about half the sugar crop and provided the Cubans with about two-thirds of their income from the sugar crop. Secretary Anderson pointed out that when Mossedegh began to take action contrary to Western interests in Iran, the Western countries ceased to buy oil from Iran. He felt we might consider a similar proposition with respect to Cuban sugar if the Cuban Government appears to be about to go Communist, whether by design or accident, and we want to discourage such a development. At present it appeared that the U.S. was supporting the price of sugar while permitting Cuba to confiscate American-owned property. Secretary Herter said that Congress would be taking up the sugar problem inasmuch as the sugar quota is up for renewal. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Cubans had not yet seized sugar properties. The President did not see how Castro could gain very much by seizing current revenues. Mr. Dulles doubted that the actions which solved the Mossedegh problem in Iran could be applied to Cuba because there was not enough production of sugar world-wide to permit such a solution. Secretary McElroy thought that if the subsidy to sugar ceased, we could buy all the sugar we needed on the world market. The Vice President asked whether the purpose of the subsidy was to obtain sugar or to support Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the purpose was to support Cuba. Secretary Herter said any suggestion by the Administration that the sugar subsidy be stopped would be interpreted as an effort to push Cuba downhill. He felt that any pressure for changing the sugar subsidy [Page 685] should come from Congress. Secretary Dillon said the sugar interests planned to suggest that the President impose a tax on sugar equal to half the subsidy, to be used to pay for seized properties.
Mr. Dulles reported that Guevara’s assumption of his new position was the first step toward a nationalization of the Cuban banks and the issuance of bonds to bank depositors.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Boggs on January 26, 1960.↩