Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

361. Instruction From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts in the American Republics¹

CA–2424

Washington, September 15, 1959.

SUBJECT

• United States Information Policy Toward the Castro Regime in Cuba
• Joint State–USIA.

Background

The Executive Branch of the Government of the United States has, since the present Cuban Government came to power last January, followed a carefully calculated policy of exercising restraint and patience in its public statements and actions regarding Cuba, seeking to avoid any impression that the United States is hostile to the regime of Prime Minister Fidel Castro or unsympathetic to the achievement within Cuba of the proclaimed humanitarian objectives of the Revolution which he heads. The United States Government has, in particular, sought to avoid statements or actions which singly or cumulatively would suggest or imply a systematic campaign against Castro. On the rare occasions that it has been necessary to make statements or or take actions which could be construed as less than sympathetic to Castro or his regime, these invariably have been the result of actions taken by Castro which the United States could not publicly ignore, such as measures affecting American property or interests in Cuba, violations

by the Castro regime of the basic principles of the inter-American system, or damaging misrepresentations by Castro about the United States.

The United States policy of restraint and patience has been designed to achieve a number of objectives. By late 1959, this Government, while recognizing the increasing repugnance of the Cuban public towards the excesses of the Batista Government and the popular desire for the restoration of democratic processes, was also seriously concerned about the anti-Americanism then already evident in Castro’s “26th of July” movement, about indications of Communist leanings among important elements of the movement’s leadership, and about the probability that the coming to power of Castro’s radical revolutionary group would seriously disrupt the social, economic and political stability of Cuba.

When Castro emerged as the victor of the Cuban Revolution, achieving overwhelming popular support among the Cuban people and colorfully capturing the imagination of a large segment of hemisphere opinion, it necessarily became an objective of United States policy to establish a climate free of hostility in which Castro could demonstrate any disposition he might have had to conduct normal and friendly relations with the United States, while at the same time giving a maximum opportunity for moderate elements friendly to the United States to exercise a tempering influence on the Castro Government. It thus became important from the point of view of both Cuban-United States and hemispheric relations that the United States avoid statements or actions which could be interpreted as being unjustifiably hostile to Castro or his Government, thus depriving Castro of any valid excuse for using the mantle of patriotic resistance to United States intervention as a cloak for the imposition of extremist social and economic theories on Cuba, for infiltration of the political and military institutions of Cuba by direct and indirect Communist influences, and for the systematic fomenting of anti-American sentiment among the traditionally friendly people of Cuba. It has been, in short, an important objective of United States policy insofar as public opinion is concerned to establish that any unsatisfactory state of Cuban-United States relations does not derive from the inflexibility and intransigence of the United States but from policies and attitudes which Castro himself adopts.

A corollary objective has been to assure that when disillusionment about Castro and many aspects of his program and government should set in, it should come initially and principally from Cuban, Latin American, and independent sources rather than from any public statements or actions of the United States Government seeming to attack Castro and his Cuban Revolution. It is already evident that in Latin America and even in Cuba the first enthusiasm about the Castro Revolution and its anti-dictatorship claims has waned in important respects, and that public opinion is increasingly focusing on certain adverse aspects of the present Cuban situation, such as:

(a) The Democracy vs. Dictatorship Question: Although Castro achieved power as the most vivid symbol of the anti-dictatorship trend of Latin American opinion and has continued to hold up the anti-dictatorship banner in his domestic and international relationships, his regime has taken on characteristics which are suspiciously like those of a dictatorship itself. Among them are Castro’s evident contempt for electoral and parliamentary processes for expressing and controlling the execution of the popular will; his disregard of independent judicial safeguards for individual liberties and human rights against executive abuse; his use of deliberately induced fear to control the mass media; and his pretensions—similar to those of many modern authoritarian leaders—to embody in himself and his movement all legitimate popular aspirations. These tendencies are illuminated for hemisphere opinion by such episodes as Castro’s overriding of those court acquittals he does not approve, by arbitrary mass arrests and other forms of intimidation of all real or potential opposition, and by demonstrations such as the recent July 26 rally which recall the practice of other 20th Century dictatorships to organize emotional mass support in lieu of submitting to elections based on rational discussion.

(b) Export of the Cuban Revolution: Important segments of Latin American opinion appear at first to have been sympathetic to the carrying out within Cuba of Castro’s revolutionary program and to have applauded the new Cuban Government’s assumption of a role of leadership against the remaining dictatorships. However, there now appears to be a growing realization that Castro and his entourage view themselves as the forerunners of a new type of social revolution which is to sweep the Caribbean and Latin America; that for this purpose they have disregarded and attempted to discredit the OAS and the principles of non-intervention and sought to appeal to Latin American public sentiment over the heads of Government; and that despite denials, they have actively supported revolutionary expeditionary forces in efforts to overthrow other Caribbean Governments.

(c) Communism and the Cuban Revolution: Largely through the efforts of the press, there has been increasing awareness throughout the hemisphere that there exists a real problem in the attitudes of Castro and his Revolutionary leadership towards Communism, in the inter-relationships between the immediate objectives of international Communism in Latin America and Castro’s immediate aims, and in the degree of infiltration and influence of the Cuban Communist Party in the Castro regime. Although interpretations continue to differ widely throughout the hemisphere as to the extent and significance of the influence of the Communist Party in Cuba, there appears to have been some awakening to a realization that the Castro Revolution has adopted a course of at least limited ideological and practical collaboration with Communism for immediate objectives similar to that of Arévalo of Guatemala, Allende of Chile and the like, distinct from the non-Communist Latin American social revolutionary trends represented by Betancourt of Venezuela, Figueres of Costa Rica, the APRA of Peru, and the moderate elements of the Mexican and Bolivian Revolutions. The extravagant and uncritical propaganda support given to Castro by Communist and pro-Communist groups in most Latin American countries may also be a factor in the awakening of moderate opinion to the implications of the spread of Castro’s concepts of revolution and anti-Americanism in terms of the advancement of Communist objectives at the expense of indigenous Latin American social, democratic trends as well as moderate and middle class interests.

Conclusion

It is to the interest of the United States that the tendencies of Latin American opinion to become skeptical of Castro on the issues of dictatorship, intervention, and Communism be intensified and accelerated. Whether the end result of the pressure of Latin American opinion on these issues is to cause Castro to adopt more acceptable attitudes and courses of action or to reduce his public support, the United States objective of isolating and eventually eliminating the undesirable aspects of Castro’s Revolution will be served. It remains important, however, particularly at this stage, that any awakening public skepticism about Castro retain the appearance of being an indigenous Latin American reaction and that the overt statements and actions of the United States singly or cumulatively give no semblance of an effort on the part of this Government to discredit Castro.

USIS Responsibility

There may be exceptional opportunities in which USIS officers, principally the PAO and Information Officer, can help by personal contact or otherwise to achieve the above-outlined objective. In such instances, PAO’s should seek the prior specific approval of the Chief of Mission and coordinate any action with other members of the country team concerned. It is the intention of this Government that any information which may assist in focusing Latin American opinion on the negative aspects of the Castro regime shall not be attributed to any U.S. Government source and that there shall be no evident U.S. Government connection with its origin. PAOs must assure that the utmost caution is used in making such information available to foreign nationals, e.g., individuals controlling mass communication media. The only exception, of course, would be statements or materials publicly issued on the authority of the U.S. Government or its responsible officials.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/9–1559. Secret. Drafted by Hill; cleared in draft with Snow, Orville Anderson, Stevenson, Philip Burns, Katherine Keany (USIA/IAL), and James Halsema (USIA/IOP); and approved by Richard Phillips. Sent to Havana for information only.