351. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs’ Special Assistant (Hill) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Rubottom)1
SUBJECT
- “Social Revolution” in Cuba
Mr. Dillon’s memorandum2 on Governor Munoz Marin’s idea that there is a “Social Revolution” going on in Cuba moves me to raise a question in view of the fact that this idea appears to be widely accepted not only in the hemisphere but is widely reflected in certain newspaper articles and books on Cuba in this country. The idea that Cuba is going through a desired and overdue “social revolution” is also not without conscious or subconscious influence within this Government in influencing our attitudes and policies.
This idea of a Cuban desire for “social revolution” appears to me in danger of being accepted as an article of faith without a really hard look at the evidence. Without questioning the fact that application of our American humanitarian standards to the Cuban scene spotlights the need for a richer and more equitable social, political and economic structure or the fact that many thoughtful Cubans of all orientations are aware at least theoretically of the need for change and modernization, what political forces in Cuba are really behind “social revolution”, especially Castro’s experiment?
There are basic political facts that should not be lost sight of. Despite Castro’s pronouncements at Moncada in 1953 and later in the Sierra Maestra about his program, the Cuban support that his Revolution received before Batista’s flight and the welcome that his victory received this January were both extended because of opposition to the elements of dictatorship, dishonesty and atrocities in the Batista regime. There appears to be no evidence that any significant elements of Cuban society were motivated to any important extent by a desire for “social revolution” in rallying to Castro’s cause. This raises a basic question in our orientation towards Cuba: was there in fact any strong desire for “social revolution” in Cuba prior to January 1 and, if one has been whipped up now, how profound is it and how much staying power does it have?
[Page 585]Analyzing this a bit further, one should take the following into account:
*3 Although the distaste left in practically everyone’s mouth by the Batista regime’s conduct, especially in 1957–59, tends to obscure it, there was a considerable though un-ideological “social revolution” in Cuba in the twenty-five years of what may be described as the Batista era. The recognition and growth of labor unions and social legislation gave a new status and outlook to urban labor; the growth of commerce and minor industry and attendant growth of the professions strengthened the Cuban middle classes and middle class mentality to a point perhaps unique in the Caribbean area; the introduction of the income tax and reforms, especially under World War II emergency powers, tended to set Cuba more permanently on the road to social revolution; the expansion of commercialized agriculture expanded opportunity in rural areas and at one stage an agrarian reform was attempted; massive public works projects and building booms during the time of high sugar prices alleviated unemployment. The extent to which Batista can claim credit for this social revolution and the extent to which he may have retarded [it] by political and economic abuses is a matter for historical debate. The fact seems to be that despite the continued prevalence of poverty and unemployment when Castro landed in 1956 there appears to have been no substantial or revolutionary dissatisfaction in Cuba on the score of social reform or desire to take radical measures.
*The almost complete apathy of the Habana working class to Castro until almost the last, its refusal to participate in Castro-sponsored strikes, and its acceptance of Batista tends to indicate that until Castro’s victory there was no deep-seated desire to launch into a “social revolution”. The question now is to what extent does the popularity of the Castro program reflect the natural response to untested demagoguery and promises and to what extent Castro may have appealed to a latent and unarticulated desire for social change.
*The moneyed class of Cuba has certainly showed neither ideological or economic interest in a social revolution under either Batista or Castro.
*As a whole, the middle classes, whose support of Castro was on the basis of middle class democratic political ideology, are giving increasing signs of disenchantment with his social and economic program and the ideology which underlies it. For the moment, of course, the necessary fashion is to attack the methods and endorse the objectives, but one wonders whether at the bottom the real issue is not the ideology which undergirds the whole Castro program.
If there is substance in the above, the question arises: who really wants social revolution in Cuba. The obvious answer is that it is that minority of the middle class constituting young radical students and ex-students and intellectuals, almost always Marxist—Nationalist—and anti-American orientated and sometimes also of Communist coloration. This element, especially in Latin America, tends to be the most articulate and boldest element in the society and its formulation [Page 586] of national goals tends by sheer weight of unchallenged repetition and propaganda to be accepted by uncritical domestic and foreign opinion as the real goals of the society.
The consequences of acceptance by the United States that there is a burning desire in Cuba for social revolution, if this is not really the case, are very serious indeed. In perhaps its most basic sense, the problem confronting us in Latin America is to help the responsible elements of the middle classes emerging from the inevitable processes of social change to establish firmly democratic and economically flexible societies, which necessitates their holding off the doctrinaire statist radical minority and the latter’s Communist allies and inciters.
If, in what would seem a shortsighted and opportunistic effort to ride along with the currents of Castroism, we would give the impression in Latin America that we accepted and wanted to help the Castro Revolution succeed, we would in effect be helping Latin America’s radical student-intellectual element to establish ascendancy over the processes of change at the expense of the elements which are potentially the United States’ best friends.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8–659. Drafted and initialed by Hill and addressed also to Snow. There is no indication on the source text that Snow saw the memorandum, but Rubottom wrote the following comment in the margin: “Very thoughtful. Show to Hank Ramsey—copy to Emb. Habana for comment.”↩
- Supra.↩
- The asterisks throughout appear in the source text.↩