349. Airgram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State1
G–9
The Department’s attention is invited to the fact that with reference to the item “Crucial Months for Castro” in the July 22 issue of the Department’s Secret publication Current Foreign Relations,2 the Embassy takes a slightly different and more optimistic view of the Cuban situation than that reflected in this article. Specific points of difference follow:
The Embassy does not feel that there has been a “swing to the left”. The Communist influence has been present in the revolutionary movement from January 1 on. It is sufficiently strong and widespread to be a cause for serious concern. While it is not declining, there is little indication that it is making significant gains at present. It is worthy of note that the leaders who seem to have marked pro-Communist tendencies, notably Raul Castro, “Che” Guevara and Nunez Jimenez, all categorically deny that they are Communists, and that Fidel Castro considers such charges to be calumnies. These men are anti-American, and in many respects they seem Communist in their thinking, but they should not be written off yet as definitively lost to the Communists.
[Page 581]It is certainly true that the PSP has assiduously devoted itself to attempts to infiltrate the Cuban labor movement. It is also true that the Communists have won some offices in the local unions and some in the National Labor Federations in which elections have thus far been held. It is equally true, however, that the PSP has not achieved the results it hoped for and that it has encountered frequent, sometimes forceful, opposition from non-Communist elements within the labor movement. The labor movement is in fact the one sector in which 26th of July spokesmen have openly attacked the Communists as such.
It is in the armed forces rather than in the ranks of labor that the Communists have their strongest infiltrations. Fidel Castro has publicly admitted to the presence of some Communists in the armed forces. He claims to know who they are and to have them under control so that they cannot engage in political activities. This is not altogether reassuring in the light of the pro-Communist tendencies of military leaders Raul and “Che”.
Cuba’s economic outlook is admittedly not promising for the period just ahead; on the other hand, it is not entirely dark. The Embassy doubts that the Government will face an economic crisis as early as November or that it will resort at any time soon to the devaluation of the peso.
With respect to the provisions in the Agrarian Reform Law for payment of expropriated lands, the Embassy does not view these as a sign of anti-Americanism, but is inclined rather to accept as sincere the Cuban Government’s defense of these provisions on the ground that it is not in a financial position now to make just, prompt and effective compensation and that for revolutionary reasons it cannot postpone agrarian reform until its finances improve. This explanation, however sincere, does not of course make the provisions any more satisfactory from our standpoint.
Reference in the last paragraph of the article to the awakening of governmental and public opinion to the “true nature of the Castro regime” is confusing and perhaps misleading. The Embassy, which has been observing the Castro regime with closest attention from the beginning, does not know the true nature of the regime. In many respects it is the most hopeful regime Cuba has ever had; in others, particularly its anti-Americanism and its complacent tolerance of Communism, it is also the most disturbing. The Embassy continues to feel there is a good possibility that in its attitudes toward the United States and toward Communism, time and experience will bring about an improvement.
The Castro regime seems to have sprung from a deep and widespread dissatisfaction with social and economic conditions as they have been heretofore in Cuba and to respond to an overwhelming demand for change and reform. The universal support it has received [Page 582] from the humble and the lower middle classes is a witness to the strength of this compulsion. Similar conditions calling for reform probably exist in many other countries of the hemisphere. If Cuba is any indication, rightist, oligarchic governments in Latin America may be overturned in the not distant future by popular revolutionary movements which in the beginning at least establish extremist, socialistic governments. Under these circumstances the United States should perhaps be looking for a new formula that can win the confidence and support of such governments until they can be guided into more moderate channels. If we turn our back on them we risk pushing them into the arms of the Communists. What seems to be called for rather is forbearance and a resolute and sustained effort to understand and help and influence them. The outstanding accomplishments of the United States in the way of freedom, of representative government, of equality of opportunity, and of success in providing a high standard of living for all, should give us a great advantage over the Communists in appealing to emerging governments that aspire to these same privileges and benefits for their own peoples.
The Embassy realizes that its view may be influenced by its proximity to the Cuban situation, and that the Department is in a much better position for an overall perspective. To the extent that the Department shares the views herein expressed, however, it might be helpful, because of the possible influence of the referenced article on the thinking of U.S. representatives in other countries, if the next article relating to Cuba could bring out a little more the hopeful features of the situation.