Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

336. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State¹

Havana, July 16, 1959—1 p.m.

133. For Rubottom. From source which I believe reliable am informed that Castro is concerned over US-Cuban relations and that he has strong belief US probably planning secretly bring about his overthrow. He would like to come to some “terms” with US in order reduce tension without sacrificing Cuba’s sovereignty, without damaging revolution, and without embarrassing Castro. Castro’s belief apparently based on much unfavorable publicity in US, on handling of Diaz Lanz case, on Admiral Burke statement,² et cetera.

According to same source, Castro’s worries increased by report from Sergio Cabro of Prensa Libre of conversation he had with me July 13 in which I told Cabro I was much concerned at continued unjustified attacks on US by prominent Cubans and in Cuban press, particularly press of July 26 Movement. I made similar statements to Felipe Pazos on July 11 and hope that these also reach Castro. Dihigo arrived evening July 14, and may have reported his conversation with you (Deptel 54³) which would further emphasize to Castro our mounting displeasure at attacks on US.

Of course, above may be either unreliable or represent only passing mood. I am letting source know that I am prepared discuss US-Cuban relations with Castro at his convenience if conversation eventuates, and [if] you approve, I would like to make following points.

1. There is general sympathy in US offical circles with stated desire Castro government to improve conditions of Cuban people. We believe that only Cuban people have right determine whether Castro is in fact giving them type of government which will achieve these aims and aspirations.

2. Policy of our government toward GOC has been entirely straightforward and correct. We would like to be able to discuss with Castro all matters of mutual concern. We regret degree to which such discussion has been limited in past.

3. US Government believes that Castro non-Communist. US Government is however concerned at evidences Communist influence in important government and armed forces circles. International Communist conspiracy aims at furthering USSR’s ambition of world domination and destruction of human liberties as understood in free world. Therefore US which has made tremendous sacrifices in blood and treasure in fighting Communist designs can hardly be expected take complacent attitude toward government which tolerates and encourages Communists in Cuba or embarks on neutralist course.

4. Castro has alienated much public and official opinion in US by continued anti-American statements which have been echoed by official press and other government officals. We as a government reflect our public opinion to important extent. Handling by newspaper Revolucion of Miami incident as one example indicates a dangerous built-in hostility, which uses any pretext to express itself in venomous and unacceptable terms. Violent, distorted lead editorial that paper July 15 good example attitude in question. (Summary editorial contained Embtel 128.⁴) Revolucion is often hardly distinguishable in its anti-American attitude from Communist paper Hoy.

5. US Government has been seriously concerned at GOC supported activities in Caribbean. On one hand, GOC has protested its adherence treaty obligations and doctrine non-intervention. On other hand, GOC has facilitated and equipped expeditions against Panama, Nicaragua and recently against Dominican Republic in violation GOC’s obligations as member OAS. Fact GOC has not been overtly denounced reflects desire permit Castro mend his ways rather than ignorance of facts on part OAS membership.

6. Treatment of legitimate American private interests in Cuba being carefully watched by American Government and public opinion. These private enterprises have made important contribution to economic progress of Cuba. Private enterprises represent means of further cooperation between our two countries and in fact is most important source of foreign capital which Cuba, according to most economists, Cuban and foreign, desperately needs in order improve standard of living. Unbridled, unfounded denunciations of these interests and harassing tactics are definitely prejudicial to good relations between our countries. I would reiterate terms of our note of June 11⁵ regarding adequate compensation of American interests.

Bonsal

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00./7–1659. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
2. See footnote 2, Document 333.
3. Telegram 54, July 13, described a conversation which Rubottom had with Dihigo that afternoon to discuss the pending Bridges-Johnston amendment to the Mutual Security Act, the possibility that Batista might be admitted to the United States, and the recent attack on the Cuban Consul in Miami. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5–MSP/7–1359) A memorandum of this conversation is scheduled for publication in volume V.
4. Telegram 128, July 15, summarized a “violently anti-American” lead editorial by Carlos Franqui in that day’s issue of Revolucion. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/7–1559)
5. See Document 318.