267. Telegram From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State1
366. Department pass interested posts. From Ambassador and Stewart. Substance all day conversations first Facio alone, then Figueres verifies with more detail report of Bonsal Department telegram 303.2 However definitely no fundamental reconciliation between [Page 443] Figueres and Castro accomplished as reported Habana’s 1110.3 Figueres and Castro did meet just prior departure and superficially parted friends because Figueres anxious not lose contact and hopes influence Castro through close friends and relatives, although believes Castro “off his rocker” and impossible influence directly at this point.
Large part Figueres story evolved around convincing details Castro either now a mental case or shortly will so become. Figueres emphasized lack of sleep, use of barbituates, constant repetition in six-hour speeches, general irrationality and impracticality of Castro utterances. Figueres’ attitude seemed to us convincingly not one of pique or anger, rather sadness towards Castro.
Re prior clearance speech with Castro Figueres tried from moment arrival do so. However Castro too busy only few words [sic] on rostrum just prior Figueres address, in which Castro requested Figueres not mention Puerto Rico and soft pedal “international situation” which understood by Figueres [to mean] revolutionary problems of Caribbean. Figueres accordingly surprised at angry reaction Castro. However Figueres pleased by numerous private contacts thereafter evidencing large volume support his thesis re Cuban relationship with US, problem of Russia, et cetera, in circles close to Castro as well as others. Both Figueres and Facio emphasized, nevertheless, widespread almost unreasoning anti-Americanism even in most intelligent Cuban circles.
Betancourt has been fully informed Figueres’ views by personal emissary Rodrigo Carazo, Costa Rican head INVU who was in Figueres’ party. Figueres expects word from Betancourt tonight and Ambassador will follow up. Figueres clearly feels that Betancourt, Munoz Marin and he are now in a bloc opposed by Castro and his close advisors, particularly those of Communist tinge who are accusing Figueres of siding with “imperialists.”
Figueres convinced Sunday labor parade Habana organized and managed by Communists who “alone could have produced such a show with type of people involved.” Facio reiterated conviction strong Communist domination in army, labor and some circles close to Castro, and considers Raul Castro at least a Marxist and “Che” Guevara an out-and-out Communist. Figueres suspects strongly that there exists in Cuba a dedicated nucleus of Communists with mission to cause a Latin American “Hungary in reverse” by attempting create situation [Page 444] requiring American armed intervention, which he considers would result in many Cubans resisting and cause great bloodshed and worldwide repercussions.
As to revolutionary movements, Facio felt little likelihood any present support from Cuban sources, Communist or otherwise, whereas Figueres claimed some information more recent than Facio’s pointed to additional revolutionary strength against Nicaragua based in Cuba and representing a real potential except for lack of general efficiency organizing any expedition. Figueres definitely left us with impression that he expects to see a revolutionary movement against Nicaragua with an excellent chance success in near future, unless the Somozas immediately leave country, which is solution he recommends. Claims that for first time his long experience Nicaraguan non-Communist anti-Somoza forces all united around Lacayo Farfan, Nicaraguan refugee in Costa Rica who now agreed provisional president, not Pedro Joaquin Chamorro as previously reported Embassy telegram 354.4 Figueres feels Guardia loyalty Somozas very doubtful especially because of Cuban executions of military, and claims likelihood Guardia deal with revolutionaries any real show Somoza weakness. We pointed out at considerable length US and other countries treaty obligations to assist Nicaragua in event revolution took on nature foreign intervention, to which Figueres’ only reply was to urge US put pressure on Somozas leave country. We of course gave him no encouragement any such pressure and in fact generally tried discourage any further revolutionary activity, particularly by trying stimulate his thinking toward possibilities dictatorship solution through OAS or moral suasion.
As to Figueres personal involvement, Stewart and I sensed that his experiences in Cuba have thrown cold water on his desires since previous talk with me, although there is no doubt about his hatred of Somozas, desire see them overthrown and we would guess he would participate if he saw good opportunity. However we do not believe that he now visualizes himself as the actual active leader and in newspaper interview today he publicly denied “he was axis of revolutionary movement.”
As to Dominican situation, Figueres not deeply interested and believes that nothing effective can be done to shake Trujillo regime present time.
Both Figueres and Facio extremely pessimistic future outlook Cuba and both look to serious deterioration of situation after which “anything might happen” meaning dictatorship or Communism.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3–3059. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bogota, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Guatemala City, Havana, Managua, Mexico City, Panama City, Port-au-Prince, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa as circular telegram 1128, March 31. (ibid., 737.00/3–3159)↩
- In telegram 303 from Havana to San José, March 25, sent also as telegram 1105 to the Department, Bonsal described a conversation the previous day with Gonzalo Facio, former Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States, who had accompanied Figueres to Cuba. Facio made it clear that he was passing on Figueres’ view that the only policies discerned in the Castro government were “extreme, unreasoning nationalism including anti-Americanism and communism.” Bonsal told the Department that he felt, while the evidence and developments did not warrant these conclusions, they were “cause for serious concern.” (ibid., 737.00/3–2559)↩
- In telegram 1110, March 26, the Embassy reported that it had learned that the break between Castro and Figueres was complete and that Castro was convinced that Figueres was an instrument of the United States. Bonsal had been told, however, by Agramonte that Castro telephoned Figueres before his departure from Cuba and also visited him briefly at his hotel. Agramonte gave Bonsal the impression that relations between Figueres and Castro were “now cordial.” (ibid., 737.00/3–2659)↩
- Not printed. (ibid., 713.00/3–1859)↩