263. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State1

1073. Reference: Deptel 686.2 Generally speaking, Embassy has had little confirmation from other sources of specifics contained Congressman Powell’s report and feels that if they were accurate he would not be only source. Embassy understands that persons close to Castro have told him Powell is not among more influential members Congress, and tenor their recent conversations may have been affected by those remarks.

Embassy has noted little change in Castro’s behavior since he came Habana other than signs strains and irritation. He is voluble, garrulous and impatient. Irritated by delays and counsels of caution, and notably sensitive to criticism, he has shown tendency label all who disagree in any way with his proposals as counter-revolutionary. Castro has seemed incoherent and confused during some public appearances, and some persons have expressed view he definitely ill. It seems more probable that he occasionally suffering from exhaustion and emotional strain. There are no clear signs of illness or early breakdown, but he is carrying tremendous load of responsibilities and heavy schedule, and may be forced to slow down.

By his actions, promises and threats Castro is rapidly creating opposition within middle and upper classes, many of whom were among his earliest supporters. Though it is growing rapidly, this opposition has not coalesced and is not open. It is not now prepared or [Page 432] capable to bring about any sudden change in government. Embassy has no information from sources other than Powell to support prediction early violent changes. Castro has publicly mentioned possibility attempt do away with him, and security measures for his protection have been heavily increased, but Embassy unaware any specific cause of such feeling.

There are rumors of Cabinet changes, but nothing definite. Officers of Embassy know most ministers and persons close to them well and have heard nothing to confirm rumors.

Communists are making determined effort to increase influence, and have had some success in Revolutionary Army and 26 July Movement apparently due principally to influence Che Guevara. Communists also active in cultural and informational fields but this is return to situation existing prior Batista.

I hope that final decision on any official hospitality extended to Castro can be delayed as long as possible.

Embassy and [less than 1 line not declassified] follow developments closely and will report changes promptly.

Bonsal
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.3711/3–1759. Confidential; Priority.
  2. In telegram 686, March 14, the Department informed the Embassy that Herter had approved the recommendation that he give a luncheon for Castro during his visit to the United States. Before taking any further action, however, the Department wanted the Embassy to provide the “fullest possible evaluation” of Congressman Powell’s views and to investigate the bases for his statements. (ibid., 033.3711/3–1459)