261. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Acting Secretary of State1

SUBJECT

  • Visit to Washington of Fidel Castro

Problem:

What courtesies should be shown by the United States Government to Fidel Castro during his visit to Washington in mid-April?

Background:

Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba has accepted an invitation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors to speak at its annual meeting in Washington on April 17. It is customary for an invitation to [Page 429] be extended to the President to address this meeting but it is understood that no date has been set for any address by President Eisenhower.

It is not believed necessary or desirable that the United States Government extend an official invitation for Castro to visit Washington or other parts of the United States in connection with the appearance which has been arranged by this private group. There is considerable precedent for informal visits to the United States by foreign Chiefs of Government without the United States Government issuing an invitation. Castro’s formal status is that of senior cabinet member rather than Chief of Government, which would make an invitation by our Government even less of a requirement. Nor would it appear a polite gesture to superimpose an official invitation on the private arrangement which has already been worked out between the ASNE and Castro.

The question remains, however, as to what courtesies or other attentions should be paid to Castro while he is in this country. Arguing in favor of certain gestures being made is the dominant position that he holds not only in the Government but as leader of the successful Cuban revolutionary movement. There is every expectation that he will be a key force in U.S.-Cuban relations for some time to come. Extending Castro courtesies might pay dividends in the future; ignoring him would certainly antagonize him as well as opinion elsewhere in the hemisphere, and would probably harden his evident anti-American feeling.

On the negative side, Castro has made numerous statements since the overthrow of the Batista administration critical of the United States Government and its policies toward Cuba. He has continued to make this type of statement since he became Prime Minister on February 16. Furthermore, there is no assurance that Castro is sufficiently well versed in or inclined to observe the usual protocolary amenities in responding to any initiative we took to demonstrate good-will or show respect for the office he holds.

Recommendation:

We believe that we are obliged to keep foremost in our minds the long-range aspects of our relationships with Cuba despite the negative considerations mentioned above, particularly the harm that might be caused if we did not extend courtesies to Castro which would be expected for any leader of a Latin American country. It is, therefore, recommended that:

(1)
You authorize an invitation to Castro for a luncheon at Blair House, to be given by you. If you approve, a proposed guest list will be submitted to you for your consideration.
(2)
Your desire to extend this invitation be brought to Castro’s attention through Ambassador Bonsal, so that if the Ambassador senses that Castro would not be responsive to this proposal he would not proceed to suggest the luncheon.2

This recommendation has been taken up with Ambassador Bonsal who is in accord with it. ARA is also considering recommending that the President receive Castro briefly but this matter will be held in abeyance pending further developments.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Rubottom–Mann Files: Lot 62 D 418, Cuba (Jan.–Apr.) 1959. Confidential. Drafted by Little and concurred in by G, U/PR, and Lightner.
  2. Herter’s stamped signature of approval of recommendations (1) and (2), March 13, appears on the source text.
  3. In a note to Devine, March 13, which is attached to the source text, Robert H. Miller, Duty Officer in S/S, pointed out that Herter had approved the memorandum but that he wanted ARA to ask the Embassy in Havana “to investigate urgently and independently whether there is any basis in fact for Congressman Powell’s story as reported in Havana’s 1049” (see footnote 2, supra). This investigation was to be carried out before Bonsal issued any invitation to Castro.