250. Memorandum of Discussion at the 396th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 12, 19591
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]
Mr. Gray requested the Director of Central Intelligence to provide the Council now with that portion of his regular intelligence briefing which dealt with Latin America.
Mr. Allen Dulles in agreeing with this suggestion pointed out to the President that his run-down of developments in Latin America would naturally tend to be gloomy since he would be touching upon trouble spots rather than upon those areas of Latin America where conditions were favorable from the point of view of the United States. Of these trouble spots Mr. Dulles indicated that Cuba was the most worrisome. In Cuba, he pointed out, we were threatened with a partial breakdown of the machinery of government. Thanks to the thoroughness of Castro’s recent revolution, there were very few trained government personnel remaining to undertake the routine tasks of administration. While President Urrutia was a good man, he was indecisive. Accordingly, Castro who was only thirty-two years old and had no previous experience in government, was obliged to make all the important decisions. Meanwhile labor unrest in Cuba was spreading and this might affect the current sugar harvest. There were also evidences of growing unemployment, a fact which the Communist Party, which was not in the open, would seek to take advantage of. Finally, Castro considers himself the man on horseback, destined not only to liberate [Page 398] Cuba but to liberate all the other dictatorships in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. However Betancourt in Venezuela and Munoz Marin apparently exerted considerable influence on Castro.
Secretary Anderson interrupted at this point to state that a group of officials from the new Cuban Government were coming to the Treasury Department this afternoon to talk with him about a stabilization fund. These officials apparently wanted $100 million for this purpose from the United States. Secretary Anderson said that he and his associates merely proposed to listen to the Cuban delegation at this afternoon’s meeting but he pointed out that a decision would have to be made in the next few days as to how far the U.S. Government was going to go in support of the Castro Government.
The President commented that he found it difficult to comprehend how we could do anything to stabilize the Cuban currency until the government of Cuba itself had become stabilized. Secretary Anderson replied that as far as we knew in the Treasury Department, Cuban finances were not in particularly bad shape if we could rely on their figures. On the other hand, he felt that the President was right as to the requirement for a stabilized government prior to a stabilized currency.
Secretary Dillon expressed the opinion that such matters as Secretary Anderson had brought up could not be decided quickly. They must be gone into very thoroughly. He warned that a financial blowup in Cuba could very well lead to a blow-up of the new Cuban Government. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the new Cuban officials had to be treated more or less like children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of doing almost anything.
[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]