Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI

187. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State ¹

Havana , December 19, 1958—5 p.m.

624. For Rubottom. At opportune occasion I was able to confirm from Papal Nuncio that church is still very much interested in obtaining peaceful solution.

I recommend that I be granted authority to approach the Papal Nuncio with the following suggested thoughts:

That the Cardinal call for truce and present to the people of Cuba a plan for a peaceful solution incorporating following ideas:

(A) Setting up a provisional government to take over the administration on February 24.

(B) Calling for general elections within six months thereafter.

(C) Present GOC ask OAS to appoint committee of 3 or 5 to supervise the truce and to supervise the electoral process.

(D) US to give tangible moral support.

Above plan would enable Batista to complete his term of office. Timing of announcement should be before February 24. Such a plan would not only be welcomed by the great majority of the people of Cuba, but also it would be most difficult for Castros to turn down. This solution would have the great advantage of not implicating too deeply US.²

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12–1958. Secret; Priority.
2. In telegram 364 to Havana, December 23, the Department instructed Smith to discuss the situation with the Papal Nuncio and if the opportunity arose suggest that a Chirstmas-time appeal by the Church for a peaceful solution would be beneficial. Smith was instructed not to indicate that the United States favored or would be willing to support any specific solution, and he was to make clear that the United States considered itself obligated to avoid any intervention in Cuba’s internal affairs. (ibid.) No further documentation regarding Smith’s suggestion to approach the Papal Nuncio has been found in Department of State files. Smith recalls in his memoirs, however, that he was advised by Rubottom that the Department did not want to go along with any effort by the Church to stop the fighting because “there were doubts as to whether the Church hierarchy would be effective in such an undertaking.” (Smith, The Fourth Floor, p. 175)