141. Despatch From the Consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Situation in Oriente as it affects American interests
It is believed necessary to assess the current situation in Oriente in an effort to determine the degree of danger to American citizens and American property in this area during the next several weeks.
[Page 231]Intentions of 26th of July Movement
The 26th of July Movement is inalterably opposed to the coming elections, and will do all in its power to prevent them from taking place. The Movement claims that candidates Grau San Martin and Marquez Sterling are playing into the hands of the government and that especially the Free Peoples Party is subsidized by President Batista in order to provide a semblance of opposition.
The opposition of the 26th to elections and its determination to block them where possible is now constantly announced by the clandestine rebel radio and press. The government’s determination to hold elections receives even better coverage. Oriente where the rebels have most of their power is the likely place for the most bitter contest. The city of Santiago, and to a lesser extent Guantanamo, Holguin, Bayamo and Manzanillo should present the greatest challenges to both sides in the struggle.
Strength of 26th of July Movement
At the present time, barring unforeseen developments of a dramatic nature, it can be assumed that the rebels will attempt to block elections. The question is how much force and power they have to accomplish this.
Despite statements by government sources, most persons feel that the 26th of July Movement and its allies are growing in power, although it is not possible to make an accurate estimate of the rebel strength and potential.
It will be recalled that in April, 1958 after an extensive propaganda campaign and a “war of nerves” which was rather successful in Oriente Province, the strike effort to be coordinated with a civic uprising failed miserably. While there was a partial strike in Santiago proper coupled with a number of terroristic attacks and one small scale “military attack” (Boniato, April 9), Army and police forces handled the potential menace with comparative ease. The rebels were able to cut land communications in Oriente for several days, however, and there were a number of casualties on both sides. No Americans were injured during this period although some spent uncomfortable moments.
Following a period of relative quiet (but certainly not complete calm) the rebel movement has again become increasingly aggressive in areas outside the mountain strongholds.
This period has also seen the build-up of the “Second Front”. This did not begin until late March when Raul Castro and a reported 150 men broke out of the Sierra Maestra and established themselves in the Sierra Cristal. While their condition was precarious for a while, they now exercise varying degrees of control over approximately 80% of [Page 232] Cuba east of longitude 76. From 150 men the force has grown to perhaps 2,000 or more and rebel leaders claimed double that figure in July during the kidnapping incidents. Arms and weapons were improved and considerable transport has been stolen. Rebel activities take place throughout Oriente.
Small groups from the Sierra Maestra command as well as from the Second Front have recently been harassing the Army and communications on all sides of Santiago. They have attacked or staged raids within a few miles of the city itself. There has been a slow but constant pattern of terrorist attacks within the city itself, although these appear to have almost stopped in the two weeks since General Cantillo took command of the Moncada Barracks as well as of military operations in Oriente.
Reports [less than 1 line not declassified] from a variety of cources are somewhat indefinite concerning rebel tactics for dealing with the elections. There have been several which seem to indicate that stronger rebel forces will push as close as possible to Santiago, so that they can harass and raid perhaps into the city itself.
Guantanamo would presumably be subject to the same circumstances. At present most of the territory surrounding Guantanamo is in rebel hands and there have been reports of small rebel groups entering the town in raids. Other major cities of Oriente will presumably be subject to the same tactics especially where hilly or mountainous terrain favor approach by guerrilla groups as it does in Santiago and Guantanamo.
The object of rebel pressure would be to prevent citizens from voting by disturbing conditions as much as possible. Organized rebel troops outside of the cities would probably be joined by rebel militants within the cities using the familiar hit and run terrorist tactics.
The Consulate believes that the rebel movement is much stronger in Oriente now than it was in April, and that its potential for creating disturbances is greatly increased. Unless the Cuban Armed Forces under the new leadership of General Cantillo or his possible successors are able to counteract the rebels more effectively than they have to date, the 26th of July and its allies can probably carry out much more of a disruptive program during elections than they did in April.
Conditions That Might Be Expected
As in April, a number of Cubans are worried about the possibility of trouble during elections and will probably leave town; many have remained out of town. They expect disruption of utilities as well as communications and violence in various forms from the rebel troops and terrorists and in counter-measures by the Army and other government forces.
[Page 233]The “April feeling” has been slow in developing in the American colony, possibly because there has been less violence within the city recently. It is expected to increase, however, on all sides, and it will be fanned by rebel propaganda.
While the exercise of careful prudence by Americans might be sufficient for protection under the circumstances, it appears likely that there is a possibility for greatly increased violence which will make protection more of a problem. If rebel forces in their present positions encircling Santiago have the power to close in, it is not inconceivable that the city would be completely surrounded and cut off in addition to local action making protection most difficult.
It is hoped that the Consulate will have further information regarding the tactics of the rebels and their abilities prior to the crucial period so that further estimates can be made.
The Consulate is revising its emergency plans in an effort to take the changing conditions into consideration.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9–3058. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Copies were sent to the Embassy in Havana.↩