HA–14. Telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Haiti1
451. For Ambassador from Rubottom.
Besides genuine concern which Department has for health of President Duvalier due his high office and long and friendly association with United States in various capacities, there is deep preoccupation [Typeset Page 764] here that unless President recovers quickly Haiti may sink back to politically unstable morass such as followed overturn Magloire. Prospect of Cabinet rule as called for by Constitution in event incapacity President is unpromising, especially if head of Secret Police, irrespective his personal qualities, is locus real power. Knowledge abroad of Barbot’s exercising authority would also contribute to further bad public relations for Haiti which has been a continually adverse factor in trying to normalize relations that country. Presumably Cabinet would have power to appoint Barbot to some official position but this is internal Haitian matter. Your view on this requested. Also, should President die, do you think there would be immediate contest for power not withstanding constitutional provision that head Supreme Court assume Presidency? Request your views urgently regarding personal qualities Nicoleau of leadership [Facsimile Page 2] and whether he could be expected to hold on to Presidency.
In view above, U.S. should try assume effective guiding role at this critical juncture in Haitian affairs. Believe all responsible Haitian should be urged to lay aside personal ambitions and permit orderly constitutional processes to be carried out should this become necessary. They should understand clearly (and you authorized use this line in talking with members of Government and others in your discretion) that ability of United States to continue its programs of assistance to Haiti will repeat will depend on their joining forces to provide orderly and peaceful transition of power if such unfortunately becomes necessary.
As you know, Mutual Security legislation is now under active debate in U.S. Congress and before U.S. public. Our programs for Haiti, including special assistance and the Marine Corps Training Mission, have been the subject of repeated informal discussion and review before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Latin America and the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Latin America. These programs have been presented to the Congress and to the U.S. public as “calculated risks”. It would be regrettable if Haiti were now to show itself incapable of maintaining orderly processes of government. Should political instability ensue, Department’s position in support of above-mentioned programs would be in grave jeopardy.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/5–3059. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Rubottom and initialed by Wieland. On May 27, Ambassador Drew informed the Department of State that he had learned from Haitian officials in strictest confidence that President Duvalier had suffered a coronary occlusion during the evening of May 24 and that his condition continued to be grave. (Telegram 415 from Port-au-Prince, May 27; 738.11/5–2759) In response to a request from Haitian officials for United State medical assistance, the Department of State arranged with the Department of Defense for the Chief Cardiologist at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base to proceed with special equipment to Port-au-Prince on May 29. Documentation is in file 738.11. Following his recovery, President Duvalier sent a letter to President Eisenhower on July 13 personally thanking the President, the Department of State, and Ambassador Drew for their assistance during his illness. (738.11/7–2359)↩