HA–13. Despatch from the Ambassador in Haiti (Drew) to the Department of State1
REF
- Department’s telegram No. 335, March 3, 1959.2
SUBJECT
- United States Policy Toward Haiti.
After protracted reflection and consultation with members of the Country Team, the following observations are submitted on the Department’s question whether the Embassy has any recommendations to make for changes in United States policy toward Haiti.
[Typeset Page 762]It is my opinion that there should be no change in our present policy of extending financial assistance to the Haitian Government in the hope of avoiding the chaos which would inevitably ensue if the Government of President Duvalier were violently overthrown. It is believed that none of the principal opponents of Dr. Duvalier could either hold office or work together for more than a brief period, if at all, following his downfall. Furthermore, in such an event, it is believed that there would inevitably follow a period of chaos and widespread disorders before some semblance of a stable Government could be installed. It can also be speculated that such conditions might lead to some form of intervention from the neighboring Dominican Republic, and possibly other countries in the Caribbean area. It would be superfluous to point out that any such developments would be contrary to our objectives in Haiti and the hemisphere as a whole.
Given this assumption, it is obvious that the only alternative to such developments is to continue to extend aid to the present Government of Haiti. The first concrete announcement of the recent decision to extend budgetary support in the amount of $6 million, which appeared in the New York Times of February 28, and was subsequently announced by President Duvalier in his speech at Cape Haitian on March 6, has already strengthened him both at home and abroad. While I believe it is much too early to predict that even if wisely used this aid will enable him to last out the remaining 4 ½ years of office, it does appear to have confounded his political opponents both within and without the country and to have given him a new feeling of confidence. In effect, Dr. Duvalier apparently feels that this aid represents the seal of approval on his Administration by the American Government. It can only be hoped that he will make good the promises contained in his March 6 speech of embarking on an era of conciliation. Such efforts on his part in many directions will come much too late. It is not believed that anything he could do would ever win the collaboration of either Déjoie, who has been ruined economically and was for a time under sentence of death with a price on his head, or Fignolé, many of whose followers have been persecuted, or Clément Jumelle, who is still in [Facsimile Page 2] hiding and two of whose brothers were shot down by Duvalierist police.
To what extent our aid has discouraged revolutionary plotting by his opponents abroad cannot be assessed by the Embassy, but based on the reaction internally it is not unlikely that they have at least been discouraged.
Conversely, were we now to withhold aid from Duvalier during the present period of crisis, it would in a sense constitute negative intervention just as much as if we were to intervene in a positive manner to overthrow his Government through extending aid and comfort to his enemies.
Still a further consideration of great importance in assessing our policy toward the Duvalier Administration is the effect which developments here involving the relations between the two countries would [Typeset Page 763] have on our prestige in the emerging African countries, as well as the colored people of Asia. While very possibly few, if any, citizens of Ghana, Indonesia, or Thailand could identify the present Chief of State of Haiti, the existence of even a brief period of chaos in the oldest independent colored country located on our doorstep would be interpreted as a failure on our part in the field of international relations and would undoubtedly be exploited by communist parties in that part of the world. In other words, we cannot afford to let Haiti “go through the wringer”.
It would be far too optimistic to forecast now that the aid we have already given will pull this Administration through its allotted course or that it will be the last aid we will be called upon to extend. However, it is my considered opinion that for better or for worse, both on grounds of moral principle and political expediency, we had no option but to follow the course we have elected to pursue up to now. To what extent we can continue to prop up this Government in the interest of both Haiti and United States is a question which will have to be answered when the time comes.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 738.00/3–1159. Confidential.↩
- See Document HA–12.↩