Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–37. Memorandum from the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 11, 1960

SUBJECT

• Considerations of Intelligence Community Regarding Recognition of El Salvador.

I have been informed that a decision has been made to extend recognition to the government which has been formed in El Salvador following the overthrow of President Lemus on October 26. While this decision is beyond my scope, I do feel very strongly that it is our duty to put forth our considered judgment of the results that may flow from such recognition.

Since there is no time for a National Intelligence Estimate in this case, Mr. Dulles, The Director of Central Intelligence, suggests that we incorporate in one paper the view of representatives of the intelligence components of the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The government formed in El Salvador following the overthrow of President Lemus on October 26 continues to exhibit an increasing trend toward the left. A growing proportion of the Junta appointments to the cabinet and other important government posts are going to confirmed or suspected Communists. The individual responsible for engineering the coup was former President Osorio who had enlisted the support of military and wealthy civilian elements in addition to many leftists. It now appears that Osorio is unable, or perhaps unwilling to contain the growing power of the leftists who are becoming entrenched in the new regime. Although there are Junta and Cabinet members who show signs of concern over the situation, they have not demonstrated the capability of coping with their more politically skilled leftist colleagues. A counter-coup by disgruntled but disunited military elements remains a possibility. The leftist trend of the Junta in El Salvador has been indicated more by the nature of government appointments than by actions or declarations. Also a considered danger is that several more important Communist and leftist appointments and removals of moderate elements are pending the receipt of recognition by the United States Government.

Although the Junta has lifted the state of siege, the dissolution of Congress and the elimination of pro-Lemus elements, friendly to the United States, and the vague promise of holding free elections two years hence, does not give an assuring picture of what future course of action the Junta will take.

United States Government recognition at this time would discourage the hopes of non-Communist opposition to carry out a counter-coup against the Junta. Recognition would provide the Junta with the respectability they now desperately are searching for. This would allow the leftists the needed time to consolidate their gains and to seek outside support from other leftist oriented governments, such as Cuba. After they become well entrenched, El Salvador would probably serve as a base for similar movements in neighboring countries. This perhaps is the major risk involved to the political stability and future security of Central America. A leftist dominated El Salvador could serve as a vital wedge, resulting in an extension of Castro-type Communism from Cuba to the Central American mainland. Castroism would then be provided with a West Coast opening—a base for seaborne Communist access to Central America. The current unrest and instability of Guatemala and Honduras are such that even the presence of a leftist government in El Salvador would provide the necessary spark needed to topple these shaky governments. Nicaragua also would not long be able to resist the presence of leftist governments in three neighboring Central American countries. The effects of such developments on Panama and the security of the Canal Zone are self-evident. A further problem would be posed to the U.S. Government in giving additional support to bolster countries thus threatened. As a final consideration, recognition of the present government of El Salvador by the U.S. would be widely interpreted throughout Latin America as well as inside the country, as approval of what could quite easily result in another Castro type regime.

The foregoing has been jointly drafted by senior representatives of the intelligence community and the conclusions approved by all of them, including The Director of Central Intelligence. ²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/11–1160. Secret.
2. In a memorandum to Herter, November 13, 1960, Mann took issue with Cumming’s memorandum and strongly urged that the United States “proceed forthwith to recognize the Junta Government.” (ARA/OAP Files, Lot 63 D 127, “El Salvador, 1960”)