Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–36. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant)¹

Washington, November 11, 1960

Mr. Gray said Mr. Gates was terribly concerned about recognition of the new government of El Salvador. He was not in agreement with State. He was strongly opposed to going ahead as were the Joint Chiefs. He acknowledges that this was political and he understood that Allen Dulles was also opposed. Mr. Gray said he could not speak for Mr. Dulles but he thought this was correct information. He told Mr. Gates that he had not been in on the matter except for what came up in the National Security Council.² He did not consider this to be an NSC matter and therefore had not inserted himself in the process, and he didn’t intend to except to pass along his point of view which is the same as Mr. Gates’. But this is an individual point of view because he would think the President would look to the Secretary of State for primary advice. However, [illegible in the original] would like to know how State felt it should be done—i.e., how do the people at the top feel—and more specifically how did Mr. Merchant feel about it.

Mr. Merchant said he would start with last [illegible in the original] about last night. Mr. Merchant had [illegible in the original] Gates through [illegible in the original] requesting that [illegible in the original] El Salvador until [text not declassified] was [illegible in the original]³ [illegible in the original] to arrive in [illegible in the original] Friday. Mr. Merchant [illegible in the original] so the situation has been held up. Although the Secretary has the President’s approval or discretionary [illegible in the original] recognize ES when it is timely and right. State’s [illegible in the original] yesterday was to recognize the country in a [illegible in the original] to watch developments. This decision was [illegible in the original] on the basis of findings of private emissaries [illegible in the original] advice from some of our top Latin American friends [illegible in the original] on balance that a counter-coup by the conservative elements in the army, contrary to our original hope was not [illegible in the original] for some months. One argument against recognition was that it would discourage any such movements by friendly [illegible in the original] There was also the question of how [illegible in the original] could best encourage and invigorate the friendly moderate element who are still in the junta before they are gobbled up by the dangerous elements. It is a delicate judgment.

Mr. Gray said that Defense and others against it are entitled to make their strong views known, but he still felt it is the primary action of the State Department.

A further development, Mr. Merchant continued [illegible in the original] of just a few minutes ago. The USIB met this morning, and it is the unanimous view of the intelligence community that this is predominately a very bad crowd. That is no news to State. The Secretary and he are getting a memo from Hugh Cumming,⁴ who attended the meeting; and that judgment, which was concurred in by Allen Dulles, would be taken into consideration by Mr. Herter and himself. It will come down to a close and difficult question of psychological and political consideration.

Mr. Gray thanked him for the background information.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.02/11–1160.
2. Reference is to the NSC meeting of November 7; for the memorandum of discussion, see Document ES–32.
3. In notes on a telephone conversation of November 10, 1960, Merchant stated that Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, called him on behalf of Secretary of Defense Gates, asking for delay of recognition pending receipt of information on the following day which might bear on the decision (716.02/11-1060)
4. See Document ES–37.