ES–26. Telegram from the Ambassador in El Salvador (Kalijarvi) to the Department of State1
233. Analyzing composition new junta and government it is difficult escape conclusion that there has been a decided shift to the left in complexion government of El Salvador.
While most of those appointed to key posts on military side thought basically friendly to the U.S. and democratically inclined, they are, with two or three exceptions, young, of middle grade and wholly inexperienced both in affairs of government and political intrigue. Civilian side of government provides grounds for real concern. High percentage of them have, at the least, questionable backgrounds. Four civilian cabinet officers believed out and out Commies; four are very leftist and at least two more known to be exceedingly liberal and revolutionary minded. Even more ominous, however, are appointments to [Typeset Page 616] second and third echelon posts now emerging, e.g., Salazar Rodezno as Public Information Officer of Casa Presidencial. Disturbing number those recently exiled and who were in forefront in leading cheers for Castro now being given second echelon posts.
Turning to coup itself, evidence rapidly accumulating that it masterminded by and executed under direction of ex-president Osorio. Substantial evidence also indicates that nerve center in Ministry of Defense, with Generals Parada and especially Lopez Ayala utilizing Guardia Nacional rather than army to carry out overthrow. Also good reason to believe that Osorio, in planning coup, effected marriage of convenience with extreme leftist and other dissident oppositionist forces, including General Quintanilla and Captain Buitrago, who [Facsimile Page 2] confirmed as actual Lemus abductors. There can be no arguing that coup masterpiece of planning and execution. No bloodshed, no disruption of public services. Although impressive number high ranking army officers given short period opt for or against junta and number those refusing subsequently relieved, no resistance any nature offered. Considerable evidence however that large sums of money changed hands, some of which reportedly of Cuban origin.
In putting together this military-civilian coalition, Osorio doubtless reasoned that he could control it. He probably also reasoned that cooperation with left was necessary both in planning stages and now for overthrow to be successful at this time. Inclusion this civilian element probably intended as sop to students and PRAM elements in effort gain their cooperation in stabilizing situation and gaining as wide acceptance of overthrow as possible until he prepared for next move. It may be that he intends move in on pro-Commie elements then in Rakosi2-like salami tactic. Present indications, however, are that plan is to allow junta to govern until regular election time in 1962 when Osorio will emerge as favorite son candidate.
It seems to us that many dangers are inherent in this reasoning and that situation as it stands today leaves many extremely important questions unanswered:
- 1.
- Osorio has not yet shown his hand and while it is generally assumed that he is man behind throne, is he in fact? Neither the public nor we have any real proof.
- 2.
- If he is in fact the strong man, how deep does his control extend, especially into the civilian side? Will he be able to control the Commies in his government?
- 3.
- What commitments did he make in order to gain left-wing cooperation?
We are convinced from pattern of coup, make-up and early actions of government, Communist tones of decrees and announcements, and especially yesterday’s press conference by junta (EMBTEL 231)3 that military element no match for civilian leftists and that as matters now stand, we must regard coup as first step towards Fidelismo. For moment announcements seem calculated to lull us but clearly next stage will be struggle for power between Commies and more conservative element and military with odds favoring former.
If remedial measures to be successful they will have to be taken within next few days while army still has control of arms. Reports reaching us indicate that while many viewed coup with approval at outset believing Osorio was the man, their ardor has cooled considerably after seeing make-up of government. A counter coup effort, therefore, which our information indicates may be in making, may find more public support outside leftist elements than could have been hoped for earlier.
View all these considerations and many still unanswered questions, believe strongly that our traditional policy of recognition should not be following in this instance. If our fears confirmed by subsequent action, major and practically only weapon available to U.S., since intervention renounced under international agreement, is recognition and/or nonrecognition. Believe from talks with colleagues our action in this respect will be closely watched and followed by number of other countries. I urge with all persuasiveness at my command the Department go slow with recognition.