Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–19. Telegram from the Ambassador in El Salvador (Kalijarvi) to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, September 10, 1960, noon

137. Reference: Deptel 86.²

With collapse yesterday’s strike efforts³ and progress in move toward conciliation, situation here decidedly calmer. May have passed crisis. Discussion with Esquivel, President Assembly, and twelve Assembly members last night convinces me military, business, church, wealthy and community leaders on second thought now recognize necessity support Lemus through current crisis. While many were ready assist in seeking solution, major move came from Archbishop when he reluctantly issued message of conciliation under specific instructions of Nunciatura. Once committed, Archbishop immediately received support banking business and social community resulting in a meeting yesterday and atmosphere evidently conducive to conciliation (Embtel 135 September 9).⁴ Group last night convinced President still firm. Contemplated investigation will cover not only police violence but also actions on other side.

Evident, however, that Lemus hold on government definitely shaken and chances finishing presidential term appreciably reduced. Open question whether Lemus hatred of and efforts to smear Osorio by permitting airing of criminal charges against military and other officers for actions taken under Osorio (Torres Valencia and Palomo cases) have so offended military to whom Osorio is darling that a coup will be forthcoming. Conversations with some responsible leaders suggest that perhaps day of reckoning may have been put off until a coup will not be confused with communism. Army as regularly reported holds key to any change now and in the foreseeable future. To date have heard nothing to indicate other than that officers currently control army still supporting Lemus. Indeed evidence to support belief that Lemus spurred to forceful action in crisis by army.

For full appreciation factors involved current situation see Embdes 363 March 14⁵ and Embtel 304.⁶ Situation of President Lemus due in part to extension of factors in play at that time. Foremost is increasingly isolated position into which President has maneuvered himself and his hesitancy to act when positive resolute action clearly indicated.

When current situation erupted August 16⁷ it primarily communist-Castro-led. Public in general appeared favor strong action against better known organizers and agitators. Instead of acting, President hesitated and then temporized giving subversive elements opportunity extend agitation in university and whip students into defiant mood. When President finally decided take action on September 2, rather than being selective against agitation leaders, applied force indiscriminately across board with heavy hand. Result, clearly promoted by purposely planted false rumors re violations women, police excesses against youth, et cetera, was antagonized public which with irresponsible press encouragement, lost sight of real issue and perpetrators of disorders—communism and vanguard professional subverters.

Through entire period Lemus did not once seek advice or counsel from Cabinet. Several who wished to give him support were unable reach him. We reliably informed that when group Prud Party members and business leaders attempted on September 1 offer support and assistance in meeting with President, they were rebuffed and told that decisions were his and he would make them. Not until September 6 were members Cabinet brought into picture and then were requested sign already prepared executive message to people (Embtel 126 and 127).⁸

This egotism, aloofness and apparent obstinate determination to go it alone further isolated Lemus and alienated many who were prepared rally around him during crisis. This also prompted disgruntled to start searching for an alternative and majority appear to be fastening on ex-President Osorio. While reports of Osorio activities differ greatly, some suggest his forces active throughout crisis attempting utilize it for own partisan political ends. These same reports say Osorio is dressed and waiting in the wings. General consensus is that if Lemus-Osorio rift could be patched up tranquility could be rapidly restored. This voiced from both sides and also from friends of both men. However, I believe breach so great that conciliation between two is wishful thinking.

While original disturbances party directed against us “Yanqi imperialism” this aspect disappeared after force and violence turned public ire against President. Leaflets currently being distributed return to this theme strongly suggesting communist leadership, which disappeared during more vociferous disorders, has returned to guide both students and CGTS.

Against this background, current period seems be interlude in what will be continuing test of strength. Regardless Lemus faults, Embassy strongly believes present government deserving of our moral and material support and U.S. should render such as long as Lemus remains in power and his government continues pursue policies the aims of which coincide with our own. At present time, main forces seem be directed toward maintaining Lemus government and avoiding making of El Salvador another Cuba. Thus, while agree that we should make our views known to subtle and direct way which we have already done, do not believe we should publicly deport ourselves in way which would add substance to charges, already being levelled by communists, of intervention in internal affairs. Rather, we should speed up action on pending aid requests, economic integration, social welfare program, et cetera, which will give notice our support and confidence in Lemus government.

Re press attitudes see Weeka 36.⁹

Kalijarvi

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/9–1060. Confidential. This telegram was sent in two sections.
2. In telegram 86, September 9, 1960, the Department of State urgently requested an evaluation and recommendations on the crisis in El Salvador and an analysis of the changed attitude of the Salvadoran press. (716.00/9–760)
3. Despatch 66 from San Salvador, September 14, 1960, reported that efforts to set a general strike in motion on September 9 failed after Lemus agreed to the conciliatory measures mentioned in footnote 4. (716.00/9–1460)
4. It reported a radio announcement that in a meeting with cabinet officers including Ortíz Mancía and Parker, and a public committee of businessmen and the Archbishop, Lemus agreed to release students arrested but not charged with crimes; to determine by investigation those responsible for the September 2 violence, and to suspend the state of siege upon restoration of order. (716.00/9–960)
5. It reported that Lemus’ egotism limited his ability to govern, but he would complete his term in office if he stopped favoring Rubio Melhado as his successor. (716.11/2–1460)
6. See Document ES–13.
7. Telegrams 82 and 83 from San Salvador, August 16 and 17, respectively, reported on anti-U.S., pro-Castro demonstrations outside the U.S. Chancery and the Prensa Grafica building on August 16, 1960. (716.00/8–1660 and 8–1760)
8. Telegram 126, September 6, 1960, informed the Department of State that the newspaper Tribuna Libre on September 6, printed an executive message appealing to the people for support of efforts to maintain constitutional government. (716.00/9–660) Telegram 127, September 7, 1960, reported on a meeting between Foreign Minister Ortíz Mancía and foreign diplomatic mission chiefs in which he explained the Government’s resort to force against provocative anti-Government demonstrations, Kalijarvi concluded that the Government might not use necessary firmness again for lack of public support. (716.00/9–760)
9. Reference is to despatch 64 from San Salvador, September 8, 1960. (716.00(W)/9–860)