Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

ES–13. Telegram from the Ambassador in El Salvador (Kalijarvi) to the Department of State¹

San Salvador, April 8, 1960, 6 p.m.

304. Developments here over past few months have presented fast moving panorama. Embassy, in attempting be as alert and sensitive to these developments as possible has not meant to be alarmist. However, in face reports such as that emanating April 2 from Cuba² (Embtel 293) review and analysis current situation deemed desirable.

There can be no denying: (1) that whole country is in state of uneasiness; (2) that some serious strains and even open cleavages have developed in recent months among components oligarchic triarchy (Army, landed gentry and church) which has ruled this country for decades; (3) that President has lost, especially over past three months, great deal of support the previously enjoyed and is finding himself increasingly isolated; (4) that oppositionist elements, led by Communists and supported morally and financially from Cuban sources, are gaining in strength, boldness and position, and are taking advantage of current situation to heighten tension, create disillusionment and promote dissension; but (5) that President Lemus is still in control of situation and is showing signs of an intention to fight back and to forswear cornerstone his policies to date, which has been preservation of status quo.³

Re (1) above current pre-electoral atmosphere is doubtless contributing significantly to general uneasiness. Government Party is facing its first real opposition in years and if free elections permitted, even ruling oligarchy admits that inroads likely to be deep. On the other hand, some elements fearful that too obvious maneuverings to control outcome might spark serious disturbances with overall deleterious affect on political stability of country. Uncertainty as to how best to deal with this dilemma is in itself causing uneasiness.

Unrelated but combining to spread uneasiness and even fear through sizeable segment local population have been recent circular letters threatening death to certain leading families here, series daylight abductions and rapings of rather prominent ladies and generally high incidence of lawlessness, all of which of course play into hands extremist elements.

Re (2) and (3) above, President Lemus deteriorating position and reasons therefore were reviewed in Embdes 368, March 14.⁴ Disaffection has continued and widened even since then and it now no longer a secret that 14 families have withdrawn their support. President himself tacitly acknowledged this and probably even widened breach during press conference early April when he called for change in mental outlook on part moneyed classes and, with veiled threat of resorting to legislation, urged them to humanize their wealth for good of country.

At crux of cleavage is wealthy element’s belief that President is largely to blame for current situation because of his do nothing attitude and policy, especially with respect to Communist-led subversive activities. They believe that if President had taken strong action against extremist elements and had prohibited them from returning from exile, organizing and openly agitating, country would not have been whipped into unhappy state of uneasiness and tension that exists today, which they naturally, and probably rightly view as threat to their privileged position. Whatever the causes and they are manifold, President today is an isolated man with his back to wall. (4) above, Communists, using other dissident elements, are not only largely responsible for creating current situation, but they are exploiting it to full and, thus far, with impunity.

There is a widely held belief here, however, that while local ground sufficiently fertile to provide sustenance for Communists to grow in, they could not and would not have been able to advance as they have without the Cuban situation. Opinion strongly voiced and heard in every quarter is that U.S. must bear share of responsibility for what is happening here. Fully conscious that Cuban money and other types of support flowing in, question asked how it could be considered possible for country like El Salvador to deal more courageously and firmly with insidious Cuban machinations than U.S. itself has thus far demonstrated willingness to do. With this: marrying of local with international uncertainty, an element of defeatism has spread which locals maintain is unlikely to be routed until U.S. alone or in concert other LA nations provides a lead.

Although isolated and confronted with situation which seems to be snow-balling, there are as yet no firm grounds for concluding that President Lemus has lost control of situation. Development of past week suggest, moreover, that he now fully realizes that maintaining status quo is no longer a viable policy and that he may be preparing to move more affirmatively. Has: (1) struck back at wealthy clique, (2) reshuffled some important military and national police posts (Embtel 288),⁵ (3) prohibited PRAM demonstration April 2 (although he has not yet moved to ban scheduled April 27 Communist-dominated CGTS labor congress), (4) in direct way indicated that anti-Communist and social welfare legislation may be in offing. He also has some strong personal traits which if brought into play could exert positive influence in his favor.

Thus, while not writing him off, Embassy convinced that critical period from now through April 24 elections and May Day. Any outbreak of disorders could tip the balance. As we see it, there is sufficient hostility and opposition so that if clique were to organize and gain even partial support of Army, President Lemus could be unseated. Most of requisite elements for such development appear to be present. Should this eventuate, Embassy convinced, however, that change would be in personalities at top and that, over short term at least, little alteration in country’s basic orientation or friendship for U.S. would result.⁶

Kalijarvi

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 716.00/4–860. Secret.
2. Reference is to San Salvador press reports that the Havana newspaper, El Mundo, reported on April 2 that the Salvadoran Air Force, led by dissident General Quintanilla and Captain Buitrago, had that day overthrown the Salvadoran Government. These reports were described in telegram 293 from San Salvador, April 4, 1960. (716.00/4-460)
3. In a conversation with Under Secretary Dillon at San Salvador, recorded in a memorandum of February 9, 1960, President Lemus said that his Government was seeking to expand its social welfare programs partly in order to counteract inroads of communism among Salvadoran farm workers. (716.11/2–960)
4. Not printed; 716.11/3–1460.
5. Telegram 288, March 30, 1960, is not printed. (102.21/3–3060)
6. This conclusion was reported to the President by John S.D. Eisenhower on April 11, 1960. (Eisenhower Library, DDE Diaries, Synopsis of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President)