DR–29. Memorandum from the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note: The Current Situation in the Dominican Republic
General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina has survived many challenges during his thirty years of completely personal rule but none have been as persistent or serious as the current threats he faces. Confronting him are internal economic crises and widespread political dissension, plus the formal condemnation of the American community of nations. Although Trujillo seemingly remains in complete control, the days of his regime appear numbered, although the time and manner of his overthrow cannot be accurately predicted.
Trujillo’s troubles can be traced directly to the fall of Batista in January 1959. Suddenly isolated, Trujillo soon bore the full brunt of the revolutionary, libertarian tide inspired by Castro’s success. Trujillo’s reaction was to embark on a ruinously expensive campaign of arms procurement, and to support openly followers of Batista then exiled in Ciudad Trujillo. The resulting economic dislocations soon turned a small but influential [Typeset Page 524] segment of the Dominican population into determined oppositionists. The turning-point for this group, mostly middle-class professionals, businessmen and intellectuals, was provided by the Castro-supported invasions of June 1959. Although unsuccessful, the invasion attempt, by its example of active resistance and because of Trujillo’s brutal repression, rekindled a demand for basic liberties and sparked a determination to remove the Generalissimo.
What followed has been a most widespread and persistent anti-Trujillo movement, characterized by increasing contacts among dissidents, cautious attempts at organization, pamphleteering amongst the university students and sporadic acts of terrorism by extremists. This ferment first came to a head in January 1960 with the discovery and ruthless suppression of a plot to assassinate the Benefactor. At this juncture the Church intervened, calling for humane treatment of those arrested and for a broader measure of civil liberties. Trujillo stubbornly refused to retreat; combining minor concessions with intimidation he has, at least temporarily, suppressed the Church. Plotting and isolated acts of resistance continued, however, heightened by the nation’s declining economy and the Generalissimo’s growing international disrepute. Dissident figures, exasperated by continued repressions and emboldened by OAS condemnation of the Trujillo regime, prepared another coup in August 1960, but this too was uncovered and quietly but vigorously suppressed.
[Facsimile Page 2]The situation in the Dominican Republic now appears, superficially at least, favorable to Trujillo. OAS condemnation produced nothing more than severance of diplomatic, but not consular relations. No meaningful economic sanctions have been levied. He has secured a large share of the “windfall “sugar market formerly allocated by the U.S. to Cuba.2 His international credit is still relatively secure and convertibility of the peso has been maintained. The opposition is discouraged, and the Church has apparently retreated. The business community, now convinced that change is unlikely, is abandoning passive resistance. The military and the police are still loyal, and the Generalissimo still holds a monopoly of the means of power. However, the seeds of Trujillo’s downfall have been sown and are still growing. The economy continues in drastic decline. Large numbers of the urban and rural poorer classes have slipped below subsistence level. All imported goods are in short supply. The dissidents, in spite of so many costly failures, have now penetrated the armed forces. The Church, in spite of its seeming passivity, is still pressuring Trujillo. Although not yet sufficiently strong to end the era of Trujillo, these forces cannot be indefinitely contained, [Typeset Page 525] and Trujillo is not likely to make the concessions which would mollify them. Although he has permitted several members of his family to leave the country, the Generalissimo himself will probably remain to the bitter end.
How this end will come is uncertain. Assassination is an increasing possibility—perhaps a probability, considering the desperate temper of the opposition. Alternatively, economic and political conditions might deteriorate to an extent where the military would intervene and attempt to dismiss Trujillo, merely to preserve their own interests. In any case members of the Generalissimo’s entourage will not be able to retain power. The transition will probably be chaotic and bloody, a situation ripe for exploitation by pro-Castro and other radical elements. Such tendencies are well-represented among the exiles, although anti-Castro factions do exist. However, any external forces, including Cuban, must rely on a protracted period of disturbance to make their influence felt. The immediate successor regime would probably be a military junta with civilian participation, moderate and not anti-U.S., especially if we provided sympathetic assistance at an early date. There are civilian elements however, which might prove somewhat antagonistic: U.S. prestige, previously high among the moderates, has been declining steadily and these moderates have been losing influence to the pro-Castro extremists. The United States is being criticized for not taking a strong stand against Trujillo—specifically, for not applying the import-export restrictions which they are sure would soon topple him. The bitterness of this group is due largely to disappointment with the widely-heralded OAS actions of last August, and there is some question as to the depth and permanence of these anti-U.S. sentiments. However, the tide is now running against the U.S. and the longer the current impasse continues, the more unfavorable to U.S. interests the outcome is likely to be when the Dominican pressure-cooker finally explodes.