Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

DR–28. Letter from the Consul General in the Dominican Republic (Dearborn) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)¹

Ciudad Trujillo, October 27, 1960

Dear Tom:

I was glad to receive your letter of October 10² and to know that you have been able to give your personal attention to our problems here. I knew you soon would, but I have also been fully aware that we were competing with any number of other problems all demanding your immediate consideration.

I am in full agreement with your impression that the problem of dealing effectively with Trujillo was made more difficult by the reluctance of the Foreign Ministers to go along with a realistic program designed to bring about orderly elections and ensure an orderly transition to a genuinely democratic government. The important word in that sentence is “realistic” and I am sure that is why you inserted it. First and foremost, the transition must not be a sham. This means that we must not fall into Trujillo’s trap of being satisfied with measures which legalistically remove him from control but, in fact, permit him to continue his dictatorship. An example of his efforts to achieve this is his announcement yesterday that he will run for Governor of the Province of Santiago. This is obviously a maneuver on his part to satisfy the U.S., the OAS and the OAR that he has bowed out of national politics, but which, at the same time, will permit him to remain in the country, to continue controls over its economic and financial life by his time-honored methods. Trujillo as Governor of Santiago will be in every practical sense the same as Trujillo is now. While he is in the Dominican-Republic and/or while he maintains his economic domination, he will also continue his political domination whether he is President or dogcatcher. While this is a political fact, the responsible opposition to his regime will not dare to form true opposition parties. There will be no real freedom of assembly, of speech, or of the press and radio for these people. On previous occasions when they rose to his lure, once he spotted them he took severe reprisals against them and they are not prepared to put their necks on his chopping block again.

A realistic program to bring about free elections can only, in my opinion, be built around one keystone – namely the removal of Trujillo from the country. Once this happens we should work toward an orderly break-up of his economic stranglehold on the national life. I admit it is quite likely that once the opposition gets moving, this break-up may be anything but orderly. This country, however, is as desperately in need of a revolution as any country. I remember reading about and revolutions are not usually orderly affairs. It should be our objective to see that the Dominican revolution is as bloodless as possible. At the same time, it is not rational to expect, in view of all the pressures of hatred which have been building up here over thirty years, that no one is going to get hurt. I would hope 1) that we could prevent the Ramfis-Espaillat-Abbes-Sanchez gang of cut throats from staging a St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of the leading oppositionists in an effort to save the situation for the Trujillistas, and 2) that we could persuade the opposition, if they gain control, not to carry their purge beyond those immediately responsible for the criminal actions of the Trujillo regime. Our friends here favor a limited purge but if they cannot maintain their prestige among the opposition as a whole, there is no telling what excesses may result. If we attach importance to the future in this country, I cannot urge strongly enough that we do everything possible to restore the pro-U.S. oppositionists at least to their influence at the time of the Sixth MFM. This can only be done if the U.S. takes strong measures against Trujillo in one way or another.

Assuming that Trujillo’s departure from the country is necessary before we can progress further toward our objectives, how is this to be brought about? I do not believe he can be persuaded to leave under present circumstances by any U.S. citizen. In his mind he built this country out of nothing. The creditable physical plant which exists here, the high degree of sanitation, the law and order, the hundreds of Trujillo statues – all these things he sees as monuments to his glory. He conceives of all this as built up by his own tireless efforts day by day for thirty years. In addition to all this he is a tough, ruthless old tyrant who has weathered many a storm when all around him thought his ship was sinking. As of this moment I believe he expects to weather this storm also. It would be against this background that some one sent by us would have to persuade him to step out and I agree with you that success in this venture is doubtful.

Not only do I believe our agent could not persuade him at this time, but I also believe Trujillo would use our move against us. In my view he would inform the UN and the OAS that we were threatening him and that it was not the first time. He would refer to the attempt of General Clark, who called on him as a result of an appointment made by Ambassador Farland, and say here was another example of our intervention. The Foreign Minister has already referred to the Clark approach to me as intervention, as I reported at the time. [text not declassified] One of our dilemmas is that for an agent to be impressive he would have to be some one who could convince the Generalissimo that he spoke with authority. Yet if he spoke with authority, this would give the Generalissimo the weapon he needs to charge us with intervention. I believe that Trujillo might (but only might) leave the D. R. today if he could be persuaded that he was about to be killed, but this is obviously no job for an American.

You asked who I thought would be the best intermediary in case we decided to approach Trujillo. Although I have said I do not believe any American can persuade him to leave, I shall go on to say why I do not think that certain persons who have been mentioned would be good choices. In this same mail, I have written a letter to Frank Devine stating at some length why I do not think Bill Pawley should be considered. Please ask Frank³ to show you that letter. The Papal Nuncio is out of the question. He is anathema to the Generalissimo and has not been in the country since last May owing to strained Vatican relations. Trujillo is presently conducting a war of nerves against the Catholic Church here and Church policy seems to be to try to ride out the storm in the hope of avoiding violence against it. The Church took courageous and unprecedented steps earlier this year by publicly criticizing the regime. The Nuncio’s statements to me at the time implied: “Well, we have done our part, now it is your turn”. I do not believe Wilbur Morrison would be a happy choice either. He would be running a great risk since if the Generalissimo should publicize the approach, Pan American’s reputation all over Latin America might suffer. None of the governments like Trujillo, but I suspect they would like even less the idea of a high official of a U.S. enterprise seeking to overthrow even Trujillo’s government. I regret that I cannot propose a likely name for you, but I think you will see why from comments on the embarrassment which I believe any approach of ours might cause us.

Getting away from an approach by a U.S. agent or the Nuncio, the type of approach I think we could make without coming off second best would be one we might make in concert with other countries. The preferable approach would be by the OAS itself, ourselves participating. Next best would be an approach by, let us say, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and the U.S. If we could include Canada this would be very helpful indeed. An approach of this sort might stand a chance of convincing the Generalissimo that the jig was up and the countries involved would be numerous and powerful enough so that Trujillo could not saddle any one of them with the onus of intervention. While this tack might have the advantage mentioned, I suppose the greatest obstacle in using it would be the unlikelihood that the countries named would participate owing to their non-interventionist commitments. The approach by the OAS itself would perhaps be the most likely and certainly the most legally defensible—but I do not suppose that we could obtain concurrence even there.

As I mentioned, I believe the only reason the Generalissimo might leave is fear of imminent death—and this is not certain. For this reason I think the Dominicans themselves have got to do the persuading. We can help them to do it in a number of ways, some of which are probably not legally possible for us. The best way would be to stop buying sugar, coffee, cacao and beef from this country. This would hit Trujillo and those around him. His own henchmen might then turn against him as their pockets would be affected. We should try to hasten the day when his own men will refuse to obey his orders and will tell him there is a plane waiting for him at the airport. Other measures which would help toward this result would be an embargo on exports of petroleum products, especially lubricants to the D.R. The country runs on these products and if we could make it impossible or highly expensive for Trujillo to obtain them we would be contributing to dissatisfaction among those dependent on him. Another helpful measure would be to induce Canadian and U.S. banks to stop loaning money to the D. R. [text not declassified] Anything we can do to show the Dominicans that Trujillo is losing his grip may at some point act as a catalyst to start the snowball rolling. [text not declassified] When we recently sent some arms to the Haitians, there was a furious reaction here. If there is anything that will drive Trujillo to madness and make him act against his better judgment, it will be a Haitian scare. This is probably dream-talk, but I am throwing many things into the pot in the hope that something may be helpful.

Then there is the question of, “After Trujillo, what?”. Right after the Sixth MFM there was little doubt in my mind but that we could expect a moderate U.S.-oriented government here if we could at that time have taken the sanctions that would have been effective against Trujillo. Mr. X believed, and I agreed, that the resulting confusion in the Trujillo family and in the national economy would have been such as soon to enable the opposition to stage a successful coup. At that time our friends were riding high in the opposition and we would have been as well off as we could ever expect in our relations with the new government. Since that time our position among the dissidents generally has deteriorated, along with that of the pro-U.S. contingent. If a revolution took place today, it would be touch and go as to whether our friends would have high places in the government. I believe our position is retrievable to a large extent. We could win back considerable lost ground by stiff recommendations from the OAS Sanctions Committee, followed by immediate and effective action on our part, for example. I realize that this is a tall order and probably impossible, but I am trying to state what I think it would take to put us where we would like to be.

What I am leading up to is to say that the answer to the question, “After Trujillo, what?” depends on us to some extent. If we are unable to convince the dissidents that we are helping them materially to put the skids under Trujillo, then it is quite likely that the extreme nationalists, the extreme leftists and other anti-U.S. elements will dominate the future here. If we can effectively help the opposition, if we jump to their assistance right after the overthrow, if we have some measure of success in keeping the communist elements among the exiles out of here for a period after the fall of Trujillo, then I believe we shall have a good future.

One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will be best for us, for the OAS and for the Dominican Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo before he leaves this island. If he has his millions and is a free agent he will devote his life from exile to preventing stable government in the D.R., to overturning democratic governments and establishing dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as being the first necessary step in the salvation of my country and I would regard this, in fact, as my Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will remember it was necessary to drive a stake through his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes. I believe sudden death would be more humane than the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and lingering illness.

I apologize for the length of this letter, but I wanted you to have a useful amount of my thinking on the questions you asked me. If there is anything I know, it is that I am not infallible. It may, for example, be possible for some one to think of a type of approach to Trujillo by a U.S. citizen which might induce him to leave. If some such proposal seems promising I would suggest you try it out on me since I will be quick to say “good” if it looks feasible from this battleground.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely,

Henry Dearborn

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/10–2760. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal.
2. See Document DR–27.
3. Frank J. Devine, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.