Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

DR–19. Memorandum of Discussion at the 441st Meeting of the National Security Council¹

[Extract]

Thursday, April 14, 1960

Mr. Dulles reported that in the Dominican Republic, Trujillo’s position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious.² The wholesale arrests ordered by Trujillo last winter had affected almost every prominent family in the Dominican Republic. Although these arrests had broken up the plotting against Trujillo, they had at the same time weakened the dictator’s position. Mr. Dulles thought that further attempts would be made to kill or oust Trujillo. Relations between the government and the church were rapidly deteriorating. Mr. Dulles pointed out incidentally that the attitude of the church in the Dominican Republic was quite different from the attitude of the church in Cuba. The economic situation in the Dominican Republic was worsening. Business is stagnant and international financial sources are drying up. The government has resorted to various subterfuges in an attempt to improve its precarious financial position. Secretary Gates³ asked whether it was true that Trujillo was one of the richest men in the world, with more money than the Dominican government. Mr. Dulles said this statement was true; Trujillo was reported to have milked the Dominican Republic of $400 million, an estimate which was probably exaggerated and should be scaled down by one-half or two-thirds. Secretary Anderson said he understood that $44 million in gold had been recently removed from Now York banks by the Dominican Republic and had been placed in the Bank of Nova Scotia. Mr. Dulles said he had a detailed report on the financial situation of the Dominican Republic, all the details of which he would not read. However, it appeared that the Dominican Republic now held $15 million in gold and that it had incurred a variety of obligations; for example, a $16.5 million loan from the Bank of Nova Scotia secured by the sugar crop. The Dominican Republic had also drawn $7 million out of a $11.5 million credit with the International Monetary Fund. Secretary Anderson said the International Monetary Fund’s dealings with the Dominican Republic might present a problem to the U.S. The Dominican Republic now had drawn so much from the Fund that it could only draw in the future $2 million every 90 days without consulting the Directors of the Fund. If the Dominicans should want to draw more than $2 million every 90 days, the question would arise as to how the U.S. Director should vote when the Dominican Republic undertakes the necessary consultation with the Fund.

Mr. Dulles continuing his briefing, reported that Trujillo, apparently not realizing his position, is not anticipating an early fall from power and is apparently not planning flight. The Dominican military forces have apparently been repelled by the excesses in Cuba and may believe they will be compelled to act against Trujillo before the radical pro-Castro elements, which are daily increasing in strength, take over the government. If there is a gap between the departure of Trujillo and the establishment of the new regime, the radical pro-Castro elements might have an opportunity to seize power. If the army does not hold off these radical elements, a period of chaos might ensue. Mr. Dulles believed that Trujillo’s downfall might not occur for weeks or even months but, on the other hand, the situation might become critical at any moment.

The Vice President wondered whether the worst outcome of the situation in the Dominican Republic would not be a take-over by the pro-Castro elements. He also wondered whether we were doing everything possible to support other elements. Mr. Dulles said the difficult question was that of leadership of moderate elements in the Dominican Republic. The vice president of the Republic might be able to assume power or the principal military officers might govern through a military junta. Many prominent anti-Trujillo Dominicans were in exile. Mr. Dillon said this government was following the situation in the Dominican Republic closely and intended to try to prevent seizure of power by any pro-Castro group. This would involve working closely with the OAS. The Vice President believed that we could not let Castro or a pro-Castro group take over the Dominican Republic even if we had to intervene in order to prevent such a takeover. Mr. Dillon felt that in order to intervene we would need an invitation. The Vice President feared that the old story was being repeated in the Dominican Republic; that is, the pro-Castro element was the only minority group with strong leadership and definite objectives. Mr. Dulles said there was a group in Venezuela which would like to move into the Dominican Republic and take over the government. Mr. Dillon believed the Castro element in the Dominican Republic was not strong enough to assume control of the government without support from Cuba. It was, accordingly, very important that the U.S. be prepared for rapid action. The Vice President agreed that it was very important that the U.S., if necessary, take rapid action to prevent any move by Castro to seize power in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Dulles said the situations in Haiti and Venezuela were being affected by the situations in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Betancourt, it is reported, has made a deal with the army whereby he will abandon government by coalition, will rule Venezuela with his own party supported by the army, and will take action against the communist movement. However, it is possible that the communists know of his plans and may take action to thwart them.

Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect to the situation in the Caribbean. If Trujillo could be removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development for us.⁴

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Extract. Drafted by Marion W. Boggs. The extract printed here is the portion pertaining to the Dominican Republic from combined agenda items 1, 2, and 3: “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”, “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba”, and “U.S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic.” Also omitted was agenda item 4, “Future NSC Agenda Items.”
2. At the 440th NSC meeting, April 7, 1960, General Charles P. Cabell, Acting Director of Central Intelligence, and Under Secretary Dillon made brief statements about the Dominican Republic. Cabell stated, inter alia, that Trujillo’s position continued to grow weaker, and Dillon commented that “Trujillo may fall before our policy of building up moderate successor elements has had time to succeed.” According to the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, drafted by Boggs, the NSC:
   “Noted and discussed the statement by the Under Secretary of State that the position of the Trujillo regime is deteriorating more rapidly than was anticipated at the time of the Department of State presentation on January 14, 1960 (NSC Action No. 2178). Therefore, alternative policies in the event of an early collapse of that regime were being actively considered by the Department of State, and would be the subject of consultation with the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
   This action, approved by the President as NSC Action 2212, was subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.
3. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense.
4. In NSC Action 2218, taken at this meeting, the NSC:
   “Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in the Dominican Republic, with particular reference to the importance of seeking to prevent anti-Castro and anti-American elements from seizing power in the event of the collapse of the Trujillo regime.”