Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

DR–18. Memorandum from the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cumming) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 25, 1960

SUBJECT

• Intelligence Note: Dominican Republic—Political Situation

A rising tide of discontent—the first serious threat to the rule of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo—has been spreading through the Dominican Republic’s influential commercial, professional and intellectual classes for several months, and has even begun to penetrate the urban and rural lower class, heretofore a Trujillo stronghold. Arising largely from an economic crisis caused by low export prices and the tremendous drain of foreign exchange into Trujillo’s frantic arms-purchase program, this discontent is reinforced by a virtually complete lack of civil liberties. Opposition feeling came to a head in January with the exposure of a conspiracy to assassinate the Generalissimo and seize power. He retaliated with a wave of political arrests, totaling in the thousands, which still continues. Concentrated chiefly in the influential middle classes, the repression has left virtually no Dominican family of any prominence untouched. The arrests have stiffened opposition sentiment, especially as news of the prisoners’ mistreatment leaked out. At this juncture, the Church issued a strongly-worded pastoral letter on January 31 condemning violation of civil liberties and calling for release of the prisoners. Trujillo, unwilling to back down or to cross the Church, adopted a temporizing stance. The Church, however, remains adamant and has issued a second forceful pastoral letter.

The Generalissimo is thus at an impasse: any real concessions on his part could be regarded as a sign of weakness and encourage further demands; yet only some degree of real political freedom will now remove the opposition feeling which threatens his regime. Although it is probably even now not too late for the self-styled “Benefactor” to resolve this political tension by making a grand gesture of renunciation, his pride and stubbornly unyielding nature, typical of the dictator, militate against any such solution. The current impasse will thus probably continue until Trujillo’s regime suddenly shatters from the strain of its own inner tensions. While neither the date nor the manner of such collapse can be predicted, it is clear that the regime’s prospects have materially declined since last December, when the belief was expressed in a National Intelligence Estimate that Trujillo would remain in power through 1960.² An increasing number of local observers claim that the nation will soon experience a total economic collapse. According to recent reports, as yet unconfirmed, members of the Trujillo family have made massive withdrawals (one report sets the figure at $46 million) from the government Reserve Bank although it is not considered likely that the Generalissimo himself will flee.

In typical strong-man fashion, Trujillo has not permitted the development of any alternative leaders. The military does have its share of ambitious men, but none with the reputation or personal following to lead a one-man government. It will, however, remain the locus of power in the Dominican Republic and will be the key to success for any new regime—unless the services are torn by an armed factional struggle, in which case there may well be no effective government at all. The attitude of the military in general, or of its key leaders, is not definitely known. Many of the younger officers and at least some senior officers are reportedly sympathetic to the opposition, although the bulk of the military is probably loyal. However, the military will not follow Trujillo blindly to self-destruction. At some time in the not-too-distant future, Trujillo’s cause may well appear lost and he could be turned out with his family in relatively bloodless fashion by his Generals.

The nature and viability of a successor administration are difficult to predict. Dissident sources have proposed a predominantly civilian provisional junta, to be composed of one high military figure, a respected civilian, and a high Church official as leader. The participation of the military and the leadership of the Church should insure a relatively stable and conservative government to which anti-Americanism would not be a major issue. Although the appeal of Castro and of his leftist radicalism is not now strong in the Dominican Republic, much leftist sentiment is concentrated among the exiles, who include some Communists and sympathizers. Their influence in a successor regime would not at first be important but many local observers predict that any new administration would soon collapse, amid bloody disorder. Radical sentiment would surely develop in such a milieu, and intervention, in one form or another, by the Castro regime in favor of a leftist faction or leader must be considered a possibility.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 739.00/3–2560. Confidential.
2. Reference is to SNIE 80/1–59, “The Situation in the Caribbean Through 1960,” December 29, 1959. See Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, Volume V, American Republics, Document 126.