Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

CO–26. Telegram from the Ambassador in Colombia (McIntosh) to the Department of State¹

439.

Bogotá, March 25, 1960, 6 p.m.

DEPTEL 442²

Following arrival Valeriano,³ I contacted Alberto Gonzalez Secretary General presidency requested permission bring Valeriano with me in my farewell call upon President today. President sent word due lack time unable receive Valeriano but would be glad have me present preliminary report⁴ which I did today during half hour private talk. President listened attentively to my exposition but made no significant comments on substance of report or on question GOC ability and willingness to finance recommended programs; nor did he comment on offer of helio-courier plane. He stated he would read report soonest and possibly would be in position to give me some comments upon arrival in Miami April 4. I stressed our desire for his early reaction indicating that both Colonel Valeriano and Chargé Wells would be available at anytime before his departure for further discussions. (Obviously, Lleras preoccupied with post-election problems and preparations for U.S. visit). In circumstances Embassy will not attempt to press him further for reaction before his departure.

As for Embassy reaction I consider preliminary report good staff study violence problem for internal U.S. consideration of basic question whether we willing take political decision provide GOC with MAP assistance on grant basis for internal security. Embassy has always understood primary mission survey team was facilitate our determination this policy issue. Therefore, we less than enthusiastic at presentation this preliminary document President Lleras before we had reached this policy decision, especially in hurried circumstances unlikely permit adequate discussions with Lleras re significance and scope recommendation.

This connection I point out first, report start on inaccurate premise that Lleras requested U.S. expert assistance when actually he asked for certain MAP equipment and material re grant basis, and accepted our offer survey team with some hesitance (see Embassy despatch 1 July 1, 1959⁵ and previous.⁶) Secondly, as report itself states, reveals nothing new as regards problem nor any new methods not already being considered raised to some extent by Colombians themselves. Thirdly, recommendations seem imply package assistance deal with heavy emphasis on assistance in form U.S. advisory personnel with little attention to initial Colombian request for MAP material. Acceptance by Lleras of large number U.S. advisory personnel may present him with tough political problem. Fourthly, as regards financing program, should be recalled that basis for Lleras original request was alleged inability GOC budget handle cost military equipment needed. We therefore appear in odd position asking him now whether GOC can afford costs program we recommend. Do we contemplate defraying entire costs advisory groups?

As to intrinsic merits of report, while it generally accurate I have impression that it missed some nuances and sensitivity to Colombian picture. For example recommendations three and four imply assumption army political. While army not now in politics and demonstrating no present inclination enter in, it is still potentially capable political action and is largely conservative in orientation. Hence entirely possible that neither Lleras nor liberal party would wish beef up army’s political potential through psychological warfare or civic action programs, however intrinsically logical this may seem from pure violence problem viewpoint.

Second impression is that recommendations would heavily involve us in internal operations, as for example having civil affairs advisor “take active part in planning and implementing regional rural civic action type programs”. I note also that we would be perilously close intervention insensitive sectors judging from Annex page VIII of working paper. While I appreciate merits of utilizing Colombian institutions as suggested in Annex I page VIII of working paper, careful thought must be given long range developments and political wisdom this course. We will be closely identifying ourselves with internal Colombian policy without really knowing what will happen in two years or how long friendly or sympathetic elements will continue in government. Such internal involvement could come back to haunt us.

This connection, Department should realize that Colombia on eve of adaption to new political balance as result elections and this situation will undoubtedly cause President take more time in assessing recommended program in relation domestic situation. Working paper could not of course reflect subtle shifts now taking place, and in fact probably not possible assess these for few weeks yet.

Am surprised and disturbed that working paper dated February 1st⁷ which was available in Department since early February was not sent to Embassy for comment.

McIntosh

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 721.5-MSP/3–2560. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. This telegram was transmitted in two sections.
2. Reference uncertain; Department telegram 442 is dated April 24, 1959, and does not relate to the subject under discussion. (102.6/4–2459)
3. Colonel Napoleon Valeriano.
4. Apparent reference to an earlier version of the “Report of the Colombia Survey Team,” dated April 1960, concerning violence in Colombia and possible methods for dealing with the problem. The report covers the period October–December 1959; a copy is filed under Department of State decimal file 721.00/4–3060.
5. Not printed; 721.5–MSP/7–159.
6. Apparent reference to despatch 804, June 24, 1959, not printed. (721.00/6–2459)
7. The referenced working paper was not further identified, and no copy of a document matching the description here was found in Department of State files.