Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume V, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics

CH–32. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs (Briggs)¹

US/MC/14

Santiago, March 1, 1960

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Secretary Herter
  • ARA - Mr. Rubottom
  • Embassy, Santiago – Mr. Krieg
  • ARA/EST – Mr. Briggs

• Chile

  • Germán Vergara Donoso, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile
  • Carlos Vial Infante, Minister of Defense of Chile

SUBJECT

• Cuban Situation

The Secretary stated that he would very much appreciate the Foreign Minister’s views on the situation in Cuba, which is very disturbing to us. When we asked our Ambassador to come home, the Secretary went on, the personal attacks in Cuba on the President, the Vice President, and the Secretary himself had become so inflammatory that we feared that serious danger to American citizens might result were these attacks continued.

Since our Ambassador left Havana, some friends of Castro from other Latin American countries have spoken with him of the danger of this foolish course and he has moderated his tone to some extent. Nevertheless, we note with concern that he is surrounding himself increasingly with people of Communist orientation and that the influence of persons of this type is extending rapidly into the schools, the labor organizations and the army, as well as in the government itself.

We have no quarrel with Cuba on the basic question of land reform, which we fully recognize is a matter of national sovereignty; but tremendous confusion is occurring in the implementation of the Cuban agrarian reform law and this confusion leads to doubt as to the intent or the ability of the Cuban Government to provide the full, adequate and effective compensation that is required for American interests affected by expropriation.

The Cuban Government recently sent us a note, the Secretary continued, requesting that we enter into discussions with them, but containing the proviso that these discussions can only be undertaken provided that the United States agree that neither its Executive Branch nor its Congress will take any unilateral action which might affect Cuba’s interests. This is manifestly impossible, given the independence of the Legislative Branch under our governmental system. Moreover, our sugar legislation expires this year and even should the Congress renew the sugar legislation in its present form, this would be definable as a unilateral act affecting Cuba’s interests.

The Secretary noted that a good deal of opinion is arising in the United States to the effect that some action is needed with respect to Cuba. One suggestion which seems to be gaining ground is that we buy Cuban sugar at the world market price and put the difference between that price and the price paid to Cuba under the quota system in escrow to be used to pay damages for expropriation or other actions of the GOC against United States interests in Cuba.

The problem of the moment, however, the Secretary went on, is the question of whether to send our Ambassador back to Havana or to keep him in Washington. There are pros as well as cons on this question. Those who advocate the Ambassador’s return say that he is needed in Havana in order to provide access to Castro and thus to enable us to have official contact with him. On the other hand, however, the Ambassador has often had to wait for three weeks or longer to see Castro and has on occasion had great difficulty in seeing him at all.

The Secretary emphasized that we do not consider the Cuban problem as peculiar to the United States but feel that it is a Latin American problem, inasmuch as the Castro mystique is beginning to appear in other countries. Feeling, therefore, that this is a Latin American problem, we would like to consult thereon in order to insure that in dealing with it we avoid mistakes which might affect the interests of other American countries, the Secretary added. He mentioned parenthetically that the status of the Guantanamo Naval Base has not been raised at any time by the GOC.

The Foreign Minister replied that President Alessandri’s sympathy for the United States position in the Cuban situation was shown by his recent statement to Senator Smathers, when the latter asked what the Chilean attitude would be if the United States Congress should take strong action against Cuba. In order to give President Alessandri a moment to collect his thoughts and reply to this unexpected question, the Foreign Minister said, he himself had asked the Senator what such action would be and what economic effects would be anticipated therefrom. Before the Senator could answer, President Alessandri had said: “All of our sympathies and those of most of the officials of the Government of Chile are with the United States Government, because we understand the damage which United States interests and the United States itself have suffered in Cuba; but there is a great mass in this country and that mass is more numerous than we are.” The Foreign Minister went on to explain that by this comment the President had meant that although thinking people realize the full implications of the Cuban situation the masses are inclined to applaud the GOC, in other Latin American countries as well as in Chile.

The Minister went on to say that in his view it would be better to try to isolate Cuba than to act directly against it. He considered that isolation would not necessarily remedy the situation there or materially change that existing in other countries, but that it would be least likely to make things worse. He described the recent visit of Cuban emissary Lechuga to Santiago to obtain Chilean agreement to attend the conference of under-developed countries which the GOC is attempting to promote. The Minister said that Lechuga had received a flat refusal in Chile, but that in Peru the government did not refuse his request due to the influence in the Peruvian Government of the APRA party through Raúl Porras, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. “If you note this situation in Peru, where the Government is conservative,” the Minister went on, “you can imagine what it might be in others with less conservative administrations.” In this situation, the Minister said, any strong action by the U.S. Congress would be likely to be dangerous. The best solution would probably be for the Congress to grant to the Executive permission to proceed in accordance with the circumstances.

The Secretary said that this authorization has been requested. He then asked whether the Foreign Minister would advise our sending our Ambassador back to Havana. The Foreign Minister replied affirmatively, saying that it would be unfortunate to give the Cubans any opportunity to divert the attention of the public of the hemisphere from matters of substance to matters of form.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 64 D 559, CF 1596. Confidential. Information on the source text indicates that this memorandum was approved in the Office of the Secretary of State on March 8.