CH–31. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs (Briggs)1
PARTICIPANTS
United States
- The Secretary
- ARA - Mr. R. R. Rubottom
- Embassy, Santiago – Mr. Krieg
- ARA/EST – Mr. W. T. Briggs
Chile
- Germán Vergara Donoso, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
- Carlos Vial Infante, Minister of Defense
SUBJECT
- Chilean Need for Naval Vessels
The Foreign Minister referred to his earlier comments on Peruvian military links with Argentina and the existence to some degree of a spirit of [illegible in the original] in Peru. He said that although he has confidence in the bona fides of President Frondisi of Argentina, the recent negotiations with the GOA on boundary matters have not been heartening and the possibility that former President Odria of Peru may again be a Presidential candidate with a good chance of election is a cause for concern. These factors are leading to some internal pressures in Chile, in the Congress and from the public as well as among the armed forces, for strengthening the Chilean military position.
The Minister noted that the United States Congress has recently released the figures on U.S. military assistance to Latin America. These figures show, he continued, that during the last ten years Brazil received the greatest amount of U.S. military assistance, followed by Peru, with Chile a poor third. He said that President Alessandri had said yesterday to President Eisenhower that the minimum which Chile can ask is to reach an agreement with the U.S. Government which would result in Chile’s receiving the two destroyers and two [Facsimile Page 2] submarines which she had expected to get under existing U.S. legislation. So far only one submarine has been authorized, he said, the availability of the other submarines and of the two destroyers depending on action by the United States Congress. He mentioned Chile’s long coastline, with innumerable channels and islands to patrol, and added that Chile has become inferior in naval strength to both Peru and Argentina and is [Typeset Page 288] beginning to feel vulnerable, both on the sea and in the air. He added that during the present century Chile has had naval superiority in tonnage ranging from three to eight times Peruvian strength, but that now the strength of the two countries is just about the same. The acquisition of two cruisers by Peru from Great Britain, one of which has already been delivered, is a matter of serious concern and the armed forces are consequently pressing the Government for arms purchases which it can ill afford. The Minister added that should Chile continue its present line while her neighbors continue to grow militarily, a point may be reached at which the armed forces, public opinion and the Congress will “say something strong”.
Referring to the Minister’s mention of the Peruvian purchase of cruisers, the Secretary said that we have assumed that this purchase was motivated more by the Peru-Ecuador boundary situation than by any problems Peru may have with Chile. The Minister of Defense rejoined that Ecuador has neither cruisers nor destroyers and, given the manifest weakness of the Ecuadoran Navy, this Peruvian contention is unacceptable.
Mr. Rubottom commented that it would be difficult to find more frustrated people than we of the United States Government in so far as these questions of arms are concerned. He said that the Congress is criticizing the Department of State for making too many arms available to Latin America. He added that Prime Minister Baltran of Peru has asked us to limit arms sales to Peru, at the same time confessing that he cannot prevent Peruvian Government attempts to purchase arms. At the same time, he went on, some of our other Latin American friends feel that they have not been fairly treated, as evidenced by the Foreign Minister’s prior remarks. Mr. Rubottom said that we certainly are sympathetic and understand the problem of the Chilean Government and are anxious to be as helpful and constructive as possible. We consider that President Alessandri’s initiative in trying to put this arms question into the proper perspective is one of the most heartening things we have seen in recent years and we hope that it will prove feasible to work something out along these lines within the inter-American system. Meanwhile, Mr. Rubottom continued, he thought President Eisenhower’s words today made it clear that we regard the Rio Treaty as the shield on which the nations of the Americas can depend for protection against aggression. For this reason, he thought, governments might be enabled to resist patriotic pressures for increased military programs in their own countries.
The Minister of Defense then reverted to the question of the two destroyers which were to be made available to Chile under the 1958 [Typeset Page 289] U.S. legislation, saying that with these two destroyers the position of the GOC [Facsimile Page 3] vis-a-vis its armed forces would be much improved and that, therefore, U.S. assistances in obtaining these two destroyers and the one submarine still lacking is grandly desired.
Mr. Rubottom replied that our whole approach to inter-American military cooperation has been based on our support of hemispheric defense and not on bilateral problems between countries. With respect to the specific items mentioned by the Minister of Defense, the Chilean Ambassador in Washington has made this point well on several occasions, he continued. Nevertheless, Mr. Rubottom added, we have a difficult budgetary problem and also the matter of Congressional interest in and attention to hemispheric military affairs, which seems likely to increase and which at times virtually ties the hands of the Department. Moreover, he went on, the naval legislation of 1958 had originally provided for the recipient nations to pay for the rehabilitation of the naval vessels involved, but the Department, feeling that such rehabilitation costs would be a burden to Latin American countries, had asked the Congress for authorization to assure responsibility for these rehabilitation costs ourselves. This attempt to be generous has, in effect, delayed implementation of the program in Latin America for almost two years.
With respect to the credit to Argentina for military purchases, Mr. Rubottom said, it totaled 12.7 million dollars, of which 6 million was for aircraft, a small amount for the rehabilitation of our submarines, and the balance of 3 or 4 million for army equipment. We have no Military agreement with Argentina, he continued, but we nevertheless felt impelled to grant this credit on a politico-moral basis, considering that the [illegible in the original] of the whole continent is enhanced by the consistency of constitutional government in Argentina. He had hoped that with this minimum military assistance it might be possible to contribute to the continuance of Argentina on the constitutional path, he went on, noting that we do not consider that the GOA has any aggressive intent.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files, Lot 64 D 559, CF 1596. Confidential. Information on the source text indicates that this conversation took place between 3:00 and 5:30 p.m. at the Union Club, and that the memorandum was approved in the Office of the Secretary of State on March 8.↩