Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

95. Paper for Presentation to the NSC¹

Washington, September 18, 1958

U.S. Internal Security Program

In the joint report of the IIC and ICIS on the Internal Security Program of the United States, the Council’s Internal Security Committees have presented the nature of the threat involved, the status of some 50 programs designed to meet the threat, and an assessment of the overall program as measured against the requirements of approved national policies which relate to internal security matters.

As provided in the charter responsibilities of IIC and ICIS, the overall objective of the Internal Security Program is the establishment, and maintenance by responsible agencies, of the highest practicable state of internal security, including plans for a war-related emergency. Consistent with this assignment of responsibility, and with the provisions of specific directives, the Internal Security Program is principally directed toward meeting the threat of Communist subversion, espionage, and sabotage, including the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons for use against military and other key installations in this country.

Based on an appraisal of specific programs, the Internal Security Committees have made a general assessment which is highlighted by the following views and conclusions: (1) recognizing the impossibility of achieving total internal security defenses, it is nevertheless possible to establish a practical program providing substantial deterrents to espionage, sabotage and subversion, (2) however, because of lack of progress in certain important areas, such a program has not been achieved, (3) most of the measures required to implement the internal security provisions of our basic national security policy (Par. 44, NSC 5810/1) are expected to remain inadequate over the period of this fiscal year, particularly in the field of countermeasures against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, and (4) Net Evaluation Studies by IIC and ICIS, reflect that implementation of current internal security programs does not pose sufficient risk to deter clandestine attack, nor will sufficient progress to that end be made in the years immediately ahead.

In certain of the broad categories of internal security programs, progress is reported by the Committees. Some of the results of full-time investigative effort by the IIC agencies are reflected in the FBI’s substantial coverage and penetration of the Communist Party, USA; the identification by FBI of U.S. citizens and aliens (now approximating 13,000 persons) who would be considered by the Justice Department for detention in an emergency, [text not declassified] and the development of evidence upon which legal action can be taken against subversive individuals and organizations. The IIC agencies anticipate no material change in the level of these particular aspects of the investigative side of the internal security program during this fiscal year, in the absence of a revision of present responsibilities as the result of international developments, new legislation, or new policy requirements.

In the prosecutive field, convictions have been successfully obtained in cases of individuals involved in Soviet espionage and other offenses of an internal security nature. (Examples of these are: (1) the conviction of a Colonel in the Soviet espionage service whose operations in New York included the use of fraudulent birth certificates, ciphers, radio and microfilm messages, etc., (2) convictions obtained under the Labor Management Relations Act for offenses involving the filing of false non-Communist affidavits by labor union officials, (3) successful prosecutive action in cases involving perjury before grand juries and Congressional Committees in internal security matters, false denials of Communist Party affiliations in loyalty certificates executed by Armed Forces personnel, and convictions for perjury and obstruction of justice arising out of grand jury investigations, (4) convictions of 6 defendants obtained under the Trading With the Enemy Act in cases involving trade with Communist China, and (5) as another example, in the cases of Cuban revolutionist activity in the U.S., 89 defendants were indicted, and 62 convictions obtained, on charges of unlicensed exportation of arms, transfers of unregistered weapons, and violation of neutrality laws.) In other prosecutive areas, however, our internal security has suffered as the result of Supreme Court decisions reversing convictions under the Smith Act of 19 Communist Party leaders, the acquittal on appeal of 20 additional CP functionaries, and the remanding for retrial of 29 others. Although a selected number of these cases are to be re-tried, the prospects of successful prosecution are limited by the unavailability of witnesses by reason of death, illness, or the loss of their usefulness as confidential informants should they appear in court.

Some progress has been made in programs calling for security checks and other internal security safeguards on the entry and exit of persons who present a threat to the national security. However, the development of adequate safeguards in this area is hampered by such factors as (1) the extensiveness of our land and sea borders, (2) Supreme Court decisions under which the issuance of U.S. passports may not be denied to known Communists, (3) the current practice of admitting alien ships crewmen into the U.S. on the basis of visas issued to an entire ships crew, instead of issuing individual visas to each crew member, and (4) the ease with which enemy espionage agents may establish fraudulent identities with falsified birth records and other false means of identification in this country.

The ICIS, in consultation with the IIC, has established, or is in the process of establishing, security safeguards with respect to the substantial internal security hazards presented by the admission of Soviet bloc nationals under the current East-West Exchange Program; the admission of ships personnel from Polish vessels permitted entry to U.S. ports under present agreements with Poland; the prospect of admissions of Soviet bloc aircrewmen and administrative personnel under current policy looking to agreements for the operation of Soviet bloc airlines into this country; the prospective admissions in increasing numbers of Soviet bloc nationals under current policy calling for substantial increases in the admission of such persons as tourists, and cultural, information, and scientific specialists from Soviet-dominated countries in Eastern Europe; and the admission of refugees from Soviet bloc countries whose numbers have proved to include bona fide Communists and intelligence agents.

In the area of providing physical security for vital industrial and Governmental facilities, the Department of Defense and AEC are maintaining physical security programs for the protection of installations under their cognizance against sabotage, espionage and subversive activities. Insofar as other facilities are concerned, for which OCDM has overall responsibility by Executive Order issued in 1951, that agency has indicated that physical security measures will remain inadequate until security cognizance over the facilities has been assigned to appropriate agencies, and until funds for the program are forthcoming. Meanwhile, the OCDM is in the process of preparing an order providing guidance to the agencies concerned. As for the protection of Government facilities housing essential functions, a guidance order to agencies is in preparation at OCDM—meanwhile the ICIS has circularized government agencies alerting them to the necessity for determining the extent of safeguards required to protect Government buildings against clandestine attack by chemical, biological, and radiological means.

Insofar as the problem of excluding subversives from employment in vital industries is concerned, Administration efforts to obtain remedial legislation has not resulted in action by the Congress.

With respect to the protection of classified U.S. defense information, the ICIS has continued to carry out the responsibility assigned to it by the NSC for surveying the implementation of the governing executive order issued in 1953. Its surveys reflect a general failure on the part of the agencies to effect downgrading and declassification of security information. These surveys have resulted in recommendations by ICIS for the improvement of the program, which recommendations are awaiting action by State and Defense preparatory to the submission by Budget of recommended amendments to the governing executive order.

With respect to the protection of other strategic information, under current policies directed toward foreign intelligence collection activities in the U.S., appropriate restrictions are applied to Soviet bloc officials on a reciprocal basis, bloc personnel and establishments are required to be appropriately identified as such, and Defense and AEC periodically alert their contractors to the efforts of Soviet bloc officials to obtain strategic information in this country.

Our defenses against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons continue to be inadequate. Indeed, we have not achieved the general objective of our Continental Defense policy wherein that policy directs that “The Soviet bloc should be confronted with internal security measures presenting such risks as will serve as a deterrent to covert attack against the United States”. While some improvement has been effected in the capability and operation of devices designed to detect the presence of radioactive material, the likelihood is remote that we will achieve in the near future a practical device which is capable of distinguishing fissionable material from other radioactive sources. While we do have less discriminating detection devices in operation at key points of entry, they are not being used in the numbers considered as an essential minimum by the Council’s Internal Security Committees. (To achieve that minimum program, 9 additional Mark I and 60 additional Mark II devices should be added to the 6 Mark I’s and the 162 Mark II’s now in operation). Meanwhile, the diplomatic pouch affords a channel of introduction for small, high-yield nuclear weapons for under present practices, Soviet bloc pouches and other diplomatic shipments are afforded immunity from search even though our devices register the presence of radioactive materials which could conceivably contain nuclear weapons components. Aside from the diplomatic pouch channels, our defenses against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons are further affected by limitations inherent in the control of our vast coastal and land borders and by the limitations placed upon our spot-check inspections of incoming parcels, express, and freight shipments.

In the event you have questions concerning any aspect of the Annual Status Report on Internal Security, I am sure that the IIC and ICIS representatives who are present at this meeting will be happy to answer them. If I can also be of assistance to that end, I will of course do so.

1. Source: U.S. internal security program. Secret. 8 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.