Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

94. Memorandum of Discussion at the 379th NSC Meeting¹

September 18, 1958

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 379th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday, September 18, 1958

Present at the 379th NSC Meeting were the Acting Secretary of State, presiding; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General (participating in Items 1 and 2); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Acting Chairmen, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (Attending for Items 1 and 2); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Acting Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Director, International Cooperation Administration; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, for National Security Affairs, for Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; the Assistant Secretary of State; the Executive Secretary NSC, and the Deputy Executive Secretary NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the main points taken:

[Omitted here is agenda item 1.]

2. STATUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS ON JUNE 30, 1958: THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM (NSC 5819)

Mr. Gray indicated that before getting into the details of this item he wished to raise a related point occasioned by the publication on September 17, 1958, in one of the Washington newspapers, of an article which attributed to Lt. General Arthur Trudeau, USA, a statement allegedly made on the previous day to the effect that the advanced state of Soviet technology was due more to Soviet success in espionage and subversion than it was to their scientific apparatus. Mr. Gray thought it timely to raise the Trudeau statement at this time inasmuch as the Status Report on Internal Security, which was before the Council for consideration, covered areas to which General Trudeau had made reference. Mr. Gray thought that if General Trudeau’s statement were true, it was quite a serious matter. If it was not true, then it appeared not to be helpful inasmuch as it cut across efforts being made elsewhere in our Government to educate our people concerning Soviet scientific advances.

The Acting Chairman, IIC, indicated that representatives of the FBI had talked with General Trudeau following the appearance of the story in the Washington newspapers. General Trudeau indicated to the FBI that he made a talk before the annual convention of the American Society for Industrial Security; that he had thought, in appearing before these officials of industry, it would be an excellent opportunity to needle them concerning their responsibility for safeguarding classified security information and classified critical equipment in their possession. He said that in making his statements he did not have any specific cases in mind not already known to the FBI. He said he did have in mind past cases like the Abel espionage case, the cases which developed at Fort Monmouth, and the German espionage cases which were developed in World War II. He said his motivation in making his statement was simply to alert his listeners to the very real need for providing adequate industrial security.

The Director, USIA, indicated that when General Trudeau raises the hackles of the industrial security people in this manner, it has adverse reverberations elsewhere. Mr. Allen mentioned that the Department of State was presently negotiating with the USSR on increased exchanges of people and that he, himself, has been endeavoring of late to negotiate exchanges of films with the Soviet Union. On the latter score, arrangements had been made for the Soviet Ambassador to the United States to visit Hollywood to observe the making of a film, and the motion picture people involved were concerned from a security standpoint to the extent of requiring a letter from the Director, USIA, before they would permit Ambassador Menshikov to observe the making of a film. He thought that statements of the type attributed to General Trudeau would tend further to aggravate these and other exchange efforts which State and USIA had undertaken.

The Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Dr. Killian, stated that, without belittling the importance of adequate security, he thought that U.S. scientists would feel that statements of the type attributed to General Trudeau constituted a disservice to this country to the extent that such statements created the impression that the Soviet scientists did not have the scientific prowess which they do in fact possess.

Mr. Gray indicated that he had raised the Trudeau matter for discussion, not with any intent of suggesting action be initiated against General Trudeau, but merely because of its timeliness and its relationship to Item 2 on today’s Council agenda.

Mr. Gray then went on to Item 2 and asked Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, the NSC Representative on Internal Security, to provide the Council with an oral summary of the highlights of the Annual Report submitted jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

The NSC Representative on Internal Security then provided an oral briefing of the Status Report (a copy of his presentation is filed in the Minutes of this Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum).

Following the oral presentation, Mr. Gray singled out for discussion the problem of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, noting that it was a very serious one and that it involved a type of attack against which it was most difficult to defend adequately. He said that he had the impression that the Status Report was a little more gloomy concerning the resolution of this problem than were the experts who discussed it with the Planning Board. Nonetheless, the Planning Board did feel that additional steps might be taken with respect to that aspect of the clandestine entry problem which involved the development and use of devices for the detection of radioactive material. Accordingly, he said, the Planning Board recommended unanimously that the Council adopt and the President approve an action calling for accelerated activity to develop, procure, and utilize devices designed to detect attempted introduction into the United States of materials which were or may be characteristic of fissionable material or other nuclear weapons components.

Mr. Gray referred to the fact that new and better detection devices would soon be available, adding that on this score there was some feeling in the Planning Board that a Council action along the lines suggested would give further stimulus to the program and might thereby expedite to some extent the development, procurement, and use of such devices.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Scribner, observed that the largest expense in connection with the device program involved operations and personnel, as distinguished from the cost of the devices themselves. He said that he had received a recent indication from the Bureau of the Budget that the Department of the Treasury should reduce rather than increase the number of its personnel, and he wondered how the direction of the Bureau of the Budget fitted in with the recommendation of the Planning Board for accelerated efforts in the detection devices area.

Mr. Gray agreed that the indication received from the Budget Bureau was a commendable one and consistent with recently expressed views of the President, but he added that it was not his understanding that the President had said that there must be a personnel cut in connection with each and every program. It was Mr. Gray’s view that hard choices had to be made in assessing the validity of all programs, but that this did not mean a personnel cut had to be made in each and every program. Mr. Gray thought that if the military and internal security people felt as strongly as they did about the clandestine entry problem, it was very important that their views be considered. He then related the cost of the device program to the very much larger cost of one cruiser or one B–52, noting that the clandestine entry program has its role to play in our defenses along with such items as the military ones he had cited.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury inquired what the language proposed by the Planning Board would add to the language already contained in the policy paper on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1) wherein it was directed that “intensified efforts should be continued to develop active and improved passive devices for the detection of fissionable material by such means, and to assure their effective use.”

Mr. Gray recalled that this point had been made at the Planning Board and that he had asked the experts in attendance if the device program were proceeding as rapidly as possible, and he had received a negative response. He therefore asked at the Planning Board if a word from the President calling for further acceleration of that program would result in such acceleration, and the response was in the affirmative. Accordingly, the Planning Board agreed unanimously to recommend that such acceleration be directed.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury said he assumed that the recommended language related only to the acceleration of the program as it involved the new devices which are coming in, and not to the existing devices. Mr. Gray advised that his assumption was correct.

The Acting Secretary of State indicated that the Department of State favored the acceleration of the development, procurement, and use of the new devices which are coming in. He said that such devices would be tremendously helpful from the standpoint of his Department in that they would reduce the likelihood of retaliation being taken against our pouches going into the Soviet Bloc countries, should we open an incoming pouch which contained innocuous radioactive material.

Mr. Gray indicated that there was now before the Planning Board, and will soon be before the Council, a paper dealing with the recommended procedures to be followed in connection with incoming diplomatic pouches which might contain radioactive materials.

The Acting Secretary of the Treasury indicated that he would have no objection to the action proposed by the Planning Board so long as it was limited to the better devices which were now being developed.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted the report on the status of the internal security programs on June 30, 1958, prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (transmitted as Part 8 of NSC 5819), as summarized orally at the meeting by the NSC Representative on Internal Security.

b. Agreed to submit to the President a recommendation that accelerated efforts should be made to develop, procure and utilize devices designed to detect attempted introductions into the United States of materials which are or may be characteristic of fissionable material or other nuclear weapons components.

NOTE: The recommendation in b above subsequently approved by the President and transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for appropriate implementation.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the memorandum.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Agenda item 2: Status of National Security Programs on June 30, 1958: The Internal Security Program (NSC 5819). Top Secret; Eyes Only. Extracts—6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.