Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

93. Memorandum for Record of Meeting Between Eisenhower and Gray¹

Washington, September 12, 1958

On September 10, I departed Washington at 5:50 a.m., by special mission aircraft in the company of General Goodpaster for a meeting with the President.

The President came to his office on the BARBARA ANN, and after General Goodpaster had completed his business, I discussed four items with the President.

1. The amended draft of “Instructions for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Accordance with Presidential Authorization dated May 22, 1957” which was transmitted to the President from the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 23 August 1958. After recounting the history of this document to the President, I suggested that it might not be profitable for him to go through it paragraph by paragraph but for me to indicate in what respects it deviated from the “Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons approved by the President on May 22, 1957.” I used as a basis for my discussion, Mr. Lay’s memorandum to me of September 3, which is attached.

I indicated to the President that the concern of the Secretary of State with respect to whether authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territories should be made subject to future agreements and understandings with the country or countries involved, had been met in the draft document. I also pointed out to the President that the draft document when finally approved, would be the basis for subsequent preparation and submission for Presidential approval of separate implementing instructions to each appropriate commander.

I pointed out what appeared to be a change of some consequence in paragraph 4 a (3), which originally read: “Subject to the consent of the country sovereign over the territory involved.” It was indicated that under the new wording whether we obtained the consent of the sovereign country would depend upon any applicable agreements or understandings. The President found no difficulty with this change.

There follow the other points I made with the President:

Paragraph 5 c, last sentence. The President felt the new limitation, which is designed to limit hostilities, was an improvement.

Paragraph 6 a, second sentence. The President wished this sentence amended by adding after the words “numbered forces”, “as specifically approved by the President.”

Paragraph 6 a, third sentence. I felt it unnecessary to take the President’s time with this item.

Paragraph 6 d. The President felt that the new factors to be considered by an authorizing commander were helpful to the document.

Paragraph 6 g. The President indicated that he did not understand this paragraph and wants more information with respect to it. He expressed great concern about security and would not be inclined to approve this paragraph unless there were convincing evidence of the need for it.

Section B, paragraph 2. The President felt it was not necessary to make any change in this paragraph although he felt it was not entirely clear.

Section B, paragraph 3 a (2). This paragraph cites as an example of an attack which would be a basis for a decision by an authorizing commander within the context of the paper, “a submarine attempts submerged penetration of a major port or harbor in the U.S., its territories and possessions.” The President was quite emphatic in rejecting this as an example of what might be considered an attack. He pointed out that we had various other methods of dealing with a submerged submarine, if it were identified and located, without the use of nuclear weapons. He felt that this was similar to U.S. planes flying over the Caspian Sea.

Section B, paragraph 3 c. This paragraph gave the President some concern and he asked first why it was not possible simply to shoot the plane down or destroy the submarine without resort to nuclear weapons. However, as he thought about it, he thought perhaps that it might be appropriate to employ nuclear warheads on antiaircraft weapons and nuclear depth charges.

Section B, paragraph 4 a (1). (General Goodpaster joined us for discussion of this item, at my request). The President was disinclined to accept this paragraph as written feeling that it was too broad, general, and unqualified. He asked that it be tightened up measurably before again being submitted to him for approval. He particularly would not wish to have this paragraph in effect authorize a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union when the attack that had been launched upon the U.S. forces did not involve or threaten to involve the continental U.S.

Section C, paragraph 3 b. The President was not willing to accept this paragraph without a means of authentication having been specified for the authorizing commander. He recalled the Orson Wells radio episode. He spoke at some length of the seriousness of nuclear strikes on the basis of incorrect or misleading information. He would wish that it be made very clear that an authorizing commander in fact knew that the nuclear attack had occurred on the continental U.S. He accepted the thought that it was insufficient in a case such as this to delegate authority to the Department of Defense but would wish to approve personally the specific authorizing commanders given authority under this section.

After this discussion, which consumed about an hour and a half, the President felt that he wished to tighten up the general authorization wherever it appears in the paper. For example, he wished the first sentence of paragraph 4 to read as follows: “When the urgency of time and circumstances clearly do not permit a specific decision by the President. . .”

2. I then indicated to the President that I had made available to Mr. Hagerty a copy of the OCB draft standby statements for possible use by the President in the event of the successful Soviet moon shot. General Goodpaster had earlier brought to the President’s attention the fact that between September 11 and September 15 there was a high degree of possibility that the Soviets would succeed in such an effort.

3. I then discussed with the President the question of attendance at NSC meetings. He approved the amendments on page 5 (attached) of the document entitled, “The Structure and Functions of the National Security Council.”

Paragraph 8 b should read as follows: “Special request members: For all agenda items which are the subject of official interest to his responsibilities until the President otherwise determined. (Currently the Attorney General, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautical and Space Administration)”

In the subsequent discussion, the President made it clear that he wished, of course, the statutory members (including the statutory advisers) to attend all regular NSC meetings. In addition, he wanted the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget to attend. He would also expect the Director, USIA, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Executive Secretary of the NSC and the Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, to attend and sit at the table.

For agenda items which are the subject of official interest, he would expect the Attorney General, Chairman, AEC and the Administrator, NASA to sit at the table. He expressed his view that this should mean that the Attorney General and the Administrator, NASA would not find it necessary to attend all regular meetings. However, he felt that he wished the Chairman, AEC to participate as regularly as his convenience and conscience dictated.

Particularly with respect to the Chairman of the AEC, the President expressed the following views: In the context of modern and perspective weapons systems, there is very little in the way of defense policy with which the Chairman of the AEC is not concerned. Furthermore, because of the special characteristics of the legislation under which the AEC operates and because of the constant effort of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, to have a dominant voice in all matters pertaining to atomic energy, the President wishes to make every effort possible to keep the Chairman of the AEC in the family of the Executive Branch of the Government. He therefore is willing in various ways to take what might be considered unusual steps to identify the Chairman of the AEC with the formulation of national policy. Finally, he felt that men such as Mr. McCone came to Washington at a considerable sacrifice and with only the motivation of service and to appear to exclude them from the high councils was something the President wished to avoid.

With respect to those who attend regular NSC meetings but do not sit at the table, he made the following comments:

Now that Arthur Larson has departed, he would not expect Mr. Larson’s successor to attend meetings. He said that he had never understood why Larson had originally been invited. He felt that the Director, ICA, should continue to attend as long as Jimmy Smith occupies that position. He had not fully understood previously that the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs had succeeded to the coordinating functions formerly assigned to ICA. He felt that the Special Assistants for Atoms for Peace Program, Foreign Economic Policy, Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination should attend regular meetings and sit at the table when participating.

He had no objection to attendance as observers of the Assistant to the President, the Deputy Assistant to the President, the White House Staff Secretary and the President’s Naval Aide.

The President felt that the foregoing would be appropriate for general NSC meetings. However, he acknowledged the need for special NSC meetings, and gave me the following instruction:

When, after talking with the Secretary of State and/or the Secretary of Defense, it was deemed by me that an item was of sufficient sensitivity to justify a separate meeting, he would wish one called with notification only to those who were to attend. The meeting would be simply described as a special meeting with the President. Upon the convening of the meeting the President would be asked whether he considered this a special NSC meeting and upon his affirmative reply it would be understood that the results of the meeting would become a part of the official records of the National Security Council. At such meetings he would expect the statutory members, the statutory advisers, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Executive Secretary of the NSC. Others who might be invited, depending upon the nature and character of the items under discussion, would be the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, AEC, the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, as well as other officials whose presence might be from time to time required.

4. We then discussed the Taiwan Straits situation. I raised the question with the President as to how long we should continue to encourage Chiang Kai-shek in the notion that we would support his return to the mainland by force inasmuch as it seemed to me that this was no longer a reasonable possibility. The President said that Chiang Kai-shek hoped that there would be disintegration from within Communist China and that in the ensuing chaos he would be in a position, with our support, to move in and take over. He felt that this was a possibility and was to be distinguished from an attack by the Chinese Nationalists which would result in their taking over control of the country. He believed as long as the first possibility existed that it was important to maintain the morale of Chiang and his people.

With respect to the Off-shore Islands, I expressed my concern that we would not have the support of neutral countries, our allies, or indeed even possibly domestic public opinion if we engaged in hostilities which promised to become wide-spread simply for the purpose of holding on to the real estate. The President agreed with this in principle and said that he had done everything he could four years ago to prevent the movement of large numbers of troops to the Off-shore Islands. He indicated that he had sent two of his most persuasive spokesmen (Walter Robertson and Admiral Radford) who found Chiang adamant. He felt, however, that another principle was involved and that was the protection of the symbol of the free world. He felt that inasmuch as the Chinese Communists themselves had by statement and action indicated that the forceable capture of the Off-shore Islands was only a prelude to the forceful capture of Formosa, we would be compelled to assist Chiang if this became necessary, to prevent loss of the Off-shore Islands by force.

He did agree with the view that some honorable way out of the Off-shore Islands dilemma was desirable. In this he indicated that perhaps his views as to methods were somewhat at variance with the Secretary of State’s.

Gordon Gray
Special Assistant to the President

cc: Mr Lay

1. Source: Expenditure of nuclear weapons; NSC structure; Taiwan Straits. Top Secret. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up.