Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, Microfiche Supplement, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament

92. Memorandum From Lay to Gray¹

Washington, September 3, 1958

SUBJECT

• Analysis of Draft “Implementing Instructions” submitted to the President for approval by letter from the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated August 23, 1958

Background

1. On April 18, 1956, the President approved the original “Authorization for the Expenditure of Atomic Weapons in Air Defense”. This Authorization covered [text not declassified] the use of nuclear weapons, under specified conditions, for defense against air attack:

a. In the United States, its territories and possessions;

b. In coastal air defense identification zones;

c. [text not declassified]

This Authorization still remains in effect.

2. On May 22, 1957, the President approved a new “Authorization for the Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons” under certain conditions:

a. This Authorization first stated that, [text not declassified] nuclear weapons could be expended for:

(1) Defense of the United States, its territories and possessions:

(a) Against air attack in U.S. territories and coastal air defense identification zones (the same provision covered by the original Authorization);

(b) Against sea attack in U.S. territories and adjacent international waters (new provision);

(c) [text not declassified]

(2) Defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory and in international waters against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces (substantially a new provision).

b. This Authorization also stated that, in circumstances involving nuclear attack upon the continental United States [text not declassified] subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to agreements or understandings with the countries concerned (a new provision).

3. The new Authorization was not to come into effect until “Implementing Instructions” had been prepared by Defense, concurred in by State, and approved by the President.

4. On June 27, 1958, a meeting was held in the President’s office to discuss two issues which had developed between State and Defense in preparing the “Implementing Instructions”. The first issue, which the Secretary of State did not press, was the fact that the retention by the President of control over the use of nuclear weapons was of great political advantage at the present time. The other issue related to the question of whether authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory should be made subject to existing and future agreements and understandings with the country or countries involved.

5. As a result of this meeting, the President approved the following further action:

a. Defense, with the assistance and concurrence of State, would amend the draft instructions presented at the meeting to provide that the authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory against Sino-Soviet Bloc attack must not be implemented in violation of existing and future agreements or understandings with the country or countries concerned. Such amended instructions (to be made in only three copies) were to be submitted for the President’s approval as a basis for the subsequent preparation and submission for Presidential approval of separate implementing instructions to each appropriate commander. Each such separate instruction was to contain specific guidance regarding applicable agreements or understandings with friendly foreign countries, and was to be submitted in one sealed copy to the commander concerned.

b. State, in consultation with Defense, would review all existing agreements and understandings with friendly foreign countries affecting the “Implementing Instructions” and take action as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of State to revise any such agreements or understandings which impede U.S. forces in foreign territory in exercising the right to defend themselves.

6. State and Defense have now submitted to the President for approval the draft “Implementing Instructions” amended pursuant to 5–a above.

Comparison of Subject Draft Instructions With Previous Draft

7. After review of the notes taken by General Goodpaster and myself at the June 27 meeting, the amended draft instructions appear to carry out fully the President’s action in 5–a above. Throughout these instructions, the authority to expend nuclear weapons for defense of U.S. forces in foreign territory against Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking forces is made “subject to applicable agreements or understandings, if any, with the government exercising sovereignty over the country or countries concerned.”

8. In addition, this quoted wording has also been used in paragraphs 4–a–(3) and 4–c, in place of the wording used in the original “Authorization” and the previous draft instructions. The new wording does not make a significant change in paragraph 4–c, which originally read “subject in the case of retaliation from friendly foreign territory to existing and future agreements or understandings with the country or countries concerned.” There does appear, however, to be a significant change in paragraph 4–a–(3), which originally read “subject to the consent of the country sovereign over the territory involved.” Under the new wording, whether we obtained the consent of the sovereign country would depend upon any applicable agreements or understandings.

Comparison of Subject Draft With Original “Authorization”

9. Except as indicated in 8 above, all of the provisions of the original “Authorization” appear to have been appropriately taken into account in the subject draft instructions. However, certain new or supplementary material has been added as follows:

Paragraph 5–c, last sentence, adds a new limitation, which appears to be consistent with existing basic policy.

Paragraph 6–a, second sentence, contemplates that commanders of joint task forces and of other commands, “equivalent in stature to the numbered forces”, might be “Authorizing Commanders”. The original “Authorization” stated that its implementation “will be extended where necessary and appropriate to the level, but not below that, of the commanders of numbered field armies, fleets, and air forces.” This does not appear to be a change in the sense of the original, [text not declassified].

Paragraph 6–a, third sentence, continues in effect the earlier “Authorization” described in 1 above rather than superseding it as contemplated in the “Authorization” described in 2 above.

Paragraph 6–d contains new factors to be considered by an “Authorization Commander”.

[text not declassified]

Section “B”, paragraph 2. Does the term “within effective enemy striking range of the United States, its Territories and possessions” have any real meaning in view of the long-range ballistic missiles?

Section “B”, paragraph 3–a, adds specific examples of attacks. Subparagraph 3–a–(2) cites as an example of an attack a submarine attempting submerged penetration of a major U.S. port or harbor. The term “attack” is elsewhere defined as “a major hostile assault of such magnitude and against such areas or forces as to constitute an immediate and vital military threat to the security of the United States or to major U.S. forces”. Presumably one submarine penetration of a major U.S. port is considered sufficient evidence of hostile intent to fit the definition of “attack”.

Section “B”, paragraph 3–a, provides that an unidentified submarine or aircraft engaged in an attack may be assumed to be a Sino-Soviet Bloc attacking force. Isn’t it conceivable that hostilities on the Middle East might under certain circumstances involve an attack on U.S. forces by submarine or aircraft of Middle Eastern countries?

Section “B”, paragraph 4–c–(1), authorizes expenditure of nuclear weapons “against all elements of the attacking forces, including those within Sino-Soviet Bloc territory.” While this fits the definition of defense against an attack, it also may become equivalent to retaliation in the case of long-range weapons.

[text not declassified]

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

1. Source: Analysis of draft implementing instructions on use of nuclear weapons. Top Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing Notes.