Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

591. Position Paper Used by Herter at 455th NSC Meeting¹

August 12, 1960

PROPOSED COURSE OF ACTION IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR STRATEGY

1. Adopt a planning date of ___________ for the first nuclear detonation in the seismic research program.

2. Authorize the U.S. Representative to state that, on studying the Soviet response to our pool proposal, the United States has decided, subject to Congressional authorization, to open its devices for U.K.-Soviet examination and thus end the debate regarding arrangements for the necessary nuclear detonations. The U.S. seismic research program of about two years substantially as outlined by our scientists in May at Geneva, is scheduled to get under way on ____________.

(a) We would attach the condition that the Soviet Union agree that any devices employed for seismic research on its own territory will be opened on a reciprocal basis. We would also state that the devices would be open for visual and manual observation by the U.K. and USSR, that U.K. and Soviet scientists can be present when the device is detonated, that U.K. and Soviet seismic instrumentation as necessary and agreed can be installed (we will make clear that our detonations will proceed on schedule and that prompt Soviet reply will be necessary if they are to leave themselves enough time to arrange for their observation and installation of agreed instrumentation), and that all data obtained will be made available to the U.K. and Soviets. This forthcoming approach, if well publicized, should make it difficult for the Soviets to make major issues of the details of these arrangements, on which they have insisted on prior agreement;

(b) We will continue to press for resolution of outstanding issues as called for in the March 29 Eisenhower-Macmillan communique, including an adequate quota of on-site inspections, the composition of the control commission, control post staffing, voting matters, and arrangements for the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes. In this connection the U.S. would continue to make it emphatically clear that the Soviet offer of 3 inspections is totally inadequate and unacceptable, and should restate its position that the level of inspections must bear an appropriate relationship to the number of unidentified events and to the capabilities of the system.

(c) Provided the coordinated research program goes ahead as scheduled on ___________ and remaining issues are solved and a treaty signed, the U.S. would agree to a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold from date of signature of the treaty for the remaining portion of the two-year research program we have outlined.

3. A joint resolution would be submitted to Congress during the August session, preferably after receipt of evidence of intent on the part of the Soviets to reach agreement, but if necessary before receiving a Soviet reply.

(If statement of a specific date in 2 above has an undesirable appearance of ultimatum, which the President on July 7 wished to avoid, our approach might be modified slightly by saying simply that we are proceeding with our preparations urgently without mentioning a specific date until a Soviet reaction was received; but we would advise Congress privately that we were determined to go ahead regardless of the Soviet answer and were making our preparations accordingly.)

Upon Presidential decision as to a course of action, there should be prompt Congressional consultations as appropriate and communication with Prime Minister Macmillan, who was advised of our intention of going to a fallback position but expressed reservations regarding any unilateral U.S. action to commence nuclear detonations.

1. Source: Proposed course of action in test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Papers, Disaster File, Disarmament.