Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

590. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of the Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, August 11, 1960

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• See list on page 6

The Secretary stated that the purpose of the meeting is consideration of the proposed course of action, and certain alternatives presented therein (Attached). In connection therewith, it would be advisable to discuss the Congressional aspects of our fallback position on safeguards. The Secretary expressed particular concern about the fact that the House of Representatives is expected to be in session only two weeks. In order that restrictions against opening devices for inspection may be lifted, both Houses would have to act on a joint resolution.

In answer to the Secretary’s question, Mr. McCone explained the mechanics of committee procedure in connection with such a resolution. In view of the jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy over matters involving restricted data, it may be expected that a new resolution, just as the resolution of last month, would be assigned by the leadership to the Joint Committee. Secretary Gates commented that at best the Committee will decide to take no action on a new Administration request. The Secretary said, his information indicates that favorable action can be expected only after a major effort. Mr. McCone recommended that, before proposing the fallback position as outlined in the course of action, we should work it out with Congress, consulting both the Joint Committee and the House Foreign Relations Committee. Informal contacts with Congress have resulted in an appraisal of a 50% chance that desired action may be obtained, provided there is vigorous Administration support. It is difficult to predict, however, how Congress would act when the time comes. Secretary Gates commented that the White House is now most reluctant to approach Congress on any new matter since, it is believed, Congress will be most likely to take no action, and thus embarrass the Administration. He expressed belief that this attitude will be reflected in the decision on the course of action. The Secretary asked about possible alternatives. Mr. McCone responded that the Commissioners of the AEC, who have responsibility under law, have voted against declassification. The Secretary inquired as to the possibilty of limited declassification. He recalled the President’s reluctance to submit matters to the Joint Committee, and wondered if Executive declassification, followed by reclassification, would provide a feasible answer. Mr. McCone asked that limited declassification, under executive order of the President, would extend only to the end of the President’s term.

Mr. McCone stated that, in giving second thought to the matter, he has serious reservations about advancing the fallback position in Geneva. He expressed belief that the President and the Vice President, who are very much concerned about making possible the Plowshare peaceful user program, will hesitate to advance a position which will greatly endanger that program. Plowshare devices are too sophisticated to be opened; a demand to open them may follow from our fallback position on research devices. He also expressed anxiety about increasing obstacles to progress in the Russian position. He recalled an informal conversation of June 23 between Tsarapkin and Wadsworth in which the former adamantly opposed the commencement of a research program before the treaty is signed. He also criticized the Soviet proposal calling for three annual inspections, and the remark allegedly made to a New York Times reporter that this proposal is not negotiable. He doubted Soviet sincerity in seeking agreement. The Secretary recalled that, at the Camp David discussions, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan envisaged that the start of the research program would not be long delayed, and that the moratorium would be in at the same time as the research program. Mr. Farley explained that, while the Soviets may not participate in a research program by conducting programs of their own before signing of a treaty, they do not object to our carrying on such a program earlier as long as they are consulted about it and permitted to join in it.

The Secretary stated that a decision to withdraw from the plan to advance the fallback position would have to be communicated to the British Government right away since we are committed to it. Of course, the President must make the final decision. The Secretary agreed that, in view of the Congressional situation, an approach to them on the fallback position now appears impractical. It is clear, he said, that a political decision must now be made on the future of these talks, which have dragged on endlessly. He expressed support for the setting of a deadline, after which the United States seismic research program would get underway. We should not subject ourselves to a protracted delay while the Russians consider any safeguards proposal we may make.

The Secretary asked whether Congressional reaction would be more favorable if our proposal included a requirement that the Russians open any alleged large high explosive detonations to our inspection to ascertain that nuclear devices are not used. Mr. McCone replied that such inspection would give us needed assurance that explosions up to 50 KT which are announced or which we detect and cannot identify are not nuclear explosions. This would certainly serve as a reassurance to Congress. However, the two principal elements of concern to Congress are: 1) the unilateral character of our commitment to open devices, giving the appearance that we are giving in to Soviet demands; and 2) the effect on our allies of such a move. The French, for example, are not permitted to inspect devices in the NATO stockpile, which are like the devices to be opened for inspection to the Russians. Rep. McConmack especially may be expected to express concern over this.

Secretary Gates remarked that it was time to say that we are now going ahead with the UK on a seismic research program. Mr. McCone suggested that, if there is no prospect of an agreement emerging from the research program proposal, we should go ahead with a program of underground shots providing information of use for seismic research, but also for Plowshare and for weapons purposes. A change in devices making possible the accomplishment of these added purposes would be practicable.

The Secretary raised the problems involved in withdrawing from our commitment to Macmillan to advance the fallback position, in devising an effective way of presenting a cut-off date, and in conducting explosions so as to minimize difficulties in the United Nations. Mr. Allen commented that our public posture would be better if the UK joined us in testing after any break. Mr. Farley commented the UK would probably show understanding for the US need to test, but would not join us unless the Soviets resume testing.

Secretary Gates remarked that, if we cannot find an adroit way to get out of this situation, any program would in effect be delayed till next year. The Secretary referred to the possibility that the President may simply decide there will be no nuclear explosions while he is in office. He referred the participants to the alternative approach at Geneva and in Congress mentioned in Para 3 of the proposed Course of Action, and commented that this approach might keep the matter out of the political arena. He suggested laying out the alternatives clearly for the President. He should decide on the date on which the research program will get underway.

Responding to the Secretary’s question, Mr. McCone said that AEC would be ready for a detonation on October 1 which will produce significant, but not optimum, results. A delay to November 15 would not be a good idea since intense technical preparations at the test site would have to be made during the week of the election, which might be seized upon as the cause for various demonstrations by those opposing the shot, and because a shot scheduled for a post-election date might produce another “voice” seeking to be heard on this matter. He responded to Mr. Gray’s question by stating that three explosions are planned up to the end of the year, but it is not sure that all will actually take place within that time period. Gen. Starbird expressed belief that at least two explosions can be made ready. Mr. Gray commented that the President has made clear that he alone will be responsible for decisions till January 20 next. If he believes that significant results could be accomplished, he may well feel differently about permitting these shots. Secretary Gates remarked that the technical people believe a better job can be done in November, except for the political factor. Mr. McCone agreed, but pointed out that there has never been a shot for which the scientists did not want more time.

Mr. McCone described the first device scheduled for explosion. [text not declassified] Its location is at the bottom of a well, 950 feet deep and 36 inches in diameter. A tunnel has been dug from a location 1000 feet away from the device to a location 250 feet away, with numerous branch tunnels. All tunnels contained lining and instrumentation to test the shock resistance of the lining material. Total cost of the installation is four to five million dollars. The results to be obtained will be useful for design of hardened bases, for civil defense shelters, and for the mining industry. When the information is published, it will prove very valuable even to the Soviets. We should take the position that this installation has nothing to do with weapons development. Nor will there be any fallout. Mr. Allen commented that results would be made available to the Soviets whether they attend the explosion or not. Mr. McCone said that he would supply to the President full particulars regarding the planned explosion.

Secretary Gates, recalling the President’s statement of July 7, expressed belief that the President would select the alternative proposal in Para 3 of the proposed Course of Action. Mr. McCone replied that the statement as to a date contained in the proposal hardly qualifies as an ultimatum in the sense that the President found objectionable.

Mr. Allen asked about the time required for the final preparations for the shot. Gen. Starbird replied that scientists must be summoned 30 days before the expected date, and practice radio countdowns begin two weeks before. Mr. Allen commented that a short lead time is of advantage since it minimized the problem of possible [illegible in the original] and demonstrations against the planned explosion. The Secretary said that the recent Presidential statement assuring that there would be no tests that would contaminate the atmosphere during his Presidency would be helpful.

The Secretary remarked that the issues seem to be clearly drawn for Presidential determination in the Course of Action paper. Mr. McCone suggested the alternative of pressing the pooling proposal once more. He referred again to Soviet adamance on a number of issues, and wondered whether we should not be equally adamant and press for resolution of other issues on our terms. He pointed out that, at the end of the two year research program, we still face a two or three year period of installation. Mr. Farley remarked that the only way to be adamant is to make plausible a threat to resume testing. If we actually resume nuclear detonations for research proposes, we lend plausibility to such a threat. Secretary Gates expressed the suspicion that the Soviets may be testing nuclear weapons. It does not seem plausible that they are developing Polaris warheads without such tests, he said. Mr. Dulles remarked that we have no indications that such tests are going on.

Mr. McCone suggested that the Course of Action paper be changed by transferring to paragraph 2(a) the provision, now contained in 2(b), that our detonations will proceed on schedule and that prompt Soviet reply will be necessary if they are to leave themselves enough time to arrange for observation.

It was agreed that the Course of Action would be presented for consideration at the meeting of the National Security Council, Friday morning, August 12.

PARTICIPANTS

• • Department of State
  • The Secretary
  • S/AE—Mr. Farley
  • Mr. Spiers
  • Mr. Baker
  • Mr. Gotzlinger
  • SOV—Mr. McSweeney
• • Department of Defense
  • Secretary Gates
  • General Dabney
  • General Loper
  • General Betts
  • Captain Foster
• • Control Intelligence Agency
  • Director Dulles
  • Mr. Brent
• • White House
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Keeny
• • USIA
  • Director Allen
• • Atomic Energy Commission
  • Chairman McCone
  • General Starbird
  • Dr. English

Attachment

Paper Prepared for the Principals of the Geneva Test Group

COURSE OF ACTION

1. Adopt a planning date of November 15 (October 1)² for the first nuclear detonation in the seismic research program.

2. Authorize Wadsworth to state that, on studying the Soviet response to the pool proposals, the United States has decided, subject to Congressional authorization, to open its devices for U.K.-Soviet examination and thus end the debate regarding arrangements for the necessary nuclear detonations. The U.S. seismic research program of about two years substantially as outlined by our scientists in May at Geneva, is scheduled to get under way on November 15 (October 1)³.

(a) In so stating he would attach the condition that the Soviet Union agree that any devices employed for seismic research on its own territory will be opened on a reciprocal basis. He would also recall our previous proposal (attach the further condition)3 that any alleged large high explosive detonations for either industrial or seismic research purposes be opened to U.K. and U.S. observers to ascertain that nuclear devices are not used. He would also state that the devices would be open for visual and manual observation by the U.K. and USSR, that U.K. and Soviet scientists can be present when the device is detonated, that U.K. and Soviet seismic instrumentation as necessary and agreed can be installed (that Soviet and U.K. scientists can observe all U.S. instruments)3, and that all data obtained will be made available to the U.K. and Soviets; this forthcoming approach if well publicized should make it difficult for the Soviets to make major issues of the details of these arrangements, on which they have insisted on prior agreement;

(b) Wadsworth will make clear that our detonations will proceed on schedule and that prompt Soviet reply will be necessary if they are to leave themselves enough time to arrange for their observation and installation of necessary and agreed seismic instrumentation that they may propose.

(c) Wadsworth will continue to press for resolution of outstanding issues as called for in the March 29 Eisenhower-Macmillan communique, including an adequate quota of on-site inspections, the composition of the control commission, control post staffing, voting matters, and arrangements for the use of nuclear detonations for peaceful purposes. In this connection the U.S. would continue to make it emphatically clear that the Soviet offer of 3 inspections is totally inadequate and unacceptable, and should restate its position that the level of inspections must bear an appropriate relationship to the number of unidentified events and to the capabilities of the system.

(d) Provided the coordinated research program goes ahead as scheduled on November 15 (October 1)3 and remaining issues are solved and a treaty signed, the U.S. would agree to a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests below the threshold from date of signature of the treaty for the remaining portion of the two-year research program we have outlined.

3. A joint resolution would be submitted to Congress during the August session, preferably after receipt of evidence of intent on the part of the Soviets to reach agreement, but if necessary before receiving a Soviet reply.

If statement of a specific date in 2 above has an undesirable appearance of ultimatum, which the President on July 7 wished to avoid, Wadsworth might modify his approach slightly by saying simply that we were proceeding with our preparations urgently without mentioning a specific date until a Soviet reaction was received; but we would advise Congress privately that we were determined to go ahead regardless of the Soviet answer and were making our preparations accordingly.

Upon Presidental approval of the above course of action, Congressional consultations should be undertaken promptly and should include Congressional leadership and Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees in addition to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. (After Congressional consultations, and only if they indicate that favorable Congressional action on the fallback proposal is probable,)⁴ it would also be necessary immediately to send a letter to Prime Minister Macmillan, who expressed reservations regarding any unilateral U.S. action and will have to be persuaded of the necessity for such a decisive course of action. If necessary because of serious objections from the Congress of Macmillan, the above course of action would be reconsidered with the President.

1. Source: Discussion of resumption of testing. Secret. 8 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.
2. Defense and AEC alternative to underlined words. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined words are printed here in italics.]
3. Defense and AEC alternative to underlined words. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined words are printed here in italics.]
4. Defense and AEC proposed addition. [Footnote is in the original. Underlined words are printed here in italics.]