Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

592. Memorandum From Farley to Dillon¹

Washington, August 12, 1960

SUBJECT

• Recent Developments in the Negotiations for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Testing

Safeguards in Connection with Seismic Research Program

On August 2, the Soviet delegation declared that the United States proposal on inspection of the interior of nuclear devices opens up the possibility of working out a mutually acceptable formulation of safeguards provisions, but rejected the concept of tripartite pooling of devices. The Soviets reiterated their proposal of June 15, calling for examination of internal and external construction and of drawings of devices used in any research explosions carried out by the U.S. or the U.K. (Tab A)

On August 11, the Principals gave consideration to a Course of Action paper dealing with authorization to advance the fallback position, and recommended its submission, in revised form, to the National Security Council on the following day. (Tabs B and C)

The matter was discussed with the President at a meeting of the National Security Council on August 12.

Package Proposal on Organizational Matters

We instructed our delegation to explore informally with the other delegations a possible package settlement of organizational issues. In the context of such a package, the United States would be prepared to accept a Control Commission based on parity between the West and the Soviet bloc, consisting of four representatives from each of these, and three representatives of uncommitted states. Except as now otherwise specified in the treaty, the Commission would decide all organization matters by majority vote. Chiefs of control posts, and personnel of inspection teams in the territories of original parties would be selected by the Administrator from nationals of the other side. Chiefs of control posts, and personnel of inspection teams in the territories of other parties would be selected from members of the staff able to function with full objectivity in the state concerned. Observers on special aircraft flights would not be nationals of any country in whose territory the event under investigation may have occurred and, where such an event may have occurred on territory of an original party, the observers would be nationals of the other side. In accordance with the general parity concept, the budget would be set by equal contributions from the Soviet Union on one hand, and the United States and United Kingdom on the other. The United States would be prepared to agree to requirement for adoption of the budget as a whole, by unanimous agreement of the three original parties.

After obtaining U.K. concurrence, Ambassador Wadsworth presented the package proposal at an informal meeting of August 10. In the course of discussion, Mr. Tsarapkin expressed the personal opinion that a 4–4–3 Control Commission is reasonable, but saw some difficulty in the provisions on staffing and budget contributions.

Sir Michael Wright has pressed our Delegation strongly to table the package proposal, in order to complete the formal introduction of the western position. He has also urged consideration of a fallback position concerning inspection teams, observers and deputies. We have instructed our Delegation not to accede to the British request since tabling is expected to make it easier for Tsarapkin to pick and choose parts of the package he will accept and parts he will reject.

Moratorium on Testing Below the Threshold

Since the Camp David announcement of United States and United Kingdom willingness to institute a voluntary moratorium of agreed length on tests below the threshold, provided that a treaty is signed and a coordinated research program arranged, the Soviet delegation has, at ten plenary meetings and a number of informal meetings, pressed the Western delegations to state the moratorium duration they envisage. Ambassador Wadsworth has urged that he be authorized to state an initial position, citing tactical advantages which would be derived therefrom. We have instructed the Ambassador to withhold such a proposal at this time on the ground that it might enable the Soviets to divert the focus of discussion from the research program and remaining treaty issues.

On August 10, Sir Michael Wright pressed our delegation strongly on the desirability of tabling a proposal, in order to complete the formal introduction of the western position.

Annex I, “Detection and Identification System”

The U.S. Delegation has tabled a revised draft of Annex I, containing a description of components, operations and criteria to be employed in detecting and identifying events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions, and an installation schedule. We are awaiting Soviet response.

The revised draft does not include provisions for the installation of a high altitude detection system. At a meeting of Principals of May 2, it was decided to make no decision at this time as to the alternative proposals on such a system, viz., a complete test ban in outer space based on controls recommended by the Experts’ Conference of 1958; a treaty ban up to 50 KM, with or without a moratorium on tests above that altitude.

On August 11, after criticizing the United States’ installation schedule for “not preserving the equality of the sides in each stage of installation”, the Soviets presented their own text, differing principally in that it sets 15 control posts on the territory of the Soviet Union, instead of 21, as contained in the U.S.–U.K. version, and in that it seeks to establish a number of control posts in such southern hemisphere locations as Australia and Oceanic Islands in the first phase of installation, rather than in later phases. This phase would be extended from three years, as proposed by the U.S.–U.K., to four.

Parties Article

On July 26, the United States delegation tabled a revised draft article on parties to the treaty containing provisions for adherence or accession of other states or authorities. (Tab D) In their response of August 4, the Soviets objected (1) to the use of the term “states or authorities”, and expressed strong preference for the term “states”; (2) to the distinction between states invited to join by the Commission, and those whose accession the Commission finds to contribute to the achievement of the purposes of the treaty; and (3) to the necessity for Commission action on accession of parties. They charged that these provisions are unprecedented in treaty usage and would discriminate against certain parties.

Recess

The U.K. delegation has informally urged a recess, and the Soviet delegation has indicated approval. At a meeting of Principals of August 2, it was decided that the United States should not agree to a recess until the matter of safeguards in connection with the research program is cleared up. Following a meeting of the National Security Council on August 12, the delegation was instructed to seek to arrange for a recess of 3 to 4 weeks beginning soonest.

Quota of On-Site Inspections

On July 26, the Soviet delegation presented a proposal calling for a quota of up to three annual inspections on the territory of each original party, for events above or below the threshold. (Tab E) Ambassador Wadsworth responded that the Soviet figure falls short of meeting the minimum requirements for effective deterrence.

TABS

TAB A: SUPNU 1262

TAB B: Memorandum for General Goodpaster, and Proposed Course of Action, August 11, 1960

TAB C: Uncleared Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting of Principals, August 11, 1960

TAB D: Draft Article on Parties to the Treaty (GEN/DNT/102)

TAB E: SUPNU 1250

1. Source: Update on test ban negotiations. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1260.