589. Letter From McCone to
Goodpaster1
Washington, August 2,
1960
Dear Andy:
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Attached please find a statement prepared by the General Advisory
Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of “USSR Capability in Weapons Development
During the Test Moratorium”. This statement was prepared as a result of
this statutory committee’s discussion of the subject at their meeting in
Washington on July 26–28, 1960.
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The reports of the several briefings mentioned in the statement,
including Dr. Bethe’s memorandum, will be made available to you should
you desire to have copies of them.
For your information, I am also furnishing a copy of the GAC statement to
the following: Secretary Herter,
Secretary Gates, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Kistiakowsky, and Mr. Gray.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment
Statement Prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the AEC
Washington,
July 29,
1960
[Facsimile Page 2]
USSR CAPABILITY IN
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE TEST MORATORIUM
The Committee continued to examine the problem presented at its May
meeting on USSR Capability in
Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium. Representatives of
the Division of Military Application, the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory, the Livermore Laboratory, and the Central Intelligence
Agency presented excellent briefings on the numerous aspects of the
general problem. At the request of the Committee, Dr. H. A. Bethe provided a memorandum
entitled “Estimate of USSR and
USA Capabilities of Weapons
Development”. The Committee greatly appreciates Dr. Bethe’s efforts
in the preparation of this carefully considered statement. As a
result of these briefings, Dr. Bethe’s memorandum, and accompanying
discussions, the Committee submits the following comments.
The General Advisory Committee is convinced that it is technically
possible for the USSR to conduct,
without serious risk of detection, significant weapons tests under
the current test moratorium. We are fearful that under these
circumstances the USSR may be able
to surpass the United States in nuclear weapons performance. The
Commission should recognize that continuation of the current
situation increases the risk that the United States advantage will
be overcome. We must take vigorous action to break the current
deadlock either by securing a test-ban agreement with adequate
inspection safeguards or by resuming testing under such conditions
as not to contaminate the biosphere.