589. Letter From McCone to Goodpaster1

Dear Andy:
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Attached please find a statement prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of “USSR Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium”. This statement was prepared as a result of this statutory committee’s discussion of the subject at their meeting in Washington on July 26–28, 1960.

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The reports of the several briefings mentioned in the statement, including Dr. Bethe’s memorandum, will be made available to you should you desire to have copies of them.

For your information, I am also furnishing a copy of the GAC statement to the following: Secretary Herter, Secretary Gates, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Kistiakowsky, and Mr. Gray.

Sincerely yours,

John A. McCone

Attachment

Statement Prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the AEC

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USSR CAPABILITY IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE TEST MORATORIUM

The Committee continued to examine the problem presented at its May meeting on USSR Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium. Representatives of the Division of Military Application, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the Livermore Laboratory, and the Central Intelligence Agency presented excellent briefings on the numerous aspects of the general problem. At the request of the Committee, Dr. H. A. Bethe provided a memorandum entitled “Estimate of USSR and USA Capabilities of Weapons Development”. The Committee greatly appreciates Dr. Bethe’s efforts in the preparation of this carefully considered statement. As a result of these briefings, Dr. Bethe’s memorandum, and accompanying discussions, the Committee submits the following comments.

The General Advisory Committee is convinced that it is technically possible for the USSR to conduct, without serious risk of detection, significant weapons tests under the current test moratorium. We are fearful that under these circumstances the USSR may be able to surpass the United States in nuclear weapons performance. The Commission should recognize that continuation of the current situation increases the risk that the United States advantage will be overcome. We must take vigorous action to break the current deadlock either by securing a test-ban agreement with adequate inspection safeguards or by resuming testing under such conditions as not to contaminate the biosphere.

  1. Source: Transmits statement by the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission on “U.S.S.R. Capability in Weapons Development During the Test Moratorium.” No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Records of the Office of the Staff Secretary, AEC, Vol. II.