589. Letter From McCone to
Goodpaster1
Washington, August 2,
1960
Dear Andy:
[Facsimile Page 1]
Attached please find a statement prepared by the General Advisory Committee
to the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject of “USSR Capability in Weapons Development During the Test
Moratorium”. This statement was prepared as a result of this statutory
committee’s discussion of the subject at their meeting in Washington on July
26–28, 1960.
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The reports of the several briefings mentioned in the statement, including
Dr. Bethe’s memorandum, will be made available to you should you desire to
have copies of them.
For your information, I am also furnishing a copy of the GAC statement to the
following: Secretary Herter,
Secretary Gates, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Kistiakowsky, and Mr. Gray.
Sincerely yours,
Attachment
Statement Prepared by the General Advisory Committee to the AEC
Washington, July 29,
1960
[Facsimile Page 2]
USSR CAPABILITY IN
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT DURING THE TEST MORATORIUM
The Committee continued to examine the problem presented at its May
meeting on USSR Capability in Weapons
Development During the Test Moratorium. Representatives of the Division
of Military Application, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the
Livermore Laboratory, and the Central Intelligence Agency presented
excellent briefings on the numerous aspects of the general problem. At
the request of the Committee, Dr. H. A.
Bethe provided a memorandum entitled “Estimate of USSR and USA Capabilities of Weapons Development”. The Committee
greatly appreciates Dr. Bethe’s efforts in the preparation of this
carefully considered statement. As a result of these briefings, Dr.
Bethe’s memorandum, and accompanying discussions, the Committee submits
the following comments.
The General Advisory Committee is convinced that it is technically
possible for the USSR to conduct,
without serious risk of detection, significant weapons tests under the
current test moratorium. We are fearful that under these circumstances
the USSR may be able to surpass the
United States in nuclear weapons performance. The Commission should
recognize that continuation of the current situation increases the risk
that the United States advantage will be overcome. We must take vigorous
action to break the current deadlock either by securing a test-ban
agreement with adequate inspection safeguards or by resuming testing
under such conditions as not to contaminate the biosphere.