Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

588. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, August 2, 1960

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list

The Secretary opened the meeting by reading Under Secretary Dillon’s memorandum of conversation of the last meeting of the Principals with the President on July 7.

Chairman McCone stated that, as agreed at the July 6 meeting, AEC had consulted members of the Joint Committee to inform them of the alternative fallback position which was under consideration and to informally ascertain their views. Mr. Dwight Ink, who handles legislative liason, had consulted five or six key members of the Joint Committee during a recent trip on which he had accompanied them. Without exception they opposed the fallback position violently. Mr. Ink’s appraisal was that if the fallback position was presented to Congress through normal channels, there would not be a single vote for the proposal on either side of the aisle in either House. If the President should use the device of securing prior endorsement by both presidential candidates and by the leadership of both political parties, the chances of passage would still not be greater than 50–50. Chairman McCone said that he recognized that our job is to reach sound policy decisions and seek to influence Congress rather than to second-guess them. He realized also there was danger in basing an appraisal upon Congressional reaction to a hypothetical question rather than one actually before them for decision. Nevertheless, he thought Congressional reaction was a legitimate factor to consider in policy decisions and wanted to emphasize the negative effect upon that reaction which the Soviet proposal of 3 inspections had produced. There was much feeling that such a ridiculous proposal in the face of the scientific facts was an indication of lack of seriousness about the negotiations as a whole. Under Secretary Douglas commented that the question of 3 inspections is not directly related to the main question of safeguards.

The Secretary, in reviewing other action that had been taken pursuant to the July 7 decision, recalled that the President had informed Prime Minister Macmillan of the course of action we had then contemplated, including the fallback position. There had been no official response from the Soviets to the proposal which was advanced in the conference on July 12. Tsarapkin had made a strong speech outside the conference condemning the proposal and using stock propaganda phrases, but he had not yet stated an official position. Meanwhile, he had put forth a proposal for 3 inspections to be applied above and below the threshold. He has pressed us for a declaration on a length of the moratorium. He may be seeking tactically to link the quota and moratorium questions. The Secretary recalled that the initial moratorium proposal of March 29 had been linked not to the quota but to two preconditions, namely, the conclusion of threshold treaty and agreement upon a coordinated research program. The Secretary was not sure that his view was fully shared by Under Secretary Dillon, but he personally considered that the original preconditions should be met before a moratorium would get us off on a tangent, and he did not see why we should agree on a moratorium before agreeing on the action to be taken by way of research during the moratorium. Both the U.S. and UK Delegations in Geneva had proposed that we get our positions on the table in the near future. The Secretary indicated that he had questions about this procedure. He would be reluctant to go to Congress on the fallback position until the Soviets had responded to our proposal, but he agreed that we could not let the Soviets delay a response indefinitely.

There was one aspect of the research program which he would like to see clarified, mainly that of the LOLLIPOP event. The Secretary read the letter of July 22 from Secretary Gates and raised the question of how urgent and important the proposed effects tests were considered to be. General Loper said that we had never had tests of underground pressures generated by close-in bursts. In building silos for underground missiles, in particular, we had to rely on extrapolation in the absence of such data. LOLLIPOP would be the first and perhaps the only shot we would conduct in granite, so we wanted to use it for this purpose. The Secretary asked whether we would be conducting the VELA program today except for the hope of achieving a test agreement through such a program. Chairman McCone said that we would, even if the negotiations break down, seek improvement of our knowledge of detection capabilities, although probably by using different devices in a somewhat different series of explosions. Even if there were no negotiations in progress, we would at least instrument our Plowshare and weapons tests to give us seismic data as well. Under Secretary Douglas, addressing himself to the Secretary’s question as to the urgency of the tunnel lining tests, said it would be hard to maintain such tests are urgent to a matter of weeks or months. Our construction program for hardened bases is already far down the road. It is true, however, that it is proceeding on the basis of limited experience. The Secretary observed that this then is not a controlling factor on the speed of moving ahead. Under Secretary Douglas said such information would be reassuring, but we have proceeded so far without any great question as to this aspect of the problem. General Loper said the designs for basic construction would not be affected, but the tunnel tests would give us better estimates as to their vulnerability. The same would be true of our evaluation of the effects of various weapons on Soviet bases in relation to differing with varying CEP’s. The Secretary asked whether we would make all the information derived from such tests public. Under Secretary Douglas said yes. Chairman McCone said that Secretary Gates, in the meeting of July 7, had affirmed this, stating that all the information was of a fundamental scientific nature useful for both military and civil defense purposes. The Secretary asked how much information this would give the Russians. General Loper said it was hard to hold this kind of information classified, as Civil Defense people need this information badly, for example, in evaluating the use of subway tunnels for emergency transportation or shelter areas. Under Secretary Douglas said that since the LOLLIPOP event would be in granite, results would not be directly applicable to any missile site construction that is contemplated. General Loper said it would, however, add to our general knowledge of the question.

The Secretary said there was the immediate question of instructions to send Ambassador Wadsworth. In this connection, he failed to see the reason for making a recess proposal now. Under Secretary Dillon said it was simply a matter of the three delegations being exhausted. Mr. Farley said that our delegation had been instructed not to agree to either the beginning or the duration of a recess. The consensus was that it would probably be for about a month. Chairman McCone recalled that the March 29 announcement regarding our willingness to have a moratorium had been based on two preconditions and agreement had not been reached on either. It hardly seemed appropriate to recall the delegation or to agree to a recess under these circumstances. The Secretary said the principal unresolved issues include moratorium, quota and composition of the Control Commission. He felt the quota and the Control Commissions questions should be resolved first, but he would have no objection to putting in a statement that we intended a moratorium of a year or eighteen months, provided it was made clear that the matter would not be discussed further unless agreement had been reached on other matters. We should also send instructions that there should be no recess until the Soviets had responded to our safeguards proposal, and we in turn had had an opportunity to respond with our counterproposal. We should send instructions that the moratorium question should not be negotiated while these matters were outstanding.

Chairman McCone referred to the telegram reporting on Narayanan’s conversation with Tsarapkin and noted that in the process Narayanan had, in effect, revealed our fallback position. He read the telegram to the group and noted that if we advanced the fallback position, we might find ourselves confronted by a situation that would give us problems on the Hill. The Secretary said it made no sense to conduct these experiments for seismic improvement if the negotiations had blown up. The Soviets say that they would be free to test anywhere. Accordingly, we should not confine ourselves to seismic improvement shots if the negotiations end. Under Secretary Dillon said the first question was what we would tell Wadsworth. We should press for a reply before granting any recess. We should decide what to do if the Soviets come back with an answer along the lines of the Narayanan telegram. Presumably, we should go to the fallback, but we cannot go to Congress unless either the Soviets have accepted our July 12 proposal, which is impossible, or we are able to tell Congress of our fallback position and that we need this authority in order to conduct an essential program and that we will fire the first shot at a specified time. There was not a chance of the Soviets accepting our fallback proposal before an August recess. Chairman McCone said this amounted to saying that the whole matter must go over to the next Administration. Under Secretary Dillon said we must either do that or be prepared to announce, we are going to make a shot. He considered it best, from the standpoint of dealing with the Soviets, to state a fallback position and set a date on which the program would begin, but this might not prove feasible since the President did not seem very keen about issuing such an ultimatum. The alternative is to let things drag on until after the elections. The Secretary said we should put the alternatives to the President. If we are to break the negotiations at our own initiative, we must issue an ultimatum and announce a date for the first shot. He had no enthusiasm for talking about the moratorium until this matter was settled. Chairman McCone said the quota of 3 against all the scientific background we have presented is so ridiculous as to raise the question of whether the Soviets have any sincerity at all. The Secretary said that the present self-imposed moratorium, of course, is in the Soviets’ interest, and accordingly is in their interest to drag out the talks. Under Secretary Dillon said we should recall that if we break off this time of the year, we get a debate in the General Assembly and possibly a resolution asking us not to proceed with the nuclear detonations. Under Secretary Douglas asked whether anybody had thought of our taking our own initiative in the UN with a resolution banning atmospheric tests. Under Secretary Dillon said he didn’t think that would work. The resolution would promptly be amended to include all tests. Testing is an emotional rather than a rational issue on which the UN would be marshalled against us. If we decide to act against UN sentiment, we should take action first and let the UN deplore it rather than announcing action, being confronted by a UN resolution and then acting in defiance of it.

The Secretary said he was planning to instruct Wadsworth that there should be no reference to the moratorium until the safeguards issue was settled. Under Secretary Douglas said he would approve such an instruction. Under Secretary Dillon asked what we would do when the Soviet answer comes. Should we decide now or have another meeting. It was generally agreed that we should decide later. Chairman McCone recalled, returning to the question of instructing Ambassador Wadsworth, that the March 29 moratorium proposal had two conditions: agreement upon a threshold treaty and upon a coordinated research program. We should not agree to a recess until these matters are agreed, but we should indicate that we would sit for only so long. We might state that the moratorium would go with a two year program to be announced as beginning on a given date. Under Secretary Dillon said he was not sure whether all of this would be satisfactory from a domestic standpoint. He welcomed Chairman McCone’s idea, however, that we should not tie the ultimatum to one shot but to the VELA program as a whole, since this would be a better public relations posture. The Secretary said we should draft immediate instructions to Wadsworth that no recess should be agreed until the safeguards matter was cleared up; then in a separate paper we should put the alternative courses of action regarding safeguards to the President. Chairman McCone agreed we should not recess until the research question is resolved. The VELA program is being undertaken in the light of our hopes for agreement. If there is no such hope, we should change our plans and employ different devices in order to get maximum benefit from the shots.

Turning to the question of high altitude controls, The Secretary thought the alternatives were whether to lay a proposal on the table for a complete control ban or for the threshold in outer space. He did not wish to pursue a technical briefing on a proposed control system, however, unless he could be assured the recommendations were scientifically sound and generally agreed. Under Secretary Dillon said he wondered whether we need take a position on outer space at all in Geneva, since technical certainty is not possible in this rapidly evolving field. Any position we take now could only embarrass us three years hence. Tabling a position would just put a new question before the conference which could open months of debate. The chances for getting an agreement on the underground aspects of control were so slim that we need not open the outer space question. The Secretary added that the outer space component would add hundreds of millions of dollars to the cost of the system. Chairman McCone said that in the high altitude area we would again be taking very inconclusive scientific evidence as a basis for national policy and repeating the mistake of 1958 if we reached a decision now. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that from a political standpoint Under Secretary Dillon’s comment seemed entirely reasonable. From a strictly scientific standpoint, the uncertainties of the underground situation were much greater than the uncertainties of a high altitude detection system. We know very little about the transmission of the signals through the complex structures of the earth, but we know a great deal about the transmission of such signals through empty space and about the instruments for recording them. As regards high altitude, there are only two uncertainties: first, that of background radiation and secondly, those of engineering the detection satellites now under construction in which we had a reasonable degree of confidence. There is a much more solid basis for confidence in the high altitude components of the system than in the underground. The Secretary asked what is the danger of the Soviets getting valuable information from tests at millions of kilometers as compared to the danger of their getting such information by testing below the threshold or by underground concealment. Under Secretary Douglas said that for our part we have no interest in tests at such great distances. Dr. Kistiakowsky said such a test would give information as to whether a device actually went off, but other diagnostics would be much more difficult in outer space than underground. The Secretary asked if the high altitude question isn’t something better left to the Control Commission in view of present technical uncertainties. Chairman McCone said there is a good technical reason for deferring decisions on it since it would require at least two years of development to know much about it. The Secretary commented that he was still attached to the pre-launch inspection approach. Mr. Irwin noted there were serious technical difficulties in this approach as well. Dr. Kistiakowsky observed that some of these difficulties related to our reluctance to permit close inspection of vehicles to be launched. He said there was still another alternative: that we could speak of a threshold in outer space not as a ceiling in terms of altitude but in terms of signal strength which was the way we had defined the underground threshold. Detection capabilities of the system recommended by the experts a year ago would be a megaton at at least a hundred million miles and a kiloton at shorter distances. The Secretary raised the question of what language could be used in the treaty to describe these various alternatives. Mr. Irwin said we could devise language for either of the three alternatives: 1) an altitude ceiling, 2) a threshold in terms of signal strength, or 3) a complete ban in which we would accept whatever uncertainties are involved. There was general agreement that the question should not be decided at the present time, that an immediate instruction should be sent to Geneva regarding the recess and silence as to the duration of the moratorium along lines already discussed, and that a further paper should be drafted for Presidential consideration of alternative courses of action on the safeguards problem.

PARTICIPANTS

• • Department of State
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • S/AE—Mr. Farley
  • Mr. Sullivan
  • Mr. Spiers
  • Mr. Baker
  • SOV—Mr. Dubs
• • Department of Defense
  • Under Secretary Douglas
  • General Loper
  • General Fox
  • General Dabney
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Captain Foster
  • Dr. Romney—AFTAC
  • Mr. Beyer—ARPA
  • Colonel Brundage
  • Major Poulson
  • Dr. Leonard
  • Mr. Gise
  • Mr. Grady Frank
• • Atomic Energy Commission
  • Chairman McCone
  • Dr. English
• • Central Intelligence Agency
  • Director Dulles
  • Mr. Brent
  • Dr. Scoville
• • White House
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Keeny

1. Source: Instructions to U.S. delegation to test ban negotiations. Secret. 7 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.