Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

587. Official Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament¹

Geneva, March 15–June 28, 1960

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

I. BACKGROUND

The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament held 48 sessions in Geneva between March 15, 1960 and June 28, 1960. The committee recessed between April 29 and June 7.

The committee originated as a result of an initiative of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and USSR. The Foreign Ministers of these countries, in a communique of September 7, 1959, declared that:

“As was announced on August 5, 1959, prior to the closing of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussed possibilities by which further negotiations on the question of disarmament could be most effectively advanced. Agreement has now been reached among the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to set up a committee to consider disarmament matters. Understanding has also been reached that the participants in the disarmament committee will be the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, and Rumania, subject to the agreement of all the named states.

“The United Nations Charter recognizes that disarmament matters are of world-wide interest and concern. Accordingly ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures rests with the United Nations. The setting up of the disarmament committee in no way diminishes or encroaches upon the United Nations’ responsibilities in this field. In setting up the committee the special responsibility resting on the great powers to find a basis for agreement is taken into account.

“The four governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces under effective international control as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations. Furthermore, it is the hope of the four governments that the results achieved in these deliberations will provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations.

“It is the intention of the four governments that United Nations Disarmament Commission will be kept appropriately informed of the progress of the deliberations of the committee. For this purpose the four governments have agreed that the committee will present reports on its work to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and through it to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. As a first step in this direction, they have requested the Secretary General, in accordance with Resolution 1252–D (XIII), to convene the Disarmament Commission during September 1959 if feasible, in order that the members may be fully informed of the nature and purpose of the disarmament committee.

“The four governments will consult with the United Nations Secretary General with respect to providing appropriate facilities to the newly established committee. They expect that the committee will begin its work early in 1960 in Geneva.”

The General Assembly on November 20, 1959, adopted Resolution 1378 (XIV), in which it called upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The same resolution requested the Secretary General to make available to the ten-nation committee for thorough consideration the U.K. declaration of September 17, 1959, the Soviet declaration of September 18, 1959 and other proposals or suggestions made, as well as the records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the First Committee at which the question of general and complete disarmament was discussed. The General Assembly also expressed the hope in this Resolution that “measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time.”

II. THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Before the Recess of April 29

At the opening session of the conference on March 15th the Soviet bloc renewed its support of the plan presented by Chairman Khrushchev to the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 1959.

The plan called for complete and general disarmament to be carried out, within a four-year period, in three stages. Stage one proposed significant reductions in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces. The second stage called for the complete disbandment of all remaining armed forces and the elimination of all foreign military bases. The final stage proposed the total elimination and/or destruction of all means of waging war, including abolition of all military institutions, courses and organizations.

The Allied plan was formally submitted at the second session of the Conference. As an ultimate goal the preamble of the plan looked toward a secure, free and peaceful world disarmed under effective international control where disputes would be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. To attain this objective the plan proposed three stages. The first and second stages detailed specific measures of disarmament which, in the first instance, would serve to stabilize the existing military environment. These two stages set forth basic measures to: guard against surprise attack or accidental war; halt future production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; reduce existing nuclear weapons stockpiles; bring about beginning balanced reductions in conventional arms and armed forces and initiate steps toward assuring the peaceful use of outer space. The third or final stage outlined far-reaching measures of disarmament. These aimed at the elimination of armaments to levels required only for internal security purposes and the build-up of an international enforcement system backed by universally accepted rules of law.

During the first three weeks of the negotiations each side probed the position of the other side.

The Soviet bloc, in asking the Allied powers to elaborate on their program, argued that the Allied plan did not provide for the total elimination of all means of warfare and did not embody concrete measures which, within a fixed time period, would lead to general and complete disarmament. They claimed that it was not responsive to Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Allies, in turn, noted that the Soviet bloc, while having stated its willingness to embark upon a program of complete and general disarmament, omitted any reference to specific measures by which this objective could be reached; its plan had unrealistic time limits and avoided control measures in the early stages. In particular, the Allies cited the fact that it detailed no specific measures which would lead to the first essential requirement—that of halting the arms race and securing a generally stable military situation.

Midway through the conference’s first round, it became apparent that neither side was prepared materially to change its basic position.

At this juncture, the Soviet bloc took a new tack. On April 11, the Soviet representative tabled, ostensibly to find a way out of the apparent stalemate, a document entitled “Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament”. This stated that general and complete disarmament should: include the disbanding of all armaments and armed forces; be achieved in a sequence of three stages within four years; be implemented under international control; result in states having only internal security forces of an agreed size; and not be interrupted by any condition not covered in the treaty. In addition, a so-called “concrete measure” was proposed. To back up an agreement on principles by a deed, the bloc suggested that states possessing nuclear weapons should “solemnly declare” that they would not be the first to use them.

The Soviet bloc’s “General principles” document was a step backward rather than a step forward. It was nothing more than a rephrased version of objectives contained in the Khrushchev plan. As to the proposed measure of renouncing first use of nuclear weapons, the West’s view was that uncontrolled paper proclamations of intent which in no way would assure world stability or security were unacceptable.

At this point, the conference seemed to be stymied. In an effort to break the apparent deadlock, the Allies, on April 26, presented to the conference a “statement on conditions” for disarmament. It was hoped that such a statement would overcome the intransigence on the Communist side and permit negotiations to proceed on specific measures.

The statement declared that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfill the following conditions: disarmament must be carried out in stages and as rapidly as possible, but with no fixed timetable; nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced in the interest of equal security for all countries; disarmament measures must be effectively controlled to ensure full compliance; and disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control. The statement concluded that the final goal of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to levels required only for internal security and the fulfillment of obligations under the U.N. Charter.

While the Communist countries did not specifically reject the Western paper, their reaction offered no encouragement to the Allied hope that the conference could turn toward a discussion of specific measures.

The conference recessed on April 29 in anticipation of the meeting of Heads of Government.

At the last session the Soviet bloc reiterated its determination to seek, as the first prerequisite of the conference, agreement on general principles for complete and total disarmament.

For its part, the West made it quite clear that unless and until the Soviet bloc was prepared to negotiate and agree on a number of specific disarmament measures, the conference’s prospects for success were dim.

The Allies had hoped that through general probing this first round would indicate possible areas of common interest for negotiation. This unfortunately was not the case.

B. After the Conference Reconvened on June 7

Upon the resumption of the conference on June 7, the Soviet Delegation submitted the paper, Basic Clauses of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which had been transmitted by the Soviet Union to the Western governments on June 2, as well as to some 80 odd additional nations, and which revised the earlier Soviet proposals of September 18, 1959. The Soviet Delegation maintained that these new proposals represented an attempt to meet some of the views expressed by the Western Delegation prior to the recess.

The Soviet Delegation was told that the Western Delegations and their governments would carefully study the Soviet proposals in the hope that they might represent a serious desire to negotiate.

The work of the conference thereafter consisted primarily of two endeavors, first a renewed effort by the Western Delegations to have the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations discuss the concrete measures of disarmament as set forth in the Western proposals of March 16, and secondly attempts by the Western delegations to obtain clarifications regarding the new Soviet paper, in order to facilitate study of these proposals by Western governments.

Our efforts to get the Soviet delegation to discuss specific practical measures of disarmament that would enable the world to make a start toward the goal of general and complete disarmament were unsuccessful. In spite of the fact that we invited the Soviet Delegation to choose any one of the measures in the March 16 paper as a basis for initial discussion, the Soviet Delegation persisted in refusing to discuss these proposals or the inspection requirements for each. The excuse used was to charge that the March 16 proposals were essentially proposals for control without significant measures of disarmament.

The Western effort to obtain clarification of the Soviet proposals of June 2 was made by a series of questions which were put to the Soviet Delegation. Only some of these questions were answered during the course of the discussions and the answers were unsatisfactory. The questions on control which were submitted by the French Delegation were answered evasively. The Soviet and other Eastern European delegations spent most of their time making propaganda speeches charging that the Western delegations were avoiding substantive responses to the new Soviet proposals and were displaying a negative and inflexible attitude.

In spite of the evasiveness of many Soviet answers to questions, it became clear that the new Soviet paper was primarily a change in format from the earlier September 18 proposals, and that most of the unrealistic and unacceptable concepts of that earlier document remained. Various changes which the Soviet Delegation maintained had been made in the September 18 paper in order to meet Western views proved in fact to be illusory or tied to impossible conditions.

Thus, for example, the Soviet Delegation maintained that moving a proposal for elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles from the last to the first stage of a disarmament program was in response to views expressed by the French Delegation, whereas in fact the Soviet proposal would have required the free world to commit itself as a first step to destroy within a matter of months its essential means of collective self-defense.

Similarly, the discussions showed that Soviet indication of a possible willingness to abandon its previous insistence on a four-year time table for complete disarmament was merely the abandonment of this particular figure but not of the impractical principle upon which it is based, that a fixed time table for the entire complex disarmament process must be agreed on before any steps can be taken to halt the arms race. As a corollary position the Soviet Union continued to insist that a time table for complex and radical disarmament measures be agreed to without the benefit of any joint studies to determine the problems or even feasibility of implementing each measure.

With regard to the critical question of control and inspection, there appeared to be little change in the Soviet position even though the Soviet paper of June 2 devoted more space to the subject than did the Soviet paper of September 18. The discussions showed that the Soviet Delegation was unwilling to accept even in principle that international inspectors would have the right to determine if clandestine installations existed in excess of agreed amounts; the Soviet position would limit the inspectors merely to counting these particular installations or forces that a government declared it was eliminating.

Finally, the responses made by the Soviet Delegation to some of the questions put to it made it apparent that a fundamental difference between positions remained. The position expressed by the Soviet Delegation was that the whole range of general and complete disarmament must be negotiated in detail in the Ten Nation Conference and then submitted to a world conference where all the nations of the world would have to approve a complex world-wide treaty before any actual measures to halt the arms race could be instituted. This approach would, of course, foredoom the world to endless discussion and no action could be taken to get the disarmament program started while negotiations were continuing on later stages.

The U.S. Delegation indicated to the Soviet Delegation the general nature of our concerns about the above indicated Soviet positions. The U.S. Delegation had also indicated in earlier meetings those elements of the June 2 paper which appeared to represent some slight movement toward a more rational approach to disarmament, such as the Soviet recognition, at least in principle, of the need to develop improved peace-keeping arrangements within the United Nations to assure the security of nations as national forces are progressively reduced, and the apparent recognition of the need to study at an early stage the arrangements necessary for the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons.

Notwithstanding the serious and fundamental faults in the Soviet paper which the discussions in the conference had revealed, and despite the fact that the Soviet Delegation had refused to discuss the allied proposals of March 16, the U.S. Representative returned to Washington for consultations during the week of June 19. The Soviet Representative, Mr. Zorin, was informed by the U.S. Representative that he was returning to Washington to discuss the various views that had been presented during the discussions since the recess. During these Washington consultations a revised U.S. proposal was prepared. This new paper was based on the same sound basic principle of that of the Western proposals of March 16, namely, that we should proceed with earlier measures of disarmament and then discuss the details of later and more difficult stages of general and complete disarmament. The new U.S. paper did, however, clarify and amplify certain of the proposals put forth in the Western delegations on March 16 and it contained modifications which reflected views expressed by our allies and certain of those expressed by the Soviet Union. Thus, its purpose was to provide a fresh basis for advancing the negotiations.

The U.S. Representative informed Mr. Zorin before the meeting of June 27 that discussions in Washington had been fruitful and that the U.S. Delegation would table a new paper within the next few days, following consultations with allied delegations.

In the light of these facts, the subsequent action of the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations during the meeting of June 27 in withdrawing from the conference clearly demonstrated that their governments were not interested in serious negotiations but rather were concerned only with propaganda.

The action of the Polish Representative who was acting as Chairman of the meeting was unprecedented in the annuals of international conferences. The Polish Representative refused to permit Western representatives who had been inscribed to speak the opportunity to make statements, recognizing only communist representatives. He then attempted the illegal procedure of declaring the meeting and conference ended. His departure from the room required the United Kingdom Representative to take the chair for the remainder of the meeting. The U.S. Delegation, in view of the actions by the communist delegations, tabled the new U.S. paper (TNCD/7). It was not possible, of course, to present the paper as a Five Power document, since none of the Allied delegations had had time fully to consult with their governments.

The Conference held one subsequent meeting on June 28 in order to give the communist delegations an opportunity to reconsider their arbitrary withdrawal. The communist delegations, however, did not attend the June 28 meeting. The Conference adopted the following communique at the end of the meeting:

“The forty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 28 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

“The Conference requested the United Nations Secretariat to forward all records of the Conference to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and, through it, to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

“The Conference decided that the verbatim record of the forty-eighth meeting should be made public as soon as possible.

“The Conference adjourned at 11:10 AM.”

The United States Delegation, together with the delegations of Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom remained on in Geneva in order to be available in the event the governments of the communist delegations reconsidered their actions and decided to resume negotiations. The failure of the communist governments to return their delegations to the Ten Nation Conference, however, created a situation in which further useful work by the Conference was impossible.

The United States Delegation expresses its regret that the communist governments have, by their actions, prevented successful negotiations on disarmament. The importance to the world of the task of halting the arms race and of achieved balanced and staged disarmament remains unchanged by recent communist actions in the Conference.

It is important that the United States continue its efforts to seek safeguarded disarmament agreements that will reduce the danger of war and permit the devotion of a greater portion of man’s creative capacity to the construction of a better world for all peoples. It remains, however, for the communist governments, and particularly the Soviet Union, to decide that they are more interested in serious practical negotiation than in propaganda before this hope can be realized.

III. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

A. Secretariat

As a result of consultations with the Secretary General of the United Nations, all facilities and services for the conference were provided by the United Nations Secretariat under the direction of Dr. Draga N. Protitch, who was present as the personal representative of the Secretary General.

B. Rules of Procedure

Prior to the first private meeting of the conference, agreement was reached on the following document (TNCD/INF. 1):

“Agreement on Procedural Arrangements

Agreement has been reached by the representatives of the ten Nations on the following matters. Modifications may be made by agreement of the ten Nations.

1. Nature of Meetings

All meetings will be private, except when agreed otherwise by the ten Nations.

2. Time of Meetings

There will normally be one meeting per day at 10:30 AM Mondays through Fridays. If experience proves that this time creates difficulties for any Delegation the matter may be raised again for further discussion.

3. Publicity and Communique

Publicity by or on behalf of the conference will be limited to the communique following each meeting. The draft communique will be prepared by the Chairman of the day and approved by the ten Nations. It will normally refer to the chairmanship of the meeting, any new documents tabled, agreements reached and the time of the next meeting. Delegations reserve the right to brief the press as regards their own positions.

4. Languages and Records

The languages of the conference will be English, French and Russian and there will be simultaneous interpretation into each of these languages. The right is reserved for delegations to request consecutive interpretation, but wherever possible advance notice of the request should be given to the Secretariat. Verbatim records will be furnished in the three languages.

5. Seating and Chairmanship

Delegations will be seated in English alphabetical order and chair will be taken in rotation by the ten Delegations in English alphabetical order.”

C. Agenda of the Conference

No formal agenda was proposed or agreed upon. In addition to the documents transmitted to the committee by General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV), the committee had before it the following documents tabled during its deliberations:

Message of greetings from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. (TNCD/1 of 15 March 1960)

A message by President Eisenhower to Ambassador Eaton for the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament. (TNCD/2 of 15 March 1960)

A Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on 16 March 1960. (TNCD/3 of 16 March 1960)

Proposal by the Delegations of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People’s Republic, the Rumanian People’s Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Czechoslovakia, submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 April 1960 (TNCD/4 of 8 April 1960)

Proposal by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 26 April 1960. (TNCD/5 of 26 April 1960)

Proposals by the Soviet Government submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 7 June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev. 1 of 8 June 1960)

Program for General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control submitted by the delegation of the United States of America to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 27 June 1960 (TNCD/7 of 27 June 1960)

IV. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE

• United States Delegation:
• • Ambassador Fredrick M. Eaton, Chairman, U.S. Representative Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Minister, Deputy U.S. Representative
• ADVISERS
• • Mr. Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State
  • Mr. N. Spencer Barnes, Department of State
  • Mr. Jeremy Blanchet, Department of State
  • Rear Admiral Paul D. Dudley, U.S.N. Senior Military Advisor, Department of Defense
  • Mr. F. Richards Ford, III, Department of Defense
  • Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley, Department of State
  • Mr. Robert E, Matteson, Department of State
  • Mr. Alan G. Mencher, Department of State
  • Captain Willard deL. Michael, U.S.N., Department of Defense
  • Mr. D. F. Musser, Atomic Energy Commission
  • Mr. John M. Stuart, Jr., Public Affairs Officer, American Consulate General, Geneva
  • Mr. Robert G. Sturgill, Department of State
  • Lt. Colonel Harry E. Taber, U.S. Army, Department of Defense
  • Mr. Malcolm Toon, Department of State
  • Mr. Henry S. Villard, Minister, U.S. Representative at the European Office of the United Nations
  • Mr. Lawrence D. Weiler, Department of State
  • Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, U.S.A.F., Department of Defense

SECRETARY OF THE DELEGATION

• Mr. Virgil L. Moore, U.S. Resident Delegation and Consulate General, Geneva

V. OTHER DELEGATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE

1. Delegation of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria… (4 members)

2. Delegation of Canada… (5 members)

3. Delegation of the Czechoslovak Republic… (11 members)

4. Delegation of France… (19 members)

5. Delegation of Italy… (10 members)

6. Delegation of Polish People’s Republic… (8 members)

7. Delegation of Rumanian People’s Republic… (9 members)

8. Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics… (17 members)

9. Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland… (20 members)

1. Source: No classification marking. 14 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.12–GE/7–2660.