Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

542. Telegram Didel 32 to Geneva¹

Washington, March 16, 1960, 8:41 p.m.

Didel 32. Secretary has approved position paper on Chinese Communist problem and US disarmament policy. Paper being pouched. Summary follows:

I. Problem: General problem is to handle disarmament negotiations in such manner that Communists not permitted use negotiations for political or propaganda gains with respect ChiCom issue while avoiding commitment on meaningful disarmament program including effective inspection arrangements.

II. Anticipated Communist Position: Communist side may try inject ChiCom issue either by direct initiative or by exploiting any opportunities which free world proposals may offer. Communist objectives would be:

A) To use this controversial political issue to divert public attention from inadequacies of Communist disarmament position.

B) To reap political propaganda gains at free world expense without accepting disarmament obligations.

C) To confer prestige on ChiCom regime which Communists would exploit throughout Asia and Africa as well as in connection Chinese representation issue at next UNGA.

III. Manner in Which Issue Might Arise at Conference: Possibilities include:

A) Direct Communist Proposal: USSR may propose ChiComs be invited participate conference Geneva either as member Communist side or as observer or in some other manner. ChiComs for their part may send message demanding invitation to participate.
Participation by ChiComs in any manner whatsoever should be firmly rejected by free world side. Composition negotiating group has been agreed upon. ChiComs have no standing of any sort before group. Injection ChiCom issue would be political maneuver which could only be designed obstruct serious disarmament talks. Group should proceed at once with assigned task without interruptions by political moves.

B) Initial Force Level Ceilings: Any suggestion that force level ceilings are to be considered for ChiComs will almost inevitably lead to immediate Communist demand for ChiCom participation. In connection 2.5 million ceiling for US and USSR, and appropriate levels for certain other states, it has been agreed that Communist China should not be included but that QUOTE escape clause UNQUOTE might be required.

C) QUOTE Escape Clause UNQUOTE in Connection 2.5 Million Ceiling: In order minimize opportunity Communists use QUOTE escape clause UNQUOTE as basis for injecting ChiCom participation issue into discussions, escape clause should be phrased generalized language without specific mention ChiComs.

D) Second Stage Force Levels: If discussion this stage should be reached Communist side would be likely raise issue ChiCom participation. Phrasing of any proposals touching on this issue under stage two and timing their discussion are accordingly very significant matters.

E) World Disarmament Conference: Question of invitations to possible world disarmament conference of militarily significant powers or any studies relating to such conference would involve political issues which Communists might seek exploit. Handling of invitation issue or any study relating to conference is complex and politically delicate matter especially in forum such as Geneva talks. Separate paper dealing this matter will be prepared. As all studies contemplated first stage cannot be undertaken at once delegation should seek avoid getting into any discussion re world disarmament conference until substantial progress has been made with USSR on other aspects disarmament program.

IV. U.S. Position:

A) In view sensitivity of political problems involved, delegation should maintain close contact with Department on handling of any issues involving problem directly or indirectly. In particular delegation should consult Department on phrasing of any proposals bearing on this matter so that wording may be worked out by mutual agreement between Department and delegation.

B) Delegation should be guided by general principle that until there is evidence USSR is prepared accept meaningful commitments including effective control system, question of how Communist China will be brought into relationship with proposed arrangement should not be broached by US delegation. Discussion of best means handling ChiCom issue can be made later in light Soviet attitude as disclosed first stages negotiations. This issue should be decided by US Government during negotiations and after Soviet intentions re acceptance effective commitments including controls in their own territory have been clarified.

V. Discussion: Discussion section of position paper contains background information including following position given Department by Chinese Ambassador: QUOTE I realize that it would not make sense to leave the whole of the Chinese mainland out of any disarmament scheme, but at the present stage the question of disarmament is largely one of cold war. As such, we must face up to the danger of increasing Chinese Communist prestige and giving additional ammunition to those who are advocating the admission of Communist China to the UN and the recognition of it by the United States. In other words, we may not achieve any actual disarmament for some time to come, but we may find ourselves having lost another round of psychological warfare. UNQUOTE

Herter

1. Source: Summary of approved position paper on Communist China and U.S. disarmament policy. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 396.1–GE/3–1660.