Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

541. Letter From Eisenhower to Khrushchev¹

Washington, March 12, 1960

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am grateful for your consideration in sending your letter of March third in which you share with me your views on matters which are indeed of great importance. As indicated in your letter, we were in full agreement at Camp David, as was mentioned in the communique covering those discussions, that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today and that the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem. To this I cannot fail to give my wholehearted and continued support.

In reply to the thoughts expressed in your letter, and in the same spirit of frank exchange of views I welcome this opportunity, as you requested, to set forth considerations which I think important.

First of all, while I do not wish to make extended comment on your remarks about the Federal Republic of Germany, I do consider that these reflect a misunderstanding of the nature of the post-war German state. An impartial appraisal would, I believe, show that the leaders of the Federal Republic, as well as the overwhelming sentiment of the population which elected these leaders to office, want peace as much as any of us and do not present an aggressive threat to any country. I can assure you from personal knowledge that this is the case, recognizing that, while memories of the past may justify caution, they should not blind us to the realities of the present.

Now, with regard to the basic questions raised in your letter, I should note that, as you yourself say, certain of the observations you make are based on interpretations arrived at in various parts of the world of the meaning of comments that Secretary Herter and I made in the course of press conferences during the month of February. If the interpretations of our comments to which you refer led you to believe that a change had taken place or was in progress in the policy of the United States as regards the transfer of nuclear weapons or information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons, they were in error. Neither Secretary Herter nor I had any intention of implying the existence of or plans for any such change; and upon re-reading carefully the transcript of our remarks I do not feel that an interpretation in this sense would be justifiable.

Your letter therefore, based as it seems to be on misinterpretation of remarks which I have made, seems to reflect fundamental misunderstanding regarding the policy of the United States Government. At the risk of being repetitious I should like to review this policy for you.

It is our policy to avoid the widening of the circle of nuclear powers. This policy is implemented in the actions of the United States and is reflected in our basic laws, in particular the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as amended. The United States does not transfer nuclear weapons to the custody of its allies in time of peace and we do not (with the exception of the United Kingdom which is already a nuclear power) provide to our allies or to others information on the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. Our policy has been public knowledge since its inception and any change would become immediately known. On the other hand, we do not know whether or not the USSR places nuclear weapons at the disposal of the members of the Warsaw Pact or others of its allies.

It must be recognized that states with a major industrial capability in the present world cannot be expected to be satisfied indefinitely with a situation in which nuclear weapons are uncontrolled and they themselves do not have nuclear weapons for their own defense. As for our allies in NATO, it must further be recognized that they have a legitimate desire to defend themselves with the most modern weapons available. This desire is easily understood when it is realized that they must provide for defense against forces which, as you yourself have made very clear on numerous occasions, already possess the most modern and destructive armaments. It is to help meet the legitimate need of our allies for their own defense that we have established the NATO atomic stockpile system. Under this system, custody of atomic warheads remains in the United States alone as provided by law and they can be used only in defense against aggression. The circle of nuclear powers is not widened thereby. The legitimate needs of our allies for modern weapons to be used in self-defense are satisfied, but in a manner which does not require them to produce such weapons themselves.

You and I must recognize, however, that the secrets of the production of nuclear weapons to which you refer cannot long remain hidden from many of the states in the modern world which have advanced scientific and industrial resources. If the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be prevented we cannot longer delay a start on the agreed international control of nuclear energy and a beginning on meaningful disarmament agreements covering both conventional and nuclear arms under verifiable conditions.

It is generally agreed that technical means are not now available for assuring the elimination of past and present stocks of nuclear weapons. This situation was officially recognized by the Soviet Government in its disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955 and reconfirmed in its declaration submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 18, 1959. I believe you also acknowledged it in a speech made at Moscow on May 24, 1958.

Nonetheless there are things which can be done now and I urge that we take the opportunities which are before us to agree to the measures which would bring to a halt immediately the possibility of the emergence of new nuclear powers.

What we can now do are the following three things:

1. We can, in the Geneva negotiations for discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests, stop all nuclear weapons tests which can now be effectively controlled. That done, we could through joint research move, as quickly as additional control measures could be proven and agreed, to the cessation of all weapons tests. The response of your representative to the proposals of the United States representative on February eleventh for immediate agreement on the presently achievable steps has thus far been negative. But surely it is in the interests of our two countries and of the whole world to conclude now an agreement in all areas for which the problems of essential inspection have been resolved.

2. We can support, in the April meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the adoption of safeguards procedures which will ensure that the future expansion of nuclear power production does not itself become the source for fissionable material for production of nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are taking significant strides in the development of nuclear power and in the making available of this new energy resource for the benefit of other nations. Surely we have a common interest, as reflected in our adherence to the principles of the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in seeing that the nuclear power reactors which are built in the future in many nations do not become the source of material for manufacture of weapons by new nuclear powers.

3. We can, in the disarmament negotiations beginning March fifteenth in Geneva, agree to stop the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons—thus stopping the accumulation of nuclear weapons stocks—as soon as effective inspection measures are agreed and operating. Simultaneously we could begin to transfer fissionable materials now in weapons stocks to peaceful purposes with a view to the eventual elimination of these weapons from national arsenals. This practical and important step is one which I have urged repeatedly since my letter of March 1956 to Premier Bulganin. The arguments which you bring forward in your letter of March third seem to me to reinforce the cogent reasons for proceeding promptly with this significant measure.

I think we are agreed that the surest method of dealing with the situation which concerns you, as indeed it does me, is to make progress toward effective disarmament measures. I think you will agree that there is little prospect of achieving much in this field at the summit unless we can base ourselves on solid progress already achieved in the Geneva negotiations. I hope that you will instruct your representatives, as I have done mine, to make every effort to eliminate differences to the point where we will have something real to deal with at Paris in May.

I hope that this frank statement will clarify the policy and objectives of my Government and remove the misapprehensions of our purpose. Particularly I again assure you that my public statements, to which you refer, implied no change whatsoever in this nation’s policies or their application. I appreciate your expression of the concerns which you feel. For my part, I express the hope that you will join with us in the negotiations to which I have referred, in undertaking now the concrete and effective measures which will make vast progress in dealing with the nuclear threat.

Sincerely,

1. Source: No change in U.S. policy against transferring nuclear weapons to other countries. Confidential; Presidential Handling. 6 pp. NARA, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower-Khrushchev.