Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

503. Memorandum From Starbird to McCone¹

Washington, October 26, 1959

SUBJECT

• AEC POSITION RELATIVE TO TESTING

I am extremely disturbed over the effect that the current position of the Commission may have on our long range weapon program and on the treaty negotiations. Specifically, I make reference to the Commission’s current position to the effect that we should place ourselves in a position by 1 January where the U.S. is free to resume underground testing, but without the U.S. Government’s taking immediately any decision to so test (or making announcement of intent). I realize that I am focused on our weapons problems but I have tried to be balanced in my outlook and to support completely Commission decisions and desires without further argument. However, I believe I would be remiss if I did not point out what I believe is a wrong course. I believe the Commission should advocate that the U.S. should:

a. Take a decision now to resume underground testing as soon as practical after 1 January.

b. When the President (or other U.S. spokesman) informs Khrushchev that we can only consider now an atmospheric treaty, he similarly announce we are making preparations to resume underground testing as of some early future date.

c. We take strong and positive action now with the British to gain support for this approach, using as tactfully as possible our weapon (and submarine) cooperation as a pry.

The steps taken in the last 1½ years by the U.S. in test cessation negotiations have been without complete agreement internally within the U.S. as to our plan and long range objectives, and without agreement with the British as to objective. They have been taken generally in the hope of securing some transitory propaganda advantage or in a scramble to avoid immediate propaganda loss (or direct conflict with the British). Because of a lack of objective and plan, we have gradually weakened our flexibility and ability to outlaw only that which can be controlled. Unfortunately, too, we have placed ourselves in a most difficult position relative to resuming an activity we need and which we know is not monitorable,—underground testing. To recall some of these steps:

May–August 1958—We initiated and carried out technical discussions of test monitoring as a separate disarmament issue. Our agreed objective was to test the Soviets’ willingness to reach realistic technical agreement on disarmament issues. (The U.S. belief was that they would not proceed reasonably, would break off the Conference, and we would gain propaganda advantage therefrom.) Though the Soviets were not reasonable, publicly they appeared reasonable enough so we could not break off the Conference. As a result:

August 1958—We believed world opinion thought the technical agreement indicated progress was possible in test cessation and this was a step toward disarmament. We had to do something. Therefore, we announced a one-year moratorium and willingness to negotiate. Our real objective was to get out of a jam, but translated it was to: test willingness of Soviets to “open up” to realistic inspection; or to show the world they wouldn’t. [We knew lower yield, useful, underground tests were unmonitorable, so we planned to retreat to a threshold concept if the Soviets proved reasonable.]²

August 1958–January 1959—We realized from new data that underground monitoring was most difficult, if not impossible. We presented data in hope that this would help our case but without firm plan of how. We realized, too, that U.K. was less firm than we, but did not press to get agreed plan or objective.

February–March 1959—Macmillan suggested to Soviets quota plan. I believe (though am not sure) we had some warning of his new approach. We did not block it, probably to avoid discrediting Macmillan.

April 1959—We finally proposed the atmospheric only treaty but were quickly countered by the “quota” and “a few.” We dropped further negotiations on this because: we could not discredit Macmillan; but must continue to show progress. The world thought we were making progress.

May–July 1959—From the Bacher study all U.S. Principals finally realized a quota system would be ineffective, and the President approved this conclusion. In July (as in April) the U.S. decided again our objective must be to negotiate limited treaty and revert to underground testing until controllable. We avoided announcing (or implying) this intent because: we could not secure U.K. agreement; did not want to discredit Macmillan; but must continue to avoid break in negotiations. The world thought further progress was being made in negotiating an agreement.

September 1959—We announced extension of moratorium to 31 December to let Lodge escort Khrushchev and give time for further negotiation. All U.S. Principals at meeting when this extension was announced stated that objective had not changed from July 23rd, i.e., to negotiate limited treaty and revert to the unmonitorable underground testing, and to set the stage for accomplishing this as soon as possible.

Now—We are returning to Geneva without agreement on what we are really trying to achieve. The U.S. and U.K. are pulling in opposite directions. Within the U.S., staff representatives of agencies are fighting to gain their agencies’ separate ends. [For examples: State to show progress in disarmament negotiations without tangling with USSR or U.K. no matter the effect on weapon preparedness; CIA to get inspection teams into Russia even though this necessitates a comprehensive treaty; DoD to retain the possibility of a wide range of testing; and AEC to retain the possibility of underground test only.]

The key issue which needs resolution, if our negotiations are to proceed without aimless wandering, depends in the answer to one question. We know now (and all agencies and apparently U.K. agree) that we cannot monitor effectively all useful underground testing. Faced by this fact this question is: “Should our objective be to revert as soon as possible to underground testing; or are the political dangers of reverting so great as to be unacceptable?”

a. Until this question is answered, we cannot draft our public presentations to show: that we are only proceeding as the world public desires most (cessation of all tests); or that we must proceed somewhat against international desires (underground testing and why).

b. Until it is answered, our people of different agencies (as well as the U.K.) will continue to pull in opposite directions. Through plan or inadvertence, more and more small events will occur which reduce our ability to adopt one course or the other.

c. Passage of time will force us more and more into a position where we must accept the moratorium,—where the world expects us to find a solution under which there will be no more testing.

There are some arguments put forth to show that there is danger to announcing and reverting to underground testing. These are:

a. This could provide the Soviets with opportunity to break off negotiations of a first agreement, accusing us of bad faith. It might if the Soviet objective is to proceed as rapidly as possible to a “banning of the bomb.” It should not if their objective is a first step toward monitored disarmament. We should be able to show this.

b. If we revert to underground testing, the Soviets may start unrestricted testing again accusing us as the provocateurs. This is a possibility, but world opinion (if it really fears fallout, as it apparently does) would probably attack them much more than the U.S.

c. The Soviets would gain more than we through any form of limited but legalized testing (particularly if they cheat a little). This depends entirely on the energy and effort we would put on the testing we can do, as compared with what the Soviets would be willing to do.

There are, in my opinion, much greater dangers in not announcing that we intend to proceed with such tests:

a. As already stated, our opportunity to resume testing becomes less and less as time passes, and events compromise our flexibility. With the passage of sufficient time we shall be in a position where we must accept perpetual cessation without any realistic control.

b. As long as we avoid announcement that we “intend to resume,” we shall avoid a showdown with the U.K. (and some of our own agencies) on this issue. Unfortunately, this will lead the U.K. (and some U.S. members) to continue to hunt for reasons why decision must be pushed further back. More unfortunately (and in view of fact negotiations must proceed), it will permit them to put forth steps which further compromise our freedom of action.

c. Unfortunately, too, our defense planning (and the defensive systems in development) are proceeding on the basis of warheads which should be tested. Without test we are being forced to compromise,—in some cases on yield, but in other cases on schedules of stockpile entry, reliability and safety. It is the latter that bothers one most, and it is happening.

d. We know there are many warhead advances which we could make with underground test, but which we cannot without. Some of these could give us new systems of defense which we lack now. People will disagree now as to the importance of these future developments (as they did in 1946 when we strove to improve atomic weapons and in 1952 to develop TN). Yet, to me these are definite possibilities which if we lose we may be very sorry about later. The McRae Committee met to determine whether there was need for further test. It has been stated that it concluded we need not test again immediately. This is just not what the Committee found. In brief, it found: no defense system in development would go without a warhead because of lack of test (this was a foregone conclusion, for none are placed in development until we can promise a warhead); systems in development could be appreciably increased in effectiveness by test; other warheads were possible with test (but not without) which should lead “almost certainly” to new concepts in weapon systems and doctrine; decision must be taken immediately that U.S. will resume test, and test be resumed within a year (and report was in early August), if we were not to suffer postponement of achieving new capabilities. It should be remembered that this was a subcommittee of the PSAC and that the PSAC has advocated for over two years (and tried to justify) complete cessation.

In summary, if we, in truth, really desire to retain a freedom to test underground as required, we must announce that we are proceeding with preparations to resume as of a particular date. As long as we do not, the various opponents to resumption (and particularly the British) will attempt to: delay the decision; develop all possible reasons why we should not resume; take steps (knowingly or inadvertently) which would further tie our hands; and to decrease thereby our flexibility until that flexibility disappears entirely. It is for these reasons I respectfully recommend the Commission reconsider its position taken two weeks ago.

Alfred D. Starbird
Brigadier General, USA
Director of Military Application

1. Source: Recommends U.S. resumption of underground testing. Secret; Personal. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Sealed File No. 3.
2. All brackets are in the original.