Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

502. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 20, 1959

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• State Department
  • Secretary Herter
  • Amb. Wadsworth
  • Mr. Charles A. Sullivan—S/AE
  • Mr. Ronald I. Spiers—S/AE
• United Kingdom
  • Mr. David Ormsby-Gore—Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Amb. Caccia—British Embassy
  • Mr. Charles Wiggin—British Embassy

The Secretary said that he understood that Mr. Ormsby-Gore asked for this meeting to discuss the U.S. position paper for the October 27 resumption of nuclear test negotiations. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that the U.K. felt that the tactics in the paper were “exactly right” but that the British had reservations about our ability to continue with these tactics until December 1 without weakening rather than strengthening our position. The British felt that we should aim for an earlier tabling of a phased agreement and a statement that our basic position is that effective control over underground testing is not possible at the present time. The British felt that there was some danger in creating the impression that if only the USSR were reasonable, e.g., if it would agree to a sufficient number of inspections, the problem would be solved. We should state frankly that our present knowledge permits us only to accept a ban on atmospheric, underwater, and high altitude tests. The U.K. furthermore felt that the limited treaty should be tabled in about two or three weeks after resumption of negotiations. We have already effectively pinned the Russians down on the questions of veto and staffing and there is little to be gained by further discussion of these issues. If we go back to the negotiations in the way the U.S. suggests, we will be accused of dragging them out unduly, and as the present Dec. 31 deadline on the U.S. testing moratorium is neared, there will be increasing pressure on the U.S. to declare its intentions about future testing.

Secretary Herter said that the Dec. 1 date was an outside limit. Our feeling was that we should get the technical data on the record whether or not the Soviets agree to discuss it. We do not have a definite date in mind for tabling the limited treaty, but do feel that we should call on the USSR once more to evaluate the data. We must take pains to make clear that we are not being frivolous or trying to back away from an underground test ban, but simply that we cannot run the risk of having the U.S. Senate reject the treaty because our scientists will not testify that it provides for adequate controls over underground testing. The Secretary inquired as to the status of the phased treaty. Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Spiers reported that a copy of one of the latest drafts had been given to the U.K. in Geneva but that there were several unresolved issues within the U.S. Government in connection with it. Also there were several articles, including the Annex on privileges and immunities, which were applicable to the limited treaty but which had not yet been worked out with the U.K. in connection with the comprehensive treaty. The present treaty draft included all of the controls, except on-site inspection, which would be required in the comprehensive treaty. The Secretary asked whether it would not be possible to provide only for a very limited control system in the phased treaty. Mr. Spiers explained that the theory had been that the treaty would look forward to the installation of the complete system in phases and that seismic instrumentation would be included for the purpose of facilitating research on underground detection. He pointed out that the initial phase would amount to a simple control system and that the Commission would have authority to postpone, substitute for, or not install the subsequent phases. The ban would apply to underground tests only when the Commission, with the concurrence of the permanent members, agreed that the controls were adequate.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said the British position was that when the limited treaty was tabled we should propose a specific joint research program on underground detection. If the USSR accepted the phased treaty approach and the research program, we would declare our intention not to resume underground tests pending the carrying out of the agreed research. The Secretary said that the latter point would give the U.S. real trouble since our feeling was that this would give the Soviet Union a de facto comprehensive test ban without adequate underground controls or provision for on-site inspection. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that if there were no such moratorium the USSR would not accept the phased treaty. Amb. Caccia said that the U.S. would not need to declare this moratorium but could in practice simply refrain from conducting underground tests. Since the USSR has stated that they would not be the first to resume testing, there would therefore be a de facto moratorium.

Speaking of the matters which could be discussed by the delegations upon resumption of negotiations, the Secretary inquired as to the status of the peaceful uses explosion issue and wondered whether we should not press the Soviet Union further on this point. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that this question had been agreed in principle with the USSR and there was little reason to press the Soviet Union on details at this point. He recalled that the remaining issues involved parity in the number of explosions which could take place and the “black box” concept. Amb. Wadsworth recalled that Mr. McCone had indicated that we could probably drop the “black box” idea and that, if so, we could agree to drop this in return for Soviet abandonment of the parity idea. The Secretary estimated that we could easily clear this matter up within the U.S. Government if this were the only issue remaining.

Returning to the question of the voluntary moratorium, Mr. Ormsby-Gore observed that the U.S. would be in a bad position to resume testing if the limited treaty were proposed, and that the U.N. would put pressure on the U.S. to refrain from further testing while negotiations on a limited treaty proceeded. The Secretary said that this would be a problem for the U.S. to deal with. Mr. Sullivan asked whether the British would be inclined to declare their intention not to conduct further tests if the U.S. were not able to do likewise. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that the U.K. would have to consider this situation very carefully but that he did not believe resumption of testing by the U.K. was a practical possibility. He said that the U.K. was strongly convinced that the Soviet Union would not accept a limited treaty unless all tests were ended. The Russians have made an impressive number of concessions in the course of the current negotiations in order to stop fourth-country weapons developments. They would not be willing to agree to the level of international control to which they now appear to be committed if underground nuclear testing were to be permitted. Thus the West would be giving up the possibility of achieving agreement with the Soviet Union on even a limited measure of international control, with all that this implies for future progress in disarmament and for the improvement of East-West relations. The Secretary observed that the longer the moratorium continued the more difficult it would be ever to resume testing. It was necessary for the U.S. to retain its freedom of action in this respect. Amb. Wadsworth wondered whether it would not be better to accept the present system with all of its uncertainties but with on-site inspection than to give up this provision and to refrain from testing anyhow.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that that would weaken our position on the fundamental principle of the necessity for effective control which will be of overwhelming importance in future disarmament negotiations. What we should now say is that in certain environments effective control is possible, but that through no fault of any of the parties in the negotiations it now appears that this is not the case with respect to underground tests. We should therefore pursue joint research in this area; while we are working together in such a research program we would mutually refrain from conducting any tests. He said that he felt that even under the present system the USSR would not in fact conduct tests in violation of the agreement and that there would be a severe deterrent to such testing. However, it was impossible to prove scientifically that a violator would be caught. Therefore we must operate in the light of present uncertainties. Mr. Spiers pointed out that under the present treaty we would be accepting a substantial period during which controls would not be in actual operation but during which the obligation not to test would apply. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that a voluntary moratorium during the research program period would not be a substantial departure from our present position.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that the U.K. was concerned about the position we would be in if the Soviet Union made further concessions on the control system. We would then have to decide whether, after these concessions were made, we could then declare an underground ban unacceptable or whether we would have to insist on a figure for on-site inspections which was far beyond anything we could practically undertake. The position could be an embarrassing one.

The Secretary said that we should hasten our preparations for the tabling of a limited treaty so that we would be in a position to decide to do so within the next two or three weeks. He suggested that this might be discussed with the U.K. at the working level and that an inter-departmental meeting be held in the near future to iron out the remaining policy differences within the U.S. Government. Mr. Ormsby-Gore then reverted to the question of the terms of the accompanying offer on a voluntary moratorium. He said that it was perhaps not necessary from a tactical point of view to make this offer precisely at the time of tabling the treaty. However, we should have a prior decision that this offer would be made if the USSR, as it probably would, rejects the idea of a limited treaty, rather than run the risk of losing the first chance we have had since the war to get a practical arms control agreement. The Secretary said that he could not be pinned down on this matter at the present time.

Mr. Ormsby-Gore then inquired as to how the problem of high altitude tests would be dealt with in the limited treaty. Mr. Sullivan said that in the present draft the ban would extend to all tests except those underground and that provision is made for high altitude controls. He said that the technical agencies in the Government regarded outer space testing as too expensive to be practical and that he therefore did not see any great problem in dealing with this issue within the Government. Mr. Spiers pointed out that the uncertainties and imperfections in the high altitude detection system were no more far-fetched than those obtaining in the case of underground tests. There were possibilities for conducting shielded tests behind the moon and the sun, and whereas such tests might be prohibitively expensive, so might the construction of the “Latter hole”. Accordingly, some of our people felt that it would be illogical to accept these uncertainties in connection with high altitude testing at the same time that we were unwilling to accept equal uncertainties underground.

Suggested Distribution:

• S/AE
• S/S G
• S/AE (3 copies) C
• S/P IO
• EUR
• Defense – Mr. Gates
• AEC –Mr. McCone
• CIA – Mr. Dulles
• White House – Dr. Kistiakowsky
• Mr. Gray
• Amembassy London – Amb. Whitney
• US Del, Geneva – Amb. Wadsworth

S/S – RO Suggested Distribution

S/S	H
G	INR
C	Defense – Mr. Gates
S/P	AEC – Mr. McCone
S/AE – 4(ICC:4 A)	CIA – Mr. Dulles
EUR	White House – Dr. Kistiakowsky Mr. Gray
IO	Amembassy London – Amb. Whitney
	US Del, Geneva – Amb. Wadsworth

1. Source: Tabling a limited treaty in nuclear test negotiations. Secret; Limit Distribution. 5 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.