501. Memorandum From Keeny to
Kistiakowsky1
Washington, October 15,
1959
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Suggested Course of Action for U.S. Delegation in Nuclear Test
Negotiations
Attached is a copy of the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the
forthcoming continuation of the Nuclear Test Negotiations as approved by
Dillon and a copy of a
letter from Gates to Dillon
commenting on these instructions. Dillon has informed Gates that his suggested change in
the “objective” will not be incorporated in the instructions. I learned
privately that the original letter from Defense as prepared by Irwin was
considerably stronger and that Gates has toned it down before
signing.
With regard to the instructions, I consider them acceptable in view of
present policy decision. However, the delegation can probably count on
some real trouble since it cannot state any quota that would be
acceptable to U.S. If pressed on this by Soviets as it probably will be,
the Delegation will have problem in maintaining illusion that we would
accept comprehensive treaty if Soviets were only reasonable on
inspections.
Attachment
Instructions for the U.S. Delegation
Washington,
October 14,
1959
[Facsimile Page 2]
Suggested Course of Action for U.S. Delegation In
Nuclear Test Negotiations
Objective
Upon resumption of the nuclear test negotiations in Geneva, the
objective of the U.S. Delegation will be to direct the negotiations
so as to place the United States, by December 1, in a favorable
position to table a phased treaty in accordance with the
Presidential decision of July 23. Without exposing our hand at
present, the U.S. Delegation should seek
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to demonstrate in a decisive
way the Soviet attitude toward the technical and political
requirements of effective international control.
Tactics
In order to accomplish this objective, the delegation should
demonstrate clearly the the uncertainties, the unresolved problems,
and the specific requirements of effective control (particularly as
regards underground detection in the light of new technical data)
and Soviet unwillingness to meet even minimal essentials of control.
For this purpose it is necessary to discuss the requirements of
effective control in terms of technical data from seismic
measurements (and their interpretation), relating to detection and
identification of underground disturbances; the effectiveness of
various levels of inspection; uncertainties to be resolved; and the
possibilities and uncertainties of system improvements. While
principal emphasis should be put on the new technical data and the
underground test detection and identification problem, unacceptable
Soviet positions on the veto, on staffing, on freedom of access, and
possibly on phasing, should also be highlighted in order that the
technical issue will not be the sole basis for subsequent U.S.
action and in order not to forewarn the Soviets of our
intentions.
Timing
Timing is of the utmost importance if we are to put ourselves in a
position to make a definitive move and avoid further indefinite
inconclusive negotiations. The program on resumption might take
generally the following lines:
- (a)
- Recall Soviet unwillingness to face up to the implications
of the new data and again propose technical discussion of
these data.
- (b)
- Even if this is not accepted, the delegation should
immediately embark upon a full exposition of our own
analysis of the new data and the problem of on-site
inspection. While we could not use the full Bacher panel
type of quantitative analysis, in view of the necessity to
omit the intelligence factor and the arbitrariness of the
numerical probabilities assigned to the success of on-site
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inspection, the general assessment of the number of
unidentified events even with Berkner improvements and the
level and freedom of inspection required to have any
substantial chance of identification could be extensively
presented. The technical presentations should be
sufficiently of [illegible in the original] raw data and
descriptions of instrumentation employed to discredit
completely any future Soviet efforts to sustain allegations
that the United States has not supplied sufficient
information to permit full evaluation and discussion of the
new seismic data. The presentation should include a
discussion of decoupling possibilities, including the theory
of the Latter hole technique. It should also include a
technical justification for whatever treaty language we
provide on high altitude detection. The approach would be
not to present or defend a specific U.S. number of
inspections, but to expose the unreasonableness of the
Soviet claim to favor effective inspection while at the same
time accepting only “a few” annual
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on-site inspections.
We should highlight the Soviet refusal to discuss the
relationship of level of inspection to technical facts:
accept improvements required to restore even in part the
estimated capabilities of the system designed by the Geneva
Experts in 1958; discuss the latest available
instrumentation and supply data or join in experimental
efforts to improve detection capabilities.
Our line on
the Soviet proposal for a predetermined number of annual
inspections [illegible in the original] would be (as in the
President’s May 5 letter to Khrushchev) that the principle of not
inspecting every unidentified event is not an issue in view
of our similar original position in our draft Annex I
limiting inspection to a percentage of unidentified events.
Our objection is to the Soviet view that the number of
inspections is based entirely on political and not on
technical considerations.
- (c)
- We would follow or intersperse our presentation on the
detection problem with summary speeches on the veto, on
staffing (in this case particularly a “signing off” speech
in view of the line already taken by Ambassador Wadsworth that we have
reached our final position on this matter); and freedom of
access of inspectors (preferably accompanying this by
introduction of Annex II on Privileges and
Immunities).
