501. Memorandum From Keeny to
Kistiakowsky1
Washington, October 15,
1959
[Facsimile Page 1]
SUBJECT
- Suggested Course of Action for U.S. Delegation in Nuclear Test
Negotiations
Attached is a copy of the instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the
forthcoming continuation of the Nuclear Test Negotiations as approved by
Dillon and a copy of a letter
from Gates to Dillon commenting on
these instructions. Dillon has
informed Gates that his suggested change in the “objective” will not be
incorporated in the instructions. I learned privately that the original
letter from Defense as prepared by Irwin was considerably stronger and that
Gates has toned it down before signing.
With regard to the instructions, I consider them acceptable in view of
present policy decision. However, the delegation can probably count on some
real trouble since it cannot state any quota that would be acceptable to
U.S. If pressed on this by Soviets as it probably will be, the Delegation
will have problem in maintaining illusion that we would accept comprehensive
treaty if Soviets were only reasonable on inspections.
Attachment
Instructions for the U.S. Delegation
Washington, October 14,
1959
[Facsimile Page 2]
Suggested Course of Action for U.S. Delegation In Nuclear
Test Negotiations
Objective
Upon resumption of the nuclear test negotiations in Geneva, the objective
of the U.S. Delegation will be to direct the negotiations so as to place
the United States, by December 1, in a favorable position to table a
phased treaty in accordance with the Presidential decision of July 23.
Without exposing our hand at present, the U.S. Delegation should seek
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to
demonstrate in a decisive way the Soviet attitude toward the technical
and political requirements of effective international control.
Tactics
In order to accomplish this objective, the delegation should demonstrate
clearly the the uncertainties, the unresolved problems, and the specific
requirements of effective control (particularly as regards underground
detection in the light of new technical data) and Soviet unwillingness
to meet even minimal essentials of control. For this purpose it is
necessary to discuss the requirements of effective control in terms of
technical data from seismic measurements (and their interpretation),
relating to detection and identification of underground disturbances;
the effectiveness of various levels of inspection; uncertainties to be
resolved; and the possibilities and uncertainties of system
improvements. While principal emphasis should be put on the new
technical data and the underground test detection and identification
problem, unacceptable Soviet positions on the veto, on staffing, on
freedom of access, and possibly on phasing, should also be highlighted
in order that the technical issue will not be the sole basis for
subsequent U.S. action and in order not to forewarn the Soviets of our
intentions.
Timing
Timing is of the utmost importance if we are to put ourselves in a
position to make a definitive move and avoid further indefinite
inconclusive negotiations. The program on resumption might take
generally the following lines:
- (a)
- Recall Soviet unwillingness to face up to the implications of
the new data and again propose technical discussion of these
data.
- (b)
- Even if this is not accepted, the delegation should
immediately embark upon a full exposition of our own analysis of
the new data and the problem of on-site inspection. While we
could not use the full Bacher panel type of quantitative
analysis, in view of the necessity to omit the intelligence
factor and the arbitrariness of the numerical probabilities
assigned to the success of on-site
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inspection, the general
assessment of the number of unidentified events even with
Berkner improvements and the level and freedom of inspection
required to have any substantial chance of identification could
be extensively presented. The technical presentations should be
sufficiently of [illegible in the original] raw data and
descriptions of instrumentation employed to discredit completely
any future Soviet efforts to sustain allegations that the United
States has not supplied sufficient information to permit full
evaluation and discussion of the new seismic data. The
presentation should include a discussion of decoupling
possibilities, including the theory of the Latter hole
technique. It should also include a technical justification for
whatever treaty language we provide on high altitude detection.
The approach would be not to present or defend a specific U.S.
number of inspections, but to expose the unreasonableness of the
Soviet claim to favor effective inspection while at the same
time accepting only “a few” annual
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on-site inspections. We
should highlight the Soviet refusal to discuss the relationship
of level of inspection to technical facts: accept improvements
required to restore even in part the estimated capabilities of
the system designed by the Geneva Experts in 1958; discuss the
latest available instrumentation and supply data or join in
experimental efforts to improve detection capabilities.
Our
line on the Soviet proposal for a predetermined number of annual
inspections [illegible in the original] would be (as in the
President’s May 5 letter to Khrushchev) that the principle of not inspecting
every unidentified event is not an issue in view of our similar
original position in our draft Annex I limiting inspection to a
percentage of unidentified events. Our objection is to the
Soviet view that the number of inspections is based entirely on
political and not on technical considerations. - (c)
- We would follow or intersperse our presentation on the
detection problem with summary speeches on the veto, on staffing
(in this case particularly a “signing off” speech in view of the
line already taken by Ambassador Wadsworth that we have reached our final
position on this matter); and freedom of access of inspectors
(preferably accompanying this by introduction of Annex II on
Privileges and Immunities).
