484. Telegram Cahto 201 From Herter at Geneva1
Cahto 201. For the Acting Secretary. Wadsworth and I met with Lloyd, Wright, Laskey and Morgan of UKdel August 1 and informed the group about latest schedule of Killian and his group re coming [Typeset Page 1702] to London. Lloyd indicated this was acceptable to them, not knowing at the moment where Penney was. He thought that if their scientists agreed with the latest U.S. findings and with a two to three year research and experimentation program that the UK might agree that we cannot accept disarmament agreements which cannot be controlled; i.e., we could not yet sign treaty banning underground tests.
Lloyd expressed considerable concern about impact of present US plan on the General Assembly. He pointed out that unless the US–UK did something about continuing the moratorium on tests other than experimentation for the detection system, we stood a good chance of receiving a resounding defeat in the Assembly. He thought that world opinion would be “aghast” if the West resumed testing, that the Irish res presented certain difficulties and that a res calling for a moratorium might even be passed. He further thought that the West’s strongest point was the Russian refusal to discuss the new seismic data and that we should play the hand on that.
I replied that I felt this would not be as serious as Lloyd thought, since most of the world objected to tests because of fall-out and the results thereof.
Lloyd pointed out that although this was true, the Soviets would be sure to make a great deal of mileage with an argument to the effect that this proved that we never had wished to have a comprehensive test ban and that the “anti-treaty forces” [Facsimile Page 2] in Washington had won the day.
All of the above predicated on assumption that Sovs would not agree to the negotiation of a limited treaty.
On further procedural matters it was agreed that Killian-Penney group should come to Geneva from London as soon as they had reached agreement. It was thought doubtful that Federov (USSR) would return to Geneva from Moscow, but it was agreed that Western scientific position should be placed upon record by Penney and Killian. It was also agreed that Western dels should table the alternative limited treaty covering atmospheric, high altitude and underwater explosions together with an undertaking to carry out the research needed, with Russian cooperation.
Considerable conversation then ensued about the advisability of making an announcement that when, as and if research and experimentation had resulted in a detection system in which we could have confidence, the US would accept the quota idea in principle. It was generally agreed that this might be a good tactical move and that it might lead the Sovs closer to agreement to join with the West in the experimentation program.
It was agreed that we would wait until completion of London talks between Killian and Penney before setting up any rigid timetable for the future. In any event, Killian and Penney should first agree on the scientific position. We could drag out the conference until they could come to Geneva and present their data. We might then suggest a recess to allow the Russians to consider the new package. Lloyd thought we should keep the [Typeset Page 1703] test conf in existence and try to delay a GA rpt GA disarmament debate at least until November with the conf still in progress to that time. It was also pointed out that there is a lot of hard work to be done on the alternative draft treaty and that it would be important to receive US Govt’s decision on the high altitude report which, according to UK group, had been accepted by the UK as an “acceptance as correct technical assessment.”
- Source: Discussions with U.K. on nuclear test ban talks. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 700.5611/8–359.↩