485. Letter From McElroy to Eisenhower1
In keeping with your announcement on August 22, 1958, of a one-year’s suspension of nuclear weapons testing, I issued certain instructions concerning preparations to be made by the Department of Defense for the resumption of testing after expiration of the suspension period. Specifically, I directed that preparations be made for conducting a limited test series not earlier than February 1960 and a more comprehensive series involving overseas operations by the middle of the Calendar Year 1960. These periods were selected with due regard to the preparatory time required and on the assumption that by the middle of 1959 we would be able to make a fair evaluation of the chances of success or failure of the test cessation negotiations.
On the basis of these instructions two test series were planned; first, a single underground shot to simulate certain effects of explosions at very high altitude, as an important consideration in the design of anti-ICBM systems; second, a comprehensive overseas series to thoroughly investigate the effects of very altitude explosions on communications, radar, materiel and personnel; to further investigate safe delivery and kill distances for anti-submarine weapons and to determine the necessary characteristics of fully hardened ICBM launching sites.
No substantial expenditures for the proposed underground test are required at this time.
[Typeset Page 1704] [Facsimile Page 2]However, we have now reached a point when considerable sums must be expended in preparations for the more comprehensive program if it to be conducted as scheduled during Calendar Year 1960. It is estimated that between the present date and the end of October 1959 from $30 to $40 million would have to be committed in preparations for this test series if the presently placed operational date is to be met.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, have advised me that the data to be obtained from these tests are of great importance to the design and operational employment of the several weapons systems to which they apply. The very high altitude tests, in particular, are designed to obtain information on interruptions or blackouts of communications and other effects of nuclear explosions in a hitherto relatively unexplored environment which may be of vital importance to our future defensive posture. These high altitude explosions would also serve as a partial test of the effectiveness of the detection system recently agreed upon at the Geneva Conference.
I recognize, however, that there are many factors which may make it impracticable to arrive at a firm decision at this time concerning the resumption of testing both as to timing and as to scope. While I am extremely reluctant to foreclose the possibility of obtaining, at the earliest possible date, the much needed data to be derived from the planned test series, I have concluded that it would be unwise to embark upon the expensive preparations required until the outcome of the Geneva negotiations and its effect on future U.S. policy can be determined. Accordingly, I am issuing instructions to the effect that within the Department of Defense modest preparations for one or more underground tests in Calendar Year 1960 will continue and that preparations for the more extensive series, including underwater and high altitude tests, will be limited to maintaining test plans [Facsimile Page 3] in a current status and to the procurement of very long lead time items only. These instructions will mean, in effect, that subject to a determination of policy by the end of this year, limited underground testing could be conducted in the Spring of 1960 and that a comprehensive series involving overseas operations could be conducted in the Spring of 1961.
I am aware that the Atomic Energy Commission, in response to specific weapons development requests placed by the Department of Defense and in pursuit of advances in the state of the art, has also tentatively planned a number of tests involving both underground and high altitude explosions. These development tests are of equal or greater importance to the Department of Defense than the weapons effects tests referred to above. Inasmuch as the need for these tests is being studied at your direction by Dr. Kistiakowsky, it would not appear appropriate for me to comment on the Commission’s plans at this time.
With great respect, I am
Faithfully yours,
- Source: Plans to resume testing. Secret. 4 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, McElroy, Neil, 1959.↩