48. Record of Telephone Conversation Between John Foster Dulles and Anderson1
TELEPHONE CALL FROM SECRETARY ANDERSON
The Sec returned the call and A said he was briefed for NSC tomorrow. It seems to him we are getting away from what he has thought of as military power being a means of enforcing the policies of the U.S. and being an implement by which we achieve our policy. A thinks we should develop more flexibility to give strength to State—apart from dropping the atomic bomb. The Sec said the trouble is people doubt we would do it and therefore we have nothing. The Sec went to the Pres and asked if he could not go to Defense and meet with the officials and JCS and discuss this problem and he agreed and the Sec went and they are making a review of the strategic concept, but the fact is our present policies are running into a dead end. They agreed we need more flexibility but also think we are getting more in the way of deterrent power than we need. A said if he says he thinks we should have more flexibility they say this is good—give us money for the nuclear defense and [illegible in the original] what we need for flexibility. We, said the Sec, have got to make some kind of an estimate and admit it cannot be 100%. Our deterrent capacity does not go down as the Soviet capacity goes up. The Sec said it goes down as they develop means of shooting down bombers so we can’t get through. The Sec thinks we are embarked on a [Facsimile Page 2] a theory—not on a really thought-out thing. We are trying to get all we can as fast as we can and not accepting any limit other than the limit which seems to be imposed by physical limitations or lack of knowledge or budgetary controls. If we are given knowledge and no limitation from a budget point of view, there is no limit. A said it will never be settled by Defense or the JCS and the Sec agreed. A said para 14 is the focus of it and he was wondering tomorrow. . . . The Sec. said we should spend several sessions on it. A said to get the top fellows of the NSC spelling it out clearly, review it for the Pres and take it in as top-side policy for his consideration. The is the top problem ever since A hit Defense. A said it is worthy of such time and debate as it takes to get it resolved. The Sec did initiate this request to reexamine the strategic concept which involves pretty much what is in para 14. He might want to see it before we try to formulate this. A said that is perfectly all right. They agreed it is crazy to resolve the paper between [Typeset Page 178] 9 and 11. The Sec thinks at the proper time the three of them (probably McElroy too) should sit down and work out what they think is sound, show it to the Pres but it should come from the top down and not down up. A agreed and said we should not pass on this.
- Source: Basic national security policy. No classification marking. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations.↩