Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

47. Memorandum from Twining to McElroy.¹

Washington, April 25, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5810

1. With respect to the Service comments on the whole of the proposed Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5810, I do not agree with the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view, nor do I agree with the Air Force position.

2. The key to both positions is the wording of paragraph 14 in the draft statement of the Basic National Policy.

3. The wording supported in the Army-Navy-Marine Corps view was proposed by the Chairman of the Planning Board, General Cutler, contrary to the views of the majority of the Planning Board. In my judgment, this wording would water down our resolution to strike back against Russia in any aggression, and would indicate that we are willing to conduct limited wars without using the force required. This intent would probably become known to the USSR and would be an invitation to start limited wars.

4. The Air Force position supports the wording in paragraph 14 as now written in the draft, which is a repeat from last year’s edition of the statement of Basic National Security Policy—NSC 5707/8. However, it proposes delaying the settlement of this issue until the results of a study now being conducted jointly by State, Defense, and the JCS are available. This study was directed by NSC action No. 1844b and is an investigation of limited wars. In my judgment, there is no need to await the findings of this study in order to settle one of the most important controversies in military strategy of recent years. We have sufficient information at hand, now, for decision.

5. I recommend that your position before the National Security Council be to support the wording of paragraphs 13 and 14 as now written in the draft statement of the Basic National Security Policy — NSC 5810. I further recommend that you non-concur in the footnote which refers to paragraph 14 and which recommends deferral of decision.

N.F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Memorandum From Twining to McElroy

Washington, April 25, 1958

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810) (C).

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their divergent views regarding a draft statement of policy on the above subject, prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 1 May 1958.

2. The majority view submitted by the Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps is attached as Appendix “A”. The minority view submitted by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, is attached as Appendix “B”.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

N. F. Twining
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix A

Washington, undated

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS: AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5810) (c)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps have reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5810) which was prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 1 May 1958.

2. From a military point of view, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of Naval Operations; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps consider that certain changes are necessary in order to provide a Basic National Security Policy which is responsive to the present world situation. Over the past several years, a trend in world affairs has developed which has increased Sino-Soviet power and influence, both actually and relatively. The United States, as the leader of the Free World and the heart of its collective security system, has reached a point where we must take action to halt and reverse this trend or resign ourselves to its indefinite continuation.

3. Our national military strategy must not only be designed to cope with the condition of nuclear parity in an era of mutual deterrence to general war, but it must be a strategy which attracts rather than repels the rest of the Free World if we are to maintain an international environment in which the United States can sustain its fundamental values and institutions.

4. Basic National Security Policy must provide the guidance for strong Free World leadership. Four issues are fundamental:

a. Initiative and an Active Policy. The United States must act to seize the initiative, thus shifting the onus of counteraction to the Communist leaders. Initiative is required in all fields but particularly in the political and economic, where it must be supported by appropriate military measures. The adroit employment, particularly movement, of U.S. or allied forces as a cold war operation might spell the difference between success or failure of a bold political move. The United States must exert active pressures against the Sino-Soviet Bloc wherever and whenever possible in order to disrupt Communist designs for world domination. Pressures should specifically include efforts to splinter and reduce the existing Communist structure.

b. Mutual Deterrence. Relative nuclear parity has already made the policy of massive nuclear retaliation unacceptable as anything but a deterrent to total nuclear warfare. Both the United States and the USSR will be increasingly deterred from implementing such a policy except in response to an attack on them of such proportions as to threaten their national survival, since its implementation could only result in mutual destruction.

c. Nuclear Weapons Policy. Because of mutual deterrence and the dangers of limited conflicts broadening into general war, the United States can no longer base its national policy on placing main reliance on atomic weapons for situations short of general war. In such situations the United States must maintain forces capable of reacting to aggression with either nuclear or non-nuclear means in the most effective manner to achieve U.S. national objectives while at the same time minimizing the risk of general war.

d. Limited War. It is important that our policy recognize that limited aggression is essentially any war in which neither the national survival of the United States nor that of the USSR is at stake, that it may include direct conflict between U.S. and Soviet forces, and that it may be intense and of significant duration. The objective may require a military victory, in the traditional sense, or some lesser solution which is to our net advantage. Since limited aggression is increasingly the more probable form of conflict which we must face, national policy should put increasing emphasis on suitable ready forces with a flexible combat capability and provided with transportation which insures their strategic mobility.

5. It is recommended that the four objectives outlined above, together with the implementing textual changes in NSC 5810 which are attached as the Annex hereto, form the basis of your position on Basic National Security Policy.

Annex to Appendix A

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

(Changes indicated in the usual manner)

1. Page 2, paragraph 5, second sentence—Change to read: “5 . . . . (b) in a time of relative nuclear parity and increased Soviet political and economic aggressiveness, to place greater emphasis on on non-military political and economic measures and on the military capability to support these measures and to deal with limited Communist aggression.”

REASON: Relative nuclear parity increases the likelihood of limited aggression and requires a military capability to deal with it and to support more active U.S. political and economic policies.

2. Page 3, paragraph 6—Insert as subparagraph 6b and reletter subsequent subparagraphs:

b. To apply pressures actively against the Sino-Soviet Bloc whenever and wherever possible in order to disrupt Communist designs for expansion and aggression, to reduce Communist influence and control, and to further U.S. objectives.

REASON: U.S. policies should be designed to mount a psychological, economic, and political offensive against the Bloc as well as to shore up the defenses of the Free World against a comparable Bloc offensive.

3. Page 4, paragraph 8, last sentence—Change to read: “Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced by obvious U.S. ability and willingness to meet a wide range of military contingencies with means appropriate to the objective at stake that aggression will not serve their interest; that it will not pay.”

REASON: To meet the flexible Communist strategy, the U.S. deterrent must include both a nuclear retaliatory force to deter total war and flexible ready forces to deter or deal with limited aggression; and above all, must be made credible to Communist leaders and our Allies by an unmistakable U.S. willingness to employ military force of a quality and degree appropriate to the situation.

4. Page 4, paragraph 9—Change to read:

“9. The higher purpose of military strategy must be to affect the will of the enemy, not merely to destroy him. The U.S. recognizes the increasing probability of long term mutual deterrence with respect to general war and the reduced political usefulness of massive retaliation as a means of insuring the security of the Free World. In this era of mutual deterrence to general war, massive retaliation can only be used as a threat, and in the event of general war, in reprisal. To deter the Communists from the use of their military power, the If this If this purpose is to be achieved U.S. and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and effectively severely with Communist overt aggression in any possible its various form, including general war. and to prevail in general war should one develop. In addition the. This deterrent is much more likely to be effective if the U.S. and its major allies show that they are united in their determination to use military force when necessary against such any aggression.”

REASON: As set forth in Section A of NSC 5810 the United States must recognize the existence of a mutual deterrence to general war and the reduced political usefulness of massive retaliation as the principal means of insuring the security of the Free World.

5. Page 4, subparagraph 10a—Change to read:

“10. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons. to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view, and to Nuclear weapons will be used them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use in either general or limited war is as determined by the President.”

REASON: It is essential that U.S. policy, in an era of relative nuclear parity, be extremely flexible and provide for adoption of whatever forces and weapons best serve U.S. interests.

6. Page 5, paragraph 13—Change to read:

“13. In carrying out our aim of deterring general war, the United States must develop and maintain under its own control, as part of its military forces, sufficient its effective nuclear retaliatory power and must keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet Knockout blow; even by surprise capability to reduce the Soviet powercomplex to impotency. To the degree that it approaches invulnerability, this force can be made progressively smaller without any decrease in the certainty of its availability for effective application. Security of the deterrent force is a crucial factor in obviating the requirement for immediate or automatic political decision as to its use. Thus, it would minimize the risk of hasty or ill-considered decision in time of crisis. The United States must also develop and maintain adequate military and non-military programs for continental defense. Defensive elements must be premised on acceptance of the fact that general war would probably result in large scale damage to the United States. The national effort devoted to defense should provide for early warning, defense of retaliatory forces, and a level of defense in vital areas sufficient to require a significant enemy effort to overcome it, leaving no single threat totally unopposed. So long as the Soviet leaders are uncertain of their ability to neutralize the U.S. nuclear retaliatory power, there is little reason to expect them deliberately to initiate general war or actions which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war, and thereby endanger the survival of the USSR.”

REASON: To establish terms of reference for the deterrent force and defense requirements.

7. Page 5, paragraph 14—Delete and substitute the following:

“14. a. There is a steadily increasing probability that armed conflicts of the future will be limited wars. Limited war can be defined as an armed conflict in which U.S. national survival is not directly at stake. It would probably be characterized by mutually accepted limitations on objectives, locale, weapons and participants. While maintaining our nuclear capability to deter general war, and during a period of relative nuclear parity, it becomes increasingly important further to develop and maintain a capability to oppose limited military aggression wherever U.S. security interests are involved.

b. In each case of limited military aggression, the United States must determine whether: (1) vital U.S. interests require the defeat of such limited aggression by prompt and resolute application of whatever degree of force is necessary, even at the risk that major Communist counteraction may spread the hostilities into general war, or whether (2) U.S. interests would be served by applying only that degree of force judged necessary to confine the hostilities to a limited area and to the objective of restoring the status quo ante, thereby seeking to minimize the risk that major Communist counteraction would spread the hostilities into general war.

c. Within the total U.S. military forces, therefore, there must be included ready forces which, with help as may realistically be expected from allied forces, are adequate (1) to present a deterrent to limited military aggression, and (2) while minimizing the risk of general war, to defeat or hold, in conjunction with indigenous forces, any such limited aggression, pending the application of such additional U.S. and allied power as may be deemed necessary to suppress the limited aggression. Such ready forces must be highly mobile and suitably deployed, recognizing that some degree of mal-deployment from the viewpoint of general war must be accepted. Military planning for U.S. forces to oppose limited military aggression will be based on a flexible and selective capability, including an appropriate nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President.”

REASON: This paragraph is a realistic and workable policy for the United States in an era when Soviet ability to deliver a massive nuclear attack on the United States will provide a strong deterrent to such an attack by the United States, except in retaliation. It properly emphasizes the increasing importance of further developing and maintaining the capability, including a nuclear capability, to oppose limited aggression, and recognizes that limited aggression may occur wherever our potential enemies see advantage in such action. Furthermore, it allows much needed political flexibility in that it does not require in advance that the United States, once committed to action in a limited war, must apply unlimited force to achieve military victory regardless of consequences, but leaves the United States free to fight for a limited objective if such is the best course under the conditions then existing.

8. Page 7, paragraph 19—add new last sentence to read:

“In addition to the foregoing, the United States should be prepared to provide limited military assistance to uncommitted nations as required to prevent such nations from seeking and obtaining military assistance from Communist sources and thus falling within the Communist sphere of influence.”

REASON: To establish a policy intended to avoid repetition of difficulties in Egypt, Indonesia, etc.

9. Page 8, paragraph 20, third sentence—Change to read:

“. . . . At the same time its must be recognized that the attainment of relative nuclear parity by the USSR will probably result in Sino-Soviet Bloc actions at a higher level of provocation than in the past which will confront us with increasingly difficult decisions. Therefore, the United States. . . .”

REASON: A logical consequence of nuclear parity is an increasingly provocative attitude on the part of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Aggressive actions stemming therefrom will pose an ambiguous threat to national security. Nonetheless, they must be resolutely opposed at the moment of their initiation, if the Free World is to avoid a steady attrition of its position.

Appendix B

Washington, undated

VIEW OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

on

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (C)

1. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, has reviewed the draft statement of policy (NSC 5810) which was prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, 1 May 1958.

2. It is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, that the majority position on NSC 5810 is suitable as a basic statement of United States policy. In reaching this conclusion the following areas have been especially considered:

a. Over-all U.S. Strategy. The basic U.S. security objective should continue to be the maintenance of a position of military strength permitting aggressive political action to achieve, by peaceful means, U.S. national objectives. NSC 5810, as written, is a comprehensive and adequate development of this objective. It provides a comprehensive basis for the development and execution of those programs in the political, economic, military and other fields necessary to give meaning to the basic strategy. The supporting military forces and tasks, and their priorities, necessary to provide the position of strength to permit the exercise of U.S. initiative in world affairs, are correctly and adequately described. In this connection, in the annual report to the National Security Council on the Status of U.S. Military Programs as of 30 June 1957, the Department of Defense indicated, based on Joint Chiefs of Staff advice, that forces are in fact in existence to fulfill the military commitments and the basic objectives outlined in basic policy.²

b. Nuclear Parity. The Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force agrees that we may be approaching a position of relative nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR. As stated in national policy, the basic threat to U.S. security is the Communist Bloc determination and ability effectively to direct rapidly growing military and economic power toward the objective of world domination. The most dangerous military manifestation of this threat is the possibility of general war. The over-riding military requirement thus continues to be the development and maintenance of adequate and safe-guarded nuclear retaliatory power. As the USSR approaches relative nuclear parity with the United States it becomes even more essential to deter conflict. The United States must ensure that the Soviet leaders recognize as unacceptable the consequences of retaliation for actions which the United States considers threaten its security.

c. Nuclear Weapons Usage. Primary reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and for selective use in actual conflict, is the keystone of U.S. policy and posture. This concept is the only course of action open to the United States compatible with the economic well-being of the United States and the free world, and hence with the preservation of our fundamental values and institutions.

d. Limited Aggression. With regard to the position taken by the majority of the Planning Board in connection with paragraph 14 of NSC 5810, it is the view of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force that review of this paragraph should be deferred pending the State-Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff consideration of limited aggression now in progress. However, a valid statement of national policy in this regard is a continuing essential; therefore, current national guidance, as repeated in paragraph 14, NSC 5810, should remain in effect for the interim. In this connection the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force agrees that within the total United States military forces there must be a capability of deterring or, if necessary, defeating, local aggression with forces able also to contribute in general war. This requirement has existed and will continue to exist regardless of forecasts as to relative probabilities of local aggression requiring United States military intervention. With respect to existing U.S. limited aggression capabilities, as of 30 June 1957, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred in the Department of Defense advice to the National Security Council that “the United States has ready forces capable of responding selectively and flexibly to local aggression in peripheral areas of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and to carry out initial general war tasks.”³

3. It is recommended that the foregoing form the basis of the Department of Defense position on NSC 5810 at the National Security Council meeting on 1 May 1958.

1. Source: JCS views on NSC 5810. Top Secret. 12 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File.
2. NSC 5720, Part 1. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. NSC 5720, Part 1. [Footnote is in the original.]